

JOINT AUDIT AND SCRUTINY PANEL

THURSDAY 30 JUNE 2016 at 2.00 PM
FORCE HEADQUARTERS, SHERWOOD LODGE, ARNOLD,
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE NG5 8PP

Membership
Stephen Charnock (Chair)
Leslie Ayoola
John Brooks
Peter McKay
Philip Hodgson

A G E N D A

1. Election of Chair
2. Apologies for absence
3. Declarations of interest by Panel Members and Officers (see notes below)
4. To agree the minutes of the previous meeting held on 11 February 2016
5. IPCC investigations
6. Force Improvement Activity
7. Professional Standards Confidential Reporting Procedure
8. Anti-Fraud and Corruption Policy – review of compliance (Oct 2015 – March2016)
9. Verbal Update on Regional Assurance work

10. Draft Group Annual Governance Statement 2015-16 - Appendix A to be tabled
11. Internal Audit - annual assurance and performance report
12. Update on the close of accounts 2015-16 – to be tabled
13. External Audit progress report
14. Internal audit progress report
15. Audit & Inspection Report
16. Risk Register – external review
17. PCC Update report
18. Work plan and meeting schedule

NOTES

- Members of the **public are welcome to attend** to observe this meeting
- For **further information** on this agenda, please contact the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner on 0115 9670999 extension 801 2005 or email nopcc@nottinghamshire.pnn.police.uk
- A **declaration of interest** could involve a private or financial matter which could be seen as having an influence on the decision being taken, such as having a family member who would be directly affected by the decision being taken, or being involved with the organisation the decision relates to. Contact the Democratic Services Officer: alison.fawley@nottsc.gov.uk for clarification or advice prior to the meeting.

NOTTINGHAMSHIRE POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER
County Hall, West Bridgford, Nottingham, NG2 7QP

MINUTES
OF THE MEETING OF THE
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER
JOINT AUDIT & SCRUTINY PANEL
HELD ON THURSDAY 11 FEBRUARY 2016
COMMITTEE ROOM C, COUNTY HALL,
NOTTINGHAM NG2 7QP
COMMENCING AT 2.00 PM

MEMBERSHIP

(A - denotes absent)

Mr Stephen Charnock (Chair)
Mr Leslie Ayoola
Mr John Brooks
A Dr Phil Hodgson
Mr Peter McKay

OFFICERS PRESENT

Paddy Tipping	Police and Crime Commissioner
Charlotte Radford	Chief Finance Officer, OPCC
Chris Eyre	Chief Constable, Notts. Police
Brian Welch	Mazaars
Simon Lacey	KPMG (External Audit)
Andrew Cardoza	KPMG (External Audit)
Alison Fawley	Democratic Services, Notts. County Council

1. APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE

Apologies for absence were received from Phil Hodgson and Paul Dawkins.

2) DECLARATIONS OF INTERESTS BY MEMBERS AND OFFICERS

None.

The Chair reminded Panel members of their duty to ensure their declarations of interests on the website were up to date.

3) MINUTES OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

The minutes of the last meeting held on 10 December 2015, having been circulated to all Members, were taken as read and were confirmed and were signed by the Chair.

AGENDA ORDER

The Panel agreed to take the items on External Audit Plan 2016, Internal Audit progress report, Assurance Mapping and Internal Audit Annual Plan 2016-17 earlier on the agenda.

4) EXTERNAL AUDIT PLAN 2016

Simon Lacey introduced the report which provided Panel members with details of the proposed External Audit Plan for 2016-17 covering the audit of accounts for 2015-16.

During discussions the following points were made:

- Materiality had been reduced from 2% to 1.5% for the proposed audit.
- Planned audit fees had reduced by 25% from the previous year but assurance was needed from Finance Teams that information would be readily available and that working papers were cross referenced and accurate if the fee was to remain at that level.
- Charlie Radford discussed the measures that were being taken in order to ensure that Finance teams were ready for the shorter timescales in 2018.

RESOLVED 2015/050

- 1) That the report be noted.
- 2) That the External Audit Plan be approved.

5) INTERNAL AUDIT PROGRESS REPORT

Brian Welch introduced the report which provided members with an update on progress against the Internal Audit Annual Plan and discussed the findings from audits completed to date.

During discussions the following point was made:

- An audit of Core Financials had received a limited assurance opinion. Charlie Radford felt that the opinion was justified but nonetheless found it hard to comprehend as this had never happened before. A meeting had been held on 28 January to discuss this and although there was work to be done, the meeting was positive and actions would be taken to MFSS management board. Paul Dawkins is the Chair of MFSS management board and also sits on the executive board and he will be a driver in pushing the work forward.

RESOLVED 2015/051

That the Panel had received assurance from the audits being undertaken and planned.

7) ASSURANCE MAPPING 2016-17

The Chief Constable introduced the report which provided the Panel with an overview of assurance mapping for quarters 2 & 3 2015-16.

The Chair had requested this item as he was concerned that the levels of defence had been reduced to two although it was proposed to reintroduce a third level during the next quarter which would focus on management assurance.

The Chief Constable explained the circumstances that had caused the delay including issues with the alliance and appropriate staffing. He confirmed that key personnel were being appointed across the alliance with the necessary staffing structures underneath. It was expected that all three forces would do this in a common way as part of driving out efficiency savings.

RESOLVED 2015/057

That the report be noted.

6) INTERNAL AUDIT ANNUAL PLAN 2016-17

Brian Welch introduced the report which informed the Panel of the proposed plan of work for 2016-17. He discussed with the Panel how the plan would meet statutory requirements for auditing key financial systems and comply with the need to audit systems where there had been significant change in year. He explained that other audits would be based upon risks within the strategic risk register and that advisory audits would be undertaken to ensure the smooth running of both legal entities.

During discussions the following points were raised:

- Stephen Charnock discussed how the Panel fulfils its functions and wondered what the external view of this was. The Panel referred to the

Nottinghamshire terms of reference document and commented that this varied across different Panels, for example some undertook scrutiny functions whilst others did not.

- Brian Welch advised that he was looking at other Panels to gauge best practice.

RESOLVED 2015/052

That the audit plan for 2016-17 be approved.

8) STRATEGIC RISK MANAGEMENT REPORT (2015-16 Q3)

The Chief Constable introduced the report which provided the Panel with an up to date picture of strategic risk management to the end of quarter 3, 2015-16 across Nottinghamshire Police and the Nottinghamshire Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.

During discussions the following points were raised:

- A cyber-attack had happened nine months ago and was to the public facing site which is separate to other systems and had not presented any risk to them.
- The A19 case was scheduled at the Court of Appeal for January 2017 and there could possibly be a further appeal to the Supreme Court.
- The report is taken through the Force Executive Board where controls & plans are discussed and the Chief Constable was confident that controls were in place to deliver in the savings required next financial year.

RESOLVED 2015/053

- 1) That the current approach to strategic risk management be noted.
- 2) That the Panel had received assurance as to the effectiveness of strategic risk management within Nottinghamshire Police and the Nottinghamshire Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.

9) BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT REPORT

The Chief Constable introduced the report which provided the Panel with an up to date picture of business continuity arrangements within Nottinghamshire Police.

RESOLVED 2015/054

- 1) That the current state of business management continuity within the Force be noted.
- 2) That the Panel had received assurance as to the effectiveness of the Force's arrangements.

10) PUBLICATION SCHEME MONITORING, REVIEW AND ASSURANCE

Charlie Radford introduced the report which provided the Panel with assurance that the Nottinghamshire Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner was working in full compliance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and The Elected Local Policing Bodies (Specified Information) Order 2011.

RESOLVED 2015/055

That the report be noted

11) NOTTINGHAMSHIRE POLICE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND DATA PROTECTION UPDATE

The Chief Constable introduced the report which provided the Panel with data on the legislative compliance of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Data Protection Act 1998.

RESOLVED 2015/056

That the report be noted.

12) AUDIT AND INSPECTION REPORT

The Chief Constable introduced the report which provided the Panel with an update of the progress made against recommendations arising from audits and inspections that had taken place within the Force.

RESOLVED 2015/058

- 1) That the progress made against audit and inspection recommendations be noted.
- 2) That details of forthcoming audits and inspections be noted.

13) PRECEPT AND BUDGET REPORTS 2016-17

Charlie Radford introduced the report which provided the Panel with details of the approved budgets and strategies for 2016-17 and the medium term.

During discussions the following points were raised:

- It was confirmed that the precept and budget had been agreed by the Police and Crime Panel on 1 February 2016.
- The debate over a new funding formula was ongoing but it was hoped that it would be in place by April 2017.
- Plans are more robust this year to make savings as reserves are at a critical level.
- Work is ongoing re rank structures. Concern was expressed about the effect of this on staff morale and the Panel were informed that staff welfare was ongoing. Positive engagement was taking place with staff unions.
- There were tight controls regarding use of overtime and MFSS gave a visibility that had not been previously available and anomalies could be dealt with.
- Progress had been disappointing with some capital projects particularly IT but there were proposed big changes in the pipeline.
- Implementing the NICHE system had given continuity of systems and would be key in delivering future capability.

RESOLVED 2015/059

That the report be noted.

14. WORK PLAN AND MEETING SCHEDULE

RESOLVED: 2015/060

That the report be noted.

The meeting closed at 4.15pm

CHAIR

For Information	
Public/Non Public*	Public
Report to:	Audit and Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	June 2016
Report of:	IPCC Investigations, recommendations and actions
Report Author:	DCI Murphy
E-mail:	paul.murphy@nottinghamshire.pnn.police.uk
Other Contacts:	nicola.thomas@nottinghamshire.pnn.police.uk
Agenda Item:	05

IPCC INVESTIGATIONS

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To inform the PCC in respect of complaint and conduct matters which have been referred by Nottinghamshire Police to the IPCC during the relevant period 1st October 2015 to 31st March 2016, together with relevant recommendations and actions.

2. Recommendations

- 2.1 That the Panel receive assurance from the processes in place relating to IPCC investigations as detailed within the report.

3. Reasons for Recommendations

- 3.1 To provide the PCC with relevant information and oversight in respect of cases that Nottinghamshire Police refers to the IPCC

4. Referral Volume and Demand

4.1 The data summary below outlines:

- Cases referred to the IPCC during the relevant period.
- All cases finalised by during the relevant period

It includes a breakdown of how the IPCC determined primacy of investigations referred. Details of referred cases are attached at Appendix A.

Referred	Total	Complaint	Conduct	Miscellaneous
Cases referred	35	15	7	13
Compared to previous period	41 (-17%)			
Mandatory referral	34			
Voluntary referral	1			
Supervised Investigation	0			
Independent Investigation	3	1	2	0
Local Investigation	26	14	4	8
Force Deal	6	0	1	5

<i>Finalised</i>	
All cases finalised	19
Finalised "No Action"	15
Finalised "Upheld"	1
Finalised "Not Upheld"	1

4.2 The following is a description of those cases finalised outlining the nature of the complaint or conduct and the outcome.

	Circumstance	Outcome
1	Allegations that excessive force used during arrest - suspected heart attack whilst in custody.	Local Resolution with consent. No appeal, case finalised.
2	Allegation that incorrect advice given by call handler to a neighbour with concerns and that police failed to take appropriate action.	Review of circumstances carried out. Local Resolution with consent. No appeal.
3	Complainant alleges that the officer's opinion about the RTC that he attended was because he was black.	IPCC decision for local investigation. Local Resolution, no appeal received.
4	Failed to report member of public for summons therefore perverting the course of justice.	Reviewed, matter is subject to an independent investigation by the IPCC. Special Case Hearing held and officer dismissed without notice.
5	Attempt to incite a minor into sexual activity	Matter subject to Local investigation – Investigation NFA, offender deceased.
6	Officer failed to adequately supervise the detained person whilst in a holding cell in the custody suite – as a result the person was able to recover drugs hidden and swallow them	Independent IPCC investigation conducted – no case to answer. Recommendations in relation to the holding cell.
7	Officers attending an incident – upon arrival the male had climbed on top of a roof. Whilst awaiting the fire brigade the male who was in drink has tried lowering himself down falling onto the air conditioning unit injuring himself.	IPCC decision for local investigation. No complaint or conduct matters identified.
8	Dog bite incident	IPCC decision for local investigation. No complaint or conduct matters identified.
9	Death following police contact	IPCC decision for local investigation. Local investigation with Coroner's File. No complaint - case finalised.
10	Whilst making an arrest an injury sustained to the elbow	IPCC decision that the matter should be subject to local investigation. No complaint – case finalised.
11	Individual recalled to prison – upon arrest at home address he has jumped out of an upstairs window breaking his wrist	Initial referral decision from IPCC for independent investigation. This was reviewed in short space of time and remitted for local investigation. No complaint made and management review identified no issues of police misconduct or organisational learning.

12	Serious injury following police contact – individual self-harmed and then jumped from a bridge, not hit by any vehicles but serious injuries sustained.	IPCC decision that the matter should be subject to local investigation. No complaint – case finalised.
13	Death following police contact	IPCC decision for local investigation. No complaint or conduct identified; Coroner's file submitted.
14	Overdose taken following bail for indecency with children	IPCC decision that the matter should be subject to local investigation. No misconduct identified, no complaint – case finalised.
15	MISPER found deceased of possible overdose	IPCC decision for local investigation. No complaint, conduct or organisational learning identified.
16	Incident reported involving a fight between two males – police attend finding subject hiding in garden, jumps over a wall resulting in a broken ankle	IPCC decision for local investigation. Divisional investigation on allegations of fight. No complaint, conduct or organisational learning identified.
17	Officers attend drugs/mental health incident, Subject later jumps from upstairs window	IPCC decision for local investigation. No complaint or conduct identified.
18	Police attend incident where subject has locked himself in the bathroom with a knife – officers force door and find subject with a cut to wrist and neck	IPCC decision for local investigation. No complaint – case finalised.

4.3 Based on the above information it is asserted that Nottinghamshire Police maintains a good application of the IPCC Statutory Guidance having due regard to compliance with voluntary and mandatory referrals. Improvements are being made in operational relations with the IPCC; Nottinghamshire Police seek to ensure clarity in primacy of investigation at the earliest opportunity including the setting of terms of reference, victim & family liaison. Protocols are developing for an operational briefing with IPCC as soon as it is declared an independent investigation; this is essential to ensure smooth transition of command, secure & preserve evidence and maintain public confidence.

4.4 Emerging themes of cases referred to the IPCC are recognised as areas of opportunity for organisational learning (see Audit Scrutiny Report: Organisational Learning). Current themes include:

- Police contact with persons identified as being in a state of “excited delirium”; a clinical term used to describe persons who may be affected and distressed from forms of substance misuse. Police officers in attendance have been focussed on helping distressed people and at times that contact occurs jointly with Paramedics. It is important to remind of the role of Constable in saving life and where relevant the priority of attending officers will be to support people at risk of harm.
- Injuries to wrists and ankles from persons fleeing police contact. Linking this to injuries sustained from non-compliant persons wearing handcuffs, work has started with Training & Development to develop advisory videos for use with the public to help explain recognised police use of force tactics including handcuffs. It is envisaged that this information may assist in managers when dealing with complaints about injuries sustained while in police contact.

5 Financial Implications and Budget Provision

- 5.1 There are no specific financial implications in respect of this report. The Directorate is aware of its responsibilities in relation to 'Spending Money Wisely' and the information within this report exemplifies approaches to manage resources effectively.

6 Human Resources Implications

- 6.1 PSD resources are under constant review, ensuring that the department has both the capacity and capability to meet demand. Where additional resources have been required these have been authorised and temporary staff recruited where necessary.

7 Equality Implications

- 7.1 No specific implications

8 Risk Management

- 8.1 It is essential the public have confidence in the service Nottinghamshire Police provide.
- 8.2 Organisational learning is a whole organisation responsibility which helps to mitigate risk. Professional Standards Directorate contributes to risk management through the sharing of learning and encouragement of change across the organisation where appropriate.

9 Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

- 9.1 IPCC Investigations ensure that the public can have confidence in the independence, accountability and integrity, of the most serious of cases, most notably Death or Serious Injury.
- 9.2 It is the responsibility of the force to ensure mandatory and voluntary referrals are made in a timely fashion and that appropriate support is given to IPCC investigators. This delivers professional services in support of the organisations PROUD values.

10 Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

- 10.1 None

11 Details of outcome of consultation

- 11.1 None

12. Appendices

- 12.1 Appendix A - Cases referred to the IPCC 1st October 2015 to 31st March 2016.

Appendix A

APPENDIX A		Summary of IPCC Referrals between 01 October 2015 to 31 March 2016		
Referred To IPCC	Reason Referred	Mode of referral		Investigation Status
			IPCC Decision	
02.10.15	Detained Person in holding cell stated that he had swallowed heroin	Mandatory	Independent	Finalised
27.10.15	Male fallen off roof whilst police present	Mandatory	Force Deal	Finalised
11.11.15	Dog bite injuries	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
30.11.15	Death following police contact	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
18.12.15	Wrist injury whilst in custody involving custody Sergeant	Mandatory	Local	Live
30.12.15	Police vehicle involved in an RTC responding to an incident	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
05.01.16	Injury sustained from a fall whilst being arrested	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
21.01.16	Injury following arrest	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
15.01.16	Serious injury following police contact	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
01.02.16	Death following police contact	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
09.02.16	Overdose following police bail	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
10.02.16	Missing person	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
22.02.16	Police chase resulting in broken leg	Mandatory	Force Deal	Finalised
22.02.16	Cadet arrested on suspicion of supplying controlled drugs	Mandatory	Force Deal	Finalised
02.03.16	Serious injury following police contact	Voluntary	Force Deal	Live
18.03.16	Injury following police contact	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
12.11.15	Serious assault	Mandatory	Force Deal	Finalised
26.11.15	Serious assault	Mandatory	Local	SJ
16.12.15	Serious assault	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
14.01.16	Incorrect advice given by police staff in relation to concerns that a member of public had re a neighbour	Mandatory	Local	Live
02.02.16	Discrimination	Voluntary	Local	Finalised
29.02.16	Discrimination	Mandatory	Local	SJ
29.02.16	Dog bite injuries	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
08.03.16	Serious injury whilst in handcuffs	Mandatory	Local	Live
10.03.16	Wrist injury whilst in custody	Mandatory	Independent	Live
		Mandatory	Local	Live

10.11.15	Serious assault	Mandatory	Local	SJ
08.12.15	Racist/sexist comments towards members of staff	Mandatory	Local	Live
03.11.15	Serious pursuit resulting in RTC and injuries	Mandatory	Independent	Live
15.12.15	Perverting the course of justice	Mandatory	Local	Live
26.12.15	Death or serious injury following police contact	Mandatory	Force Deal	Finalised
10.12.15	Serious sexual offence	Mandatory	Local	Finalised
29.03.16	RTC involving police resulting in serious injury	Mandatory	Local	Live
21.12.15	Death following police contact	Mandatory	Local	Live
16.03.16	Discrimination	Mandatory	Local	Live
02.11.15	Perverting the course of justice	Mandatory	Local	Finalised

For Information	
Public/Non Public*	Public
Report to:	Audit and Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	June 2016
Report of:	FORCE IMPROVEMENT ACTIVITY, LESSONS LEARNED MONITORING, IPCC LESSONS LEARNED REPORT
Report Author:	DCI MURPHY
E-mail:	paul.murphy@nottinghamshire.pnn.police.uk
Other Contacts:	nicola.thomas@nottinghamshire.pnn.police.uk
Agenda Item:	6

FORCE IMPROVEMENT ACTIVITY

1. Purpose of the Report

- To inform the PCC in respect of force improvement activity, lessons learned monitoring, and the implementation of learning from the IPCC 'lessons learned' bulletins during the relevant period – October 2015 to March 2016.

2. Recommendations

- That the Audit and Scrutiny Panel notes the report.

3. Reasons for Recommendations

- To provide the PCC with relevant information and oversight of Nottinghamshire Police response to lessons learned as a result of public complaints and internal conduct matters.

4. Context

- 4.1 The identification of organisational learning within the context of Professional Standards is sourced through assessment of three key business areas:
 - Complaints from members of the public
 - Police conduct
 - Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)
- 4.2 The strategic aim is to ensure best practice across the organisation by sharing knowledge and learning with relevant business areas.
- 4.3 In addition to organisational learning, individual accountability is expected of specific officers through "management action" by their local leader.
- 4.4 Monitoring and evaluation of this approach is organised through the national police complaints recording system, "Centurion".
- 4.5 Where learning is considered relevant to the wider organisation it is shared with respective discipline heads including for example Learning & Development,

Custody or Contact Management. Learning is also shared through the Police Intranet and “Keeping You Informed” bulletins. Discipline heads are invited to review current practice against specific learning and if appropriate, deliver changes to policy and practice.

- 4.6 Governance and oversight of PSD organisational is secured at the ‘*Professional Standards, Integrity and Ethics Board*’ Chaired by Deputy Chief Constable Fish.
- 4.7 Monitoring, evaluation and reporting mechanisms have recently been developed which will enhance the governance of learning and development at the *Professional Standards, Integrity and Ethics Board*. This scheme improves clarity of ownership for learning across a range of business disciplines as appropriate.

5. Learning from Complaints, Conduct, IPCC

- 5.1 Since the last reporting period, there have been no new organisation learning points identified within PSD. Work continues however through the Organisational Learning Reference Group which is focussing on previously identified points of Custody procedures (care of detained persons) and management and control of property seized by the police. The strategic leads working with PSD on these business areas are Chief Inspector Phil Baker and Maria Fox respectively.

5.6 IPCC Learning

Three Learning Lesson Bulletins have been released by the IPCC since October 2015 (see Appendix 1, 2 & 3). Each bulletin has been shared with Departmental and BCU leads inviting consideration as to how the evidence can be used to inform business locally. They are also available for access through the police intranet, linked through the professional standards section.

- 5.7 Highlights from the bulletins include the following topics.

Topic	Questions for policy makers/managers
Missing delivery Driver	Have your systems been set up to prompt officers to review incidents involving missing persons after a certain amount of time?
Abuse of position	If a complaint about inappropriate sexual conduct is made, would this automatically trigger a review of the individual’s complaint history, IT use, timekeeping and patterns of overall behaviour.
Managing a pursuit	What steps has your police force taken to make officers and staff aware of the general principles contained in the Authorised Professional Practice (APP) on Police Pursuits (2013)?
Fatal Traffic Collision	What guidance does your force give investigators on securing evidence from on board data recorders?
Detention of a 17yr old	Does you force routinely use healthcare professionals as appropriate adults.
Response to child grooming concerns	When a parent reports concerns about a child being groomed, does you force routinely signpost them to organisations that can provide advice and support.

- 5.7.1 Operating protocols within Nottinghamshire Police have been reviewed against the IPCC challenge questions and remains satisfied that there is no significant risk from its current policy and practice.
- 5.7.2 In the previous report to the OPCC, reference was made of plans to carry out custody training on scenarios relating to death and serious injury while in police detention. This took place on May 18th. It was regarded as extremely successful and well received by the Custody Staff audience; lead by Criminal Justice and supported in attendance by PSD and the IPCC. With regional Police partners were present there an intention to widen this training across the strategic alliance and repeat it in Nottinghamshire.

6. Financial Implications and Budget Provision

- 6.1 No specific financial implications have been identified.

7. Human Resources Implications

- 7.1 No specific implications.

8. Equality Implications

- 8.1 No specific internal equality implications are identified. Learning around improving services to the vulnerable, the young and in respect of mental health services will enhance equality of service across the local communities.

8 Risk Management

- 9.1 The process as described ensures that learning is embedded in a way that mitigates against risk.

10. Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

- 10.1. Strategic Priority Theme 1: Protect, support and respond to victims, witnesses and vulnerable people.

11. Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

- 11.1 None.

12. Details of outcome of consultation

- 12.1 None

13. Appendices

13.1 Appendix A IPCC BULLETIN 24

13.2 Appendix B IPCC BULLETIN 25

13.3 Appendix C IPCC BULLETIN 26

Appendix A

LEARNING THE LESSONS

ASK YOURSELF:

Could it happen here?

www.ipcc.gov.uk/learning-the-lessons

Learning the Lessons bulletins summarise investigations conducted by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) or police forces where learning opportunities are identified. Police forces facing similar situations to those described can use the experience of other forces to improve their policies and practices. The bulletin challenges forces to ask "Could it happen here?"

Bulletin 24

October 2015

General

Issues covered in this bulletin:

Managing intelligence

Personal safety warnings (case 1)

Linking intelligence (cases 1, 2, 5)

Abandoned calls (case 2)

Concerns for welfare

Definition of missing persons (cases 3, 4)

Carrying out physical welfare checks (case 5)

Shift handovers (cases 4, 5)

Cross-border enquiries (case 4)

Dealing with vulnerable adults

Use of computer systems (case 6)

Risk assessment (case 7)

Monitoring officer activity (case 7)



Call
handling

Cases
2, 3, 4



Crime and
investigation

Cases
1, 5



Information
management

Cases
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6



Neighbourhood
policing

Cases
2, 3, 5, 7



Professional
standards

Cases
6, 7



Public
protection

Cases
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7



Roads
policing

Case
4


Contacting us

Please email learning@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk with any queries or to join our mailing list.

Case summaries

Managing intelligence

1 Threat to personal safety



A man was given a personal safety warning after he was arrested on suspicion of supplying a noxious substance to his partner, which resulted in her hospitalisation and a dispute with her family.

As part of this warning the man was told not to return home, visit his partner in hospital, meet any of her friends, or tell anyone his whereabouts.

The woman died in hospital a few days later. After her death, an arson attack was carried out on the property she had shared with the man.

The officers investigating the arson attack spoke to the officers dealing with the investigation into the events leading to the woman's hospital stay because the two incidents involved some of the same people. However, no attempt was made to link or oversee the two investigations.

The officer dealing with the arson attack was not told about the personal safety warning given to the man by any of the people he spoke to, nor was it recorded on any force systems.

The officer asked the force's intelligence unit to find out whether there was any available intelligence to identify the offenders. They later found out that the woman's son had made a threat to kill the man. Unfortunately, the officer was on leave when this information was sent to him.

The man was discovered dead a few days later. The woman's son and another man were later charged with his murder.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- How do you make sure that all of the officers involved in handling incidents involving a person served with a personal safety warning share information effectively, to help them deal with incidents in a joined-up way?
- What steps has your force taken to make sure that force systems are updated and contain

the latest information about people who have been served with personal safety warnings, and the level of current threat to them?

- How do you make sure that important intelligence that could lead to finding an offender does not go un-actioned because a member of staff is on leave?
- Where new intelligence is received while a member of staff is on leave and this intelligence alters a risk, what guidance do you give to officers to make sure that this information is taken forward in their absence?
- What guidance do you give to officers on reviewing personal safety warnings or risk assessments to make sure that the response remains appropriate to the level of risk identified?
- How is information about personal safety warnings stored so that it is easily accessible to relevant staff when needed?

Key questions for police officers/staff:

- Are you aware of all the systems you can use to find out more about the risk posed to people involved in ongoing investigations?
- Do you use out-of-office messages to direct people to your line manager or another colleague when you are un-contactable, or where information may be time critical?

Action taken by this police force:

- The force director of intelligence reviewed the personal safety warning policies and protocols. All personal safety warning/personal conduct notices must now be accompanied by a completed threat assessment document which must be entered on to the force data management system without delay.
- All parties subject to either a personal safety warning or personal conduct notice must now have an information marker attached to their Police National Computer (PNC) nominal record. The information marker must identify the nature of the threat, the threat assessment database reference, and the name of the senior investigating officer who owns the warning.
- Intelligence unit detective inspectors must now make sure that as part of the daily scanning process in divisional and force intelligence units,

all intelligence about persons or addresses with existing threat assessment documents, personal safety warnings, or personal conduct notices is immediately brought to the attention of the senior investigating officer with responsibility for that warning, or in their absence another person with responsibility for the warning. A review should be made of the threat assessment database, personal safety warning or personal conduct notice in light of the further intelligence received.

- Appropriate de-briefing and additional awareness training was held around risk and threat and personal safety warnings for officers and staff.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- Two sergeants and an inspector involved in the case received management action.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

Concerns for welfare

2 Dealing with abandoned calls



Around midnight police received a call from a member of the public who was concerned about a neighbour. The caller said that their neighbour was playing loud music and that he had suffered from fits in the past, and may be having a fit. Police and ambulance crews were sent. The ambulance arrived first but the crew could not get into the property and were unable to confirm the status of the man. A police control room operator phoned the man, spoke to him, and asked him to go and speak to the ambulance crew, which he agreed to do. After examining him the ambulance service called the police to say that they were no longer needed. The police log was then closed.

About an hour later the man called 999. While on the line, the operator could hear him apparently talking to himself and saying that he "was sick of people telling him how to live his life". The operator was concerned and discussed this with the police call handler who was unable to get any response from him. The call handler cleared the line and tried to call him back without success. A log was created and then sent to dispatch.

The log was accepted and linked with the log about the earlier call from the man's neighbour. The status of the call was changed from priority to resolved –

requiring no one to be sent as an ambulance had just attended and stood the police down. The log was then closed. No one from the police spoke to the man about this call and no attempt was made to get an update from the ambulance service.

Roughly an hour later the man again called 999, but this time said that he was going to hang himself. A log was created and police officers were sent to his home address. They forced entry and found the man hanging. He was taken to hospital but died a few days later.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- What advice does your force give to control room operators or dispatchers on dealing with calls where the caller is not talking with the operator, or where the call is abandoned? Is clear guidance available on when concerns about no response or a caller talking to themselves become a warning sign for mental health or distress?
- Does your force give advice to control room operators and dispatchers on dealing with repeat contacts from members of the public, and how to make sure that circumstances are not changing between contacts?
- Where you receive a call about an incident that has already been responded to by other agencies, for example the ambulance service, what guidance do you give to control room operators and dispatchers about finding out from these agencies what action has already been taken before deciding how to respond to the call or sending officers?

Action taken by this police force:

- The force accepted that it did not have a policy on how staff should deal with silent/abandoned 999 calls. This was taken forward as a priority and a force 'abandoned calls' procedure was developed.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- The police control room operator who downgraded the incident following the second call received management action.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

Classifying an incident as a concern for welfare



In the early hours of the morning staff from a hostel for the homeless called the police to report that a resident had failed to return before the 11pm curfew. Hostel staff told police that this was out of character and that the man was an alcoholic.

An incident log was opened and classified as concern for welfare, and graded for response within 24 hours. The incident was passed to a control room operator who checked the Police National Computer (PNC) and found a warning marker dating back four years about suicidal threats.

Officers on patrol were asked to keep a look out for the man, but over the next few hours there were no reported sightings.

Police called the hostel around 7am and were told that the man had still not returned. The incident log was updated with new information that the man was depressed. After this call, the control room operator requested via the duty inspector that the man be dealt with as a missing person.

Enquiries were made into the man's whereabouts and a risk assessment was completed which led to the man being assessed as a high-risk missing person due to his alcoholism and suicidal threats. The incident log was updated with this information.

Shortly after 11am a member of the public discovered the body of a man in a river. The man had fallen into the river while drunk.

Definition: missing person

At the time of the incident the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) defined a missing person as "anyone whose whereabouts is unknown whatever the circumstances of disappearance. They will be considered missing until located and their well being otherwise established".

In 2013 this definition was updated to state that: "anyone whose whereabouts cannot be established and where the circumstances are out of character or the context suggests the person may be subject of crime or at risk of harm to themselves or another."

Current guidance is available on the College of Policing website:

- The Management, Recording and Investigation of Missing Persons (2010)
- Interim Guidance on the Management, Recording and Investigation of Missing Persons (2013)

Key questions for policy makers/managers:


- What steps has your force taken to make sure that staff understand the national definition of a missing person?
- What action are operators working in the control room advised to take when they receive calls from members of the public expressing concern about someone's welfare? Would your force have treated the situation described in case 3 as a missing person case from the start?
- Do you provide call handlers with any prompts about information to collect from callers when they call to report someone is missing? Do you advise them to ask about any relevant health conditions and any out of character behaviour?
- Does your force have agreements with local hostels setting out how you will respond to incidents involving residents?

Action taken by this police force:

- Improvements have been made to the incident recording system. Selecting 'concern for welfare' now prompts the call handler to complete a further risk assessment matrix.
- The policy on recording incidents as a 'concern for welfare' has been updated.
- An ongoing training programme for control room staff has been put in place, focusing on the national definition of a missing person and what initial action should be taken when a missing person is reported.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- There were no misconduct or criminal outcomes for any of the police officers or police staff involved in the handling of this incident.

 [Click here](#) for a link to the full learning report

Missing delivery driver



Around 6pm on a Friday a lorry driver was reported missing by his employer after he did not complete his deliveries. The police were told that the man had made a delivery at 8am but had not been seen

since. His employer told police that this behaviour was very out of character for the man.

The man lived in France but worked in the UK.

The employer telephoned the police force in the area where his depot was based, but the man's last delivery was made in a different force area.

The call handler requested checks on the whereabouts of the man's vehicle and completed a risk assessment. Only one area of concern was found at that time – that this was out of character for the man. She then passed the incident onto the duty control room inspector. The duty control room inspector closed the incident, saying that the man was probably caught up in traffic.

The call handler was concerned that the incident had been closed, and told her supervisor. Her supervisor spoke with the duty inspector, but the case remained closed.

Just after 11pm the employer called again, asking for an update. The call handler left a voicemail and text message for the missing man, and placed a marker against his vehicle.

The employer called again at 9am and then 3.30pm the next day. By this time the shifts in the control room had changed. After the employer's second call that day the new duty inspector in the control room told an officer to visit the employer to get more information, and asked that the incident be passed to the police force where the missing man made his last delivery.

When questioned as part of the investigation into the police handling of this incident, the new duty inspector said he asked the officer to complete a missing person enquiry form, but the officer said he was not given this instruction. The result was that a missing person enquiry form was not completed when it should have been.

Shifts had now changed again in the control room and the duty inspector who initially handled the incident was now back on duty. The officer who visited the employer updated a radio operator with details of his visit. He then updated the incident log and called the duty inspector in the control room. The radio operator asked if the incident should be forwarded to the other police force, but the duty inspector said that he did not think anything more should be done as he did not think the man was missing. This inspector closed the incident log again.

Around noon on Sunday the employer called for an update; it was now 42 hours since the man had been

reported missing. The employer spoke to the station desk officer, who telephoned the other police force and found out that they were not aware of the incident. The station desk officer passed the incident log back to the control room, and at around 3.30pm the incident was forwarded to the other police force.

At 1.30pm on Monday a sergeant from the other force phoned and said he did not think this was a missing person incident for his police force, but should remain with the force who received the report.

An hour later a sergeant at the original police force agreed that his police force would take ownership of the enquiry. A risk assessment was carried out on the missing man, and the incident was appropriately graded as high risk.

In the mean time the employer had asked a friend to re-trace the route the man would have taken. At 9.30pm the same day, over three days after he was reported missing, the man was found dead in his vehicle at a service station, five miles away from the location of his last known delivery. The man had died of natural causes. The post mortem suggested that even an immediate police response would probably not have prevented his death.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- What guidance or training has your police force given to officers to make sure that key information is passed over when shifts change?
- Does your missing person policy give clear direction on where ownership lies in cross-border incidents?
- Have your systems been set up to prompt officers to review incidents involving missing persons after a certain amount of time?
- Where an incident is recorded as a missing person incident, do your systems offer any prompts to complete a missing person enquiry form?
- What steps are taken to make sure that instructions given via radio are auditable if necessary, for example where it is disputed that instructions were given?

Key questions for police officers/staff:

- Are you confident in going to a manager for a second opinion about a decision?
- If you disagree with the decision taken by a colleague to close an incident, do you feel comfortable challenging this?

- Are you aware of when your force requires a senior manager to be involved in decision making around reports of missing persons or concerns for welfare?

Action taken by this police force:


- The force missing person policy was updated to reflect national guidance on dealing with cross-border incidents.
- All officers were reminded of the need to complete missing person enquiry forms, regardless of the level of risk.
- The decision to purchase recording equipment for radios is being kept under review.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- The duty inspector who repeatedly closed the log received a final written warning for failing to follow force policy and national guidance.

Guidance: cross-border missing person

Guidance issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers on *Management, Recording and Investigation of Missing Persons (Second Edition) (2010)* emphasises that the police area that receives a missing person report should record it and carry out all necessary initial actions before transferring the report to another police area for investigation.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

Dealing with vulnerable adults

5 Acting on risks already identified



In the early hours of the morning two officers were sent to a phone box after a woman called the police, a scuffle was heard in the background and the call ended. The woman, who had a history of domestic abuse, was calling to report that her former partner had stolen her mobile phone and keys.

Officers went there but could not find the woman and attempts to contact her were unsuccessful.

A witness suggested that she was likely to be with her former partner. Officers did not visit the man's property to check if the woman was there, but focused their search on the local area. The officers

did not raise the alarm for abduction with their supervisor or consider starting a missing persons' investigation. Also, despite being told the woman had a risk management plan, the officers did not ask for further details.

The woman contacted the force saying that her former partner had given back her mobile phone and keys, and that she was safe at another address. She would not give any details. She was advised to call back if she had any further problems. The matter was not correctly tagged as a domestic abuse matter by the call handler. However, details of the call were given to the officers looking for the woman. Because of their concerns, they asked for someone to visit the woman the next morning. Neither the control room supervisor nor the duty inspector were told about the action taken.

No further investigatory options were considered, in particular the use of automatic number plate recognition to trace the partner's vehicle. The action to follow up with the woman was passed to the next shift without a formal handover, and was not reviewed at the next day's daily management meeting. It was filed for further action.

During the next five days the incident continued to be passed between shifts. The incident was reviewed twice by divisional supervisors but was not allocated to an officer to follow up.

The force was then alerted by a Women's Aid worker that the woman had not attended a pre-arranged meeting. Following further investigation the man's property was searched and the woman was found. The man was later arrested and charged with 14 counts of rape and offences relating to the woman's abduction. He was convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- How does your police force record that high risk management plans have been completed, and that relevant people can access them?
- How do you make sure that officers use high risk management plans as an intelligence source when dealing with relevant incidents?
- How do your control room staff/supervisors make sure that calls are not simply passed from shift to shift without positive intervention?
- Where a person could be at risk of harm, does your police force require officers to physically check on their welfare?

- Does your police force have a policy which details the length of time an incident log can be held without positive action?

Key questions for police officers/staff:

- What further action would you have taken in this situation to trace the woman?

Action taken by this police force:

- The force has reviewed their processes to make sure that where high risk management plans are created the risk is recorded on systems, visits are undertaken, and staff review any plans that are in place.
- Duty inspectors are now asked to provide written handovers which include specific reference to incidents where managing risk is a concern.
- A new post has been created to quality-check the response to reports of potential abuse.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- The two officers attending the original report received management action for missed lines of enquiry and failure to update their supervisor.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

6 Abuse of position



Police received a report that an officer had forced a woman to perform a sexual act. The officer came into contact with the woman after responding to a domestic abuse incident at her property.

The officer was a first response officer and a trained sexual offences liaison officer, and regularly came into contact with members of the public and victims of crime.

The allegations were first dealt with by a senior officer until the matter could be taken no further and the woman refused to pursue the allegation because of fears about how this might affect her family. The matter was referred to the professional standards department (PSD) for monitoring.

After a 12 month review the matter was referred to the force's anti-corruption unit. The unit used a variety of covert and conventional investigative techniques to gather evidence about the officer's alleged inappropriate behaviour.

Investigations found that the officer frequently used the police force's systems to access information about women aged 18 to 30 years, often making follow-up calls or visits to women without having any valid reason for doing so.

The officer claimed that his actions were driven by a desire to find intelligence about criminal activity in the area he was operating in.

The officer was suspended while enquiries were made to trace and interview ten women whose records the officer was shown to have viewed most frequently. Five of these women went on to make complaints against the officer about inappropriate sexual conduct. Another woman was identified as a result of a surveillance operation, and she later made a complaint about the officer.

The officer continued to deny the alleged offences and continued to claim that he had only checked records for valid purposes.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- If a complaint about inappropriate sexual conduct is made, would this automatically trigger a review of the individual's complaint history, IT use, timekeeping, and patterns of overall behaviour?
- Has your force chosen sensitive posts, such as those where officers come into contact with vulnerable victims, for enhanced vetting?
- Is your force able to monitor how officers are using computer systems?
- Are computer records (including the Police National Computer (PNC), the Police National Database (PND), and other systems) routinely dip-sampled to ensure proper use and to find any concerning patterns? For example, continuing to text or phone victims of crime, or offenders, following initial contact; being overly friendly and familiar; or displaying an unusual interest in, or preference for, attending a particular type of incident?
- If a concern was found, at what point would you consider using covert methods to gather supporting evidence?
- What information do you provide to victims to help them understand the service they should receive from the police or the support that is available from other agencies?

- How do you make sure that officers are aware of their obligations to report concerns about contact their colleagues have with victims, witnesses and suspects?

Action taken by this police force:

- The force is exploring whether different levels of access can be applied to computer and intelligence systems, only allowing individuals to access information that is relevant to their role and position.
- The force is also exploring the use of more intrusive auditing tools similar to those used on the PNC, which makes a random pop-up screen appear asking the user to provide their reasons for using the system.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- The officer was dismissed following a misconduct hearing. He was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment after being convicted on one count of misconduct in a public office. He also received a fine for offences under the Data Protection Act 1998.

In 2012 the IPCC published a joint report with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) looking at the abuse of police powers to perpetrate sexual violence. The report, available from the IPCC website at www.ipcc.gov.uk includes a number of recommendations and a checklist designed to help the police prevent, spot and respond to any similar incidents.

 [Click here](#) for a link to the full learning report

7 Contact with a vulnerable adult



A Police Community Support Officer (PCSO) was allocated as a single point of contact to a woman who was considered vulnerable due to alcoholism, following a referral from the local authority.

The PCSO made a number of visits to the woman when on duty and in uniform to see if he could help her with anything. Over time his visits became more regular and lasted longer, and on occasions they would embrace.

The PCSO shared his work mobile phone number with the woman and they exchanged text messages. Some of the text messages sent by the PCSO were sexual in nature.

After 18 months of the PCSO being the woman's point of contact, the woman told two neighbours that the PCSO had touched her inappropriately and that she thought he wanted a sexual relationship with her. The woman told her GP too, who raised a complaint about the PCSO on her behalf.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- How are contact arrangements with vulnerable adults made and agreed? To what extent does a supervisor oversee these agreements?
- What steps does your police force take to monitor the contact that officers and staff have with vulnerable people within the community?
- Do you have a policy in place around single crewed units carrying out welfare visits to vulnerable adults?
- Do you regularly review the appointment of single points of contact to vulnerable adults to check if arrangements remain appropriate?
- What steps have you taken to make sure that officers know how to report concerns about contact their colleagues have with victims of crime or vulnerable adults?

Key questions for police officers/staff:


- Do you give any consideration to how your actions could put you at risk of being seen as behaving inappropriately when interacting with vulnerable adults?
- Do you know where to go to report concerns over suspected inappropriate contact a colleague may be having with a victim of crime? Would you feel confident making such a report?

Action taken by this police force:

- Risk assessments are now undertaken before agreeing a contact plan with vulnerable adults in similar situations.
- Contact with vulnerable adults is now not carried out by single-crewed units, and visits are monitored by supervisors.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- A complaint of discreditable conduct against the PCSO was substantiated, and a file was passed to the human resources department to carry out a disciplinary investigation.
- The PCSO resigned before any disciplinary action could be taken.

 [Click here](#) for a link to the full learning report

TELL US WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT THIS BULLETIN

Complete our [short survey](#)



Related reading

The Learning the Lessons pages on our [website](#) contain links to a variety of research and other publications relating to the cases featured in this bulletin, as

well as previously published bulletins, and copies of the more detailed learning reports which accompany each case.

Appendix B

LEARNING THE LESSONS

ASK YOURSELF:

Could it happen here?

www.ipcc.gov.uk/learning-the-lessons

Learning the Lessons bulletins summarise investigations conducted by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) or police forces where learning opportunities are identified. Police forces facing similar situations to those described can use the experience of other forces to improve their policies and practices. The bulletin challenges forces to ask "Could it happen here?"

Bulletin 25

February 2016

General

Issues covered in this bulletin:

Integrity

Claiming expenses (case 8)

Policing protests

Officer identification (case 3)

Evidence gathering (case 3)

Use of volunteers (case 4)

Neighbourhood policing

Working with nightclub door staff (case 5)

Passing on intelligence about vulnerable people (case 6)

Armed policing

Issuing Taser to officers (case 7)

Custody

Use of appropriate adults (case 7)

Roads policing

Use of incident data recorders (case 1)

Dealing with obstructions on the road (case 2)

Miscellaneous

Valuing seized property (case 9)



Armed
policing

Case
7



Crime and
investigation

Case
9



Custody and
detention

Case
7



Forensics and
evidence gathering

Case
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Case
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Public
order

Cases
3, 4



Roads
policing

Cases
1, 2

Contacting us

Please email learning@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk with any queries or to join our mailing list.

Case summaries

Roads policing

1 Fatal traffic collision



A man disqualified from driving took his partner's car while drunk. This was reported to the police and a radio message was sent asking officers to look out for the car.

A few minutes later the car was spotted leaving a nearby petrol station. A police vehicle pulled up behind the car and turned on its blue lights and sirens. The car sped away and the police car followed.

During a radio conversation, the police car driver told the control room that he was not pursuit trained. The control room told the driver not to continue the pursuit. The police car backed off and turned off its blue lights and sirens.

Definition: pursuit

Authorised Professional Practice (APP) says that a police driver is deemed to be in pursuit when a driver indicates by their actions or continuance of their manner of driving that:

- They have no intention of stopping for the police; and
- The police driver believes that the driver of the subject vehicle is aware of the requirements to stop and decides to continue behind the subject vehicle with a view to either reporting its progress or stopping it.

Thirty seconds later it was reported that the car had been involved in a collision. The car had lost control going around a bend and had hit a lamp post and two cyclists.

The driver was taken to hospital with minor injuries. The two cyclists died at the scene.

A collision investigator went to the scene. They were told not to do anything other than take photographs as the collision was going to be investigated by a neighbouring force.

Investigators from the other force arrived two hours later.

Throughout this time the engine and blue lights of the police car had remained on. This was because technology on-board the police car allowed the blue lights to remain on for a long time without draining the car's battery.

There was an on-board data recorder in the police car. However, this only had a three hour memory. Because the police car's engine had remained on, the on-board data recorder did not contain any data from the time of the collision or events leading up to it by the time it was secured.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- What guidance or advice does your force give investigators on securing evidence from on-board data recorders?
- What steps does your force take to brief investigators from other forces on equipment you use (such as on-board data recorders) when they are involved in investigating incidents in your force area involving police vehicles?
- What training has your police force given to collision investigators to make sure that they can obtain evidence from the different models of on-board data recorders your police force may use?
- What steps does your police force take to safeguard against data being lost through overwriting?

Key questions for police officers/staff:

- Are you confident in identifying the point at which requesting a vehicle to stop turns into a pursuit?
- Do you know the level of involvement you can have in a pursuit, in accordance with the driver training you have completed?

Action taken by this police force:

- Force policy has been updated and clearly assigns responsibility to professional standards investigating officers for immediately securing evidence in fatal police collisions.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- The officer driving the police car involved in the pursuit received training about the actions to be taken when a pursuit is identified.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

2 Dealing with obstructions on the road



A member of the public contacted the police to report that there was a large amount of mud on a road. A Police Community Support Officer (PCSO) went to the scene and decided that the road was now clear of mud, before going back to patrol.

Later that day a road traffic incident (RTI) involving a single vehicle happened at the same place. The driver lost control of the vehicle which left the road on a right-hand bend. The vehicle came to rest on a hedge four metres off the road. Fortunately, the driver was uninjured. The driver said that the mud on the road contributed to this incident. Three police officers went to the scene but did not report mud on the road when updating the control room.

Later that evening a two vehicle RTI was reported close to the original RTI. One of the drivers died from injuries at the scene. Again, mud making the driving conditions dangerous, contributed to this incident.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- What action does your force take when you receive reports of obstructions on the road - do you always send officers to assess the obstruction?
- In wider outreach work with farming and rural communities, does your force address issues around the safe and responsible use of roads? For example, where farm work can impact on road safety?

Key questions for police officers/staff:

- When attending an RTI, do you make sure that any factors which may have contributed to the RTI are minimised before re-opening the road?

Action taken by this police force:

- The force updated its command and control system to include a drop-down menu and risk assessment for control room operators to complete when dealing with reports of obstructions on the road.
- The force routinely sends a mobile police patrol to reports of obstructions on the road. Where a PCSO is the only available resource, a control room operator must document reasons for the use of a PCSO on the command and control system. They must also gain supervisory approval for the deployment.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

Public order

3 Policing public order incidents



A local demonstration quickly became violent when hundreds of people joined the protest and confrontation between police and protestors spread to the surrounding areas.

It was reported that some protestors began attacking officers by pushing their shields and throwing missiles, including bricks and bottles.

As the protest continued officers were ordered to clear the street of protesters, to prevent disorder and to protect officers from further attack.

It was reported that there were protestors who did not respond to instructions to leave the area, who resisted officers, or continued to threaten violence. Some of those protestors were struck by officers with batons.

A local man had gone to the protest to show his support. At the protest this man said that he began arguing with officers about how they were making matters worse. The man said that he had to quickly run out of the way of a line of police horses which charged the protestors. Shortly after this he said he was struck three times to the legs, and once to the head, by police batons.

The man made a complaint to the police about this incident.

To help the investigation into his complaint, the man was invited to view the available CCTV. The man recognised one officer who he thought witnessed his assault.

The officer identified from the CCTV was spoken to. She recalled a man similar in appearance to the man making a complaint being at the protest. However, the officer could not be certain if this man was the same individual who was making the complaint.

A range of local authority CCTV and YouTube footage was available of the protest. However, camera angles meant that no individual officers could be identified. The incident involving the man making the complaint could not be found on the footage, and the identity of any officers who may have been involved in this incident could not be established. More than 40 officers were spoken to as part of the complaint investigation, but none were able to provide further information.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:


- What steps does your force take to make officers more identifiable in public order situations?
- Does your force have a strategy for using body-worn video in public order situations?
- Where your force plans to make widespread use of body-worn video at events, do protestor liaison teams routinely discuss this with relevant groups before the event to help raise awareness and manage expectations?
- What is your force policy on using evidence gathering teams? How does this tie in with any officers who may be using body-worn video?
- How is the capture of data at events managed to make sure that images are not deleted?

Action taken by this police force:

- Following this incident the force has made changes to helmets used by officers in similar situations. They now display force identification numbers which can be seen from all angles, including high-level cameras.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- There were no criminal, disciplinary, or misconduct outcomes for any of the police officers or police staff involved in the handling of this incident.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

4 Controlling demonstrations



During a planned demonstration a number of demonstrators volunteered to act as stewards. They wore high-visibility vests so they could be easily seen.

As the demonstrators were leaving, a rival group gathered and clashed with them.

Police responded to this incident and some officers began to usher people away from the area. Other officers gathered on a nearby bridge to stop missiles being thrown over the edge to the road below. A number of the volunteers from the demonstration also gathered on this bridge.

A crowd of demonstrators approached the bridge. Police officers formed a line to stop the crowd moving forwards.

Some of the volunteers on the bridge tried to calm the crowd and others tried to speak with the police officers. Some of the volunteers removed their high-visibility vests and became part of the crowd.

Officers on the bridge began to move towards the crowd, encouraging them back with shields. The crowd pushed back at the police line and some of the volunteers became trapped between the police line and the crowd.

The crowd began shouting and throwing missiles towards the police line. This lasted a few minutes before the crowd dispersed into the local area.

After this incident several of the volunteer stewards complained about the way they had been treated by the police during the demonstration.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- What steps does your police force take to plan for spontaneous incidents that may arise during or following planned public demonstrations?
- Where public demonstrations are planned, how does your police force engage with event organisers to brief them on planned police presence at the event?
- Does your police force provide advice and information to organisations who will be facilitating or stewarding large public gatherings?

- When responding to a public order event, what steps does your police force take to capture evidence from the incident? For example, do you make use of body-worn video, dedicated evidence gatherers, or local CCTV provision?
- When responding to spontaneous public order incidents such as the incident described in case four, how do you make sure that rival groups have freedom of speech and movement but that you also prevent further disorder or a breach of the peace?

Key questions for police officers/staff:


- Where a spontaneous incident breaks out and you are not aware of any nominated intermediaries, how do you identify members of a crowd who may be able to help mediate or resolve a situation?

Action taken by this police force:

- The incident was reviewed by the force's public order unit to consider the presence of volunteers at future events, and how best to ensure public safety in such circumstances.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- There were no misconduct or criminal outcomes for any of the officers involved in the handling of this incident.

 [Click here](#) for a link to the full learning report

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- How does your force make sure that door staff and police officers understand their respective roles when incidents occur in or near licensed premises?

Key questions for police officers/staff:

- When making arrests and charging decisions, do you take into account how a member of the public may have been influenced by the actions of door staff?

Action taken by this police force:

- Together with the local authority, licensing officers have been requested to review the way that officers work with licensed door staff.
- The force created a guidance note on the use of force to share with door staff.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- There were no criminal, disciplinary, or misconduct outcomes for any of the police officers or police staff involved in the handling of this incident.

 [Click here](#) for a link to the full learning report

Neighbourhood policing

5 Working with door staff



Police officers intervened to break-up a fight outside a public house. One man was left lying injured on the floor.

When the man's brother went to see if he was ok, he was ushered away by a police officer. The man pushed the police officer away before a member of door staff grabbed him and pulled him away.

The man tried to approach his brother again. He became involved in a struggle with the member of door staff. Police then intervened and arrested the man for affray. He was taken into custody but later released without charge.

6 Responding to concerns of welfare



A man with a history of poor mental health put a note saying 'call police' on the inside window of his front door. One of his neighbours saw the note and called the police using a local neighbourhood policing telephone number. The officer who answered the call knew the man and his medical history. He told the neighbour that he would ring the man and if there was no answer he would visit him to make sure he was ok.

Information about the man and his medical history was held in many different places on police computer systems. Although the police officer knew about the man's poor mental health and had discussed it with his mental health team, the man's Police National Computer (PNC) record did not have a warning marker for 'mental health'.

The officer did not call or visit the man during his shift. No one else was allocated to visit the man because no log was created for the call; the officer was the only one who knew about it. There were a

number of inconsistencies in the officer's account about his decision making and how he spent his time on that day.

Much later on the same day, the man's neighbour called the police again saying the note was still on the man's front door. Although his shift had ended, the officer quickly said he would visit. When he arrived no one answered the door and the police forced entry. The man was found dead with a plastic bag over his head. This was connected by tubing to two canisters containing helium gas. The mental health team who had been treating the man knew he had bought a suicide kit but did not share this information with the police.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- Does your police force have policies and procedures on the handling of intelligence about vulnerable members of the community enabling comprehensive information to be accessed quickly when necessary?
- Does your force have policies and procedures setting out where it is necessary to have a 'mental health' marker placed on a person's PNC record and how this should be done?
- Does your police force have arrangements in place with partner agencies about the disclosure of relevant information on vulnerable members of the community?

Key questions for police officers/staff:

- If you receive a telephone call about a matter needing police attendance, would you know what to do to make sure the call is recorded, assessed, graded, and allocated?


Action taken by this police force:

- The police force committed to creating policies and procedures about the handling of intelligence about members of the community with poor mental health. This should make sure comprehensive information can be assessed quickly where necessary.
- The police force committed to creating policies and procedures setting out where it is necessary to have a 'mental health' marker placed on a person's PNC record and how this should be done.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- The police officer who failed to follow-up on the man's note was found to have a case to answer for gross misconduct. The panel of his disciplinary hearing found that the officer failed to adequately respond

to a request from a member of the public about a vulnerable person. He then acted dishonestly when providing his account of what happened. The panel decided this amounted to gross misconduct. The officer was dismissed for breaching the standards of professional behaviour, namely 'duties and responsibilities' and 'integrity'.

 [Click here](#) for a link to the full learning report

Custody

7 Detention of a 17 year old



Police were called to a disturbance at the flat of a 17 year old woman. Three officers attended and were met with threatening and aggressive behaviour by the woman. The woman was known to one of the officers from a previous case when she was the victim. He was aware that she had Asperger's Syndrome. Assessing the threat level as high, the officer drew his Taser. Following a warning, he discharged his Taser. The woman was taken to the local hospital by ambulance, where the Taser barbs were removed and she was arrested. She was then taken into police custody.

The woman was wearing a head-guard and leg restraints were applied due to her aggressive behaviour and risk of self-harm. She was not given her rights on arrival as the custody sergeant thought she was incapable of understanding due to the influence of alcohol. No one was informed of her arrest and detention, contrary to Code C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE).

The police sergeant covering as the duty review inspector conducted a review of the woman's detention. This was done without the presence of an appropriate adult as he felt it would have been difficult to identify an appropriate person, given that she lived independently, was almost 18 years old, and was incapable of understanding her rights due to her intoxication.

The woman was seen by a healthcare professional and considered to be unfit for interview. Later in the morning she was given her rights and stated she had Asperger's Syndrome. She was seen sometime later by another healthcare professional who was asked by officers to act as her appropriate adult in an interview.

The divisional response inspector, with PACE responsibilities for the custody suite, reviewed the woman's custody record later in the day. The inspector was not aware the woman's mother, or any other person responsible for her welfare, had not been contacted. He did not consider it necessary to inform anyone else of her detention at the time he conducted the review.

Later that afternoon, the woman was charged with assault on the officer who had discharged the Taser and was released shortly after.

The investigation subsequently found that the officer who used his Taser had not yet been confirmed in rank.

Guidelines issued by the College of Policing state that officers should not be trained to use Taser until confirmed in rank.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- What steps has your force taken to make sure that you comply with College of Policing guidance on issuing Tasers?
- How do you make sure that all officers comply with their responsibilities about notifying parents or carers when a young person is arrested or detained, and that appropriate adults are contacted?
- Does your force routinely use healthcare professionals as appropriate adults?
- Do you provide people acting as appropriate adults with any information to help them understand their role and responsibilities?

Key questions for police officers/staff:

- What factors would you consider when choosing an appropriate adult?
- Can an appropriate adult be responsible for informing the detainee of their rights and entitlements?

Action taken by this police force:

- The force agreed to take action with all custody officers about police officers not informing a person responsible for the welfare of a juvenile of the juvenile's arrest and detention.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- A number of officers were given words of advice about their failure to meet their obligations when dealing with a person under the age of 18.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

Integrity

8

Checking travel expense claims



The travel expenses of a special constable were investigated after a suggestion they may be inaccurate.

Over three and a half years a number of discrepancies were clear, including a greater than accurate distance being claimed. The special constable's access card use did not match the number of days claimed for. It was also logged on occasions when an expense form was not submitted.

Similarly, the pocket notebook of the special constable did not show entries for all the days for which expenses were submitted. It also confirmed instances when he was on duty but no expense form was completed.

The system used to show when an officer was on duty and available did not match with pocket notebook entries or access card logs.

The special constable said that sometimes when travel expenses were submitted, a greater distance had been entered as he was commuting from his girlfriend's address. No one was aware of this arrangement and the distance to this address was also below the distance he claimed. When the special constable stopped doing this commute, he continued to claim the same amount. He suggested this was justified as he was not claiming any refreshment allowance.

At a later date, following the serving of a regulation notice, the special constable submitted a claim for the accurate distance. This showed he was aware of the correct distance that should be claimed for travel expenses.

Expense claim forms were only checked to confirm a claimant signature was included, rather than for the accuracy of the expense claim.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- What guidance does your force give to officers (including special constables) and other staff on how and when to claim expenses?
- What guidance does your force give to supervisors on reviewing expense claims, and

how do you make sure that officers are not mis-using the expense system?


- How do you record when special constables are on or off duty?

Action taken by this police force:

- A policy was created to improve the expenses claim process and improve the means of recording.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- The special constable who submitted the expense claims was sentenced to four months imprisonment (suspended for one year), received 180 hours community service, was ordered to pay £1343.50 compensation to the force, and a further £343 in costs.
- A fast-track special case hearing took place. It was found that the officer's actions breached the standards of professional behaviour, namely 'honesty and integrity', 'discreditable conduct' and 'orders and instructions'. The breach was so serious it constituted gross misconduct. The officer was dismissed without notice.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

Miscellaneous

9 Valuing seized property



A man attended crown court in relation to a confiscation order made against him under the Proceeds of Crime Act.

Before attending court he was given a list of items, referred to as "free property", with a total value of nearly £10,000 which were due to be confiscated.

At the hearing there was a dispute over one of the items listed. Following discussions between the

defence team, the prosecutor, and the police, it was agreed by the presiding judge that the item be removed from the list and the confiscation order be reduced to take into account the value of the item. The realisable asset amount was therefore reduced to nearly £7500.


It was found that the man had benefited from his criminal activity by more than £400,000.

At the hearing, the man was provided with a list of items that the judge had ordered to be sold for realisation. He was told that all other property would be returned. However, the one item that was due to be removed from the list after the crown court hearing, plus a number of others that had been seized but were not listed, were sold by mistake.

Later, it was revealed that a number of items had been over-valued, and in some cases incorrectly listed as assets. In fact, they were fake, had been stolen, or were damaged and un-saleable. Despite this, the man was allowed to claim nearly £4,000 against these items, which were then written off under a certificate of inadequacy.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- How does your force make sure that it finds out the authenticity of items before valuing them and listing them as seizable assets to help prevent defendants benefitting financially from their sale?
- How does your force make sure that only the correct items are sold for realisation?

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

(This case was investigated locally by the force)

TELL US WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT THIS BULLETIN

Complete our [short survey](#)



Related reading

The Learning the Lessons pages on our [website](#) contain links to a variety of research and other publications relating to the cases featured in this bulletin, as

well as previously published bulletins, and copies of the more detailed learning reports which accompany each case.

Appendix C

LEARNING THE LESSONS

ASK YOURSELF:

Could it happen here?

www.ipcc.gov.uk/learning-the-lessons

Learning the Lessons bulletins summarise investigations conducted by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) or police forces where learning opportunities are identified. Police forces facing similar situations to those described can use the experience of other forces to improve their policies and practices. The bulletin challenges forces to ask "Could it happen here?"

Bulletin 26

March 2016

General

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Contacting us

Please email learning@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk with any queries or to join our mailing list.

Case summaries

1 Young girl missing from home



A vulnerable 14 year old girl was reported missing by her school. She had recently moved into the area, was being looked after by the local authority, and had a history of being sexually exploited by older men.

The girl was found later the same day. Although safe, she said that she had left school intending to jump under a train. Ten days later, the girl was admitted to hospital after trying to take her own life.

The girl's foster carer contacted the police three days later to report that the girl was in contact with an older man.

An intelligence log was completed. This recorded that the girl was at risk of child sexual exploitation. This was later added to as the girl had sexual encounters with two separate boys. A flag was placed on systems saying that she was at high-risk of sexual exploitation.

The girl was again reported missing. She was found later the same evening and returned home. However, she ran off. She was initially assessed as being at high-risk, but this was overturned by an acting sergeant who re-assessed the risk as medium.

The missing persons report was reviewed the same evening and re-assessed as high-risk. Searches continued throughout the night but the girl was not found. She was found at around 11pm the following evening having slept rough in a churchyard. She had also stayed with a man with whom she had got drunk and smoked cannabis.

She was reported missing again three days later in the early evening.

An intelligence check was made which showed that the girl was at risk from sexual exploitation. It also flagged multiple intelligence logs about sexual exploitation, reports that she had previously gone missing, and that she was known to the child abuse investigation unit.

The missing from home report was assessed as medium-risk but with the condition that if she was not found in the early evening, this could be raised to high-risk.

The following day the investigation was reviewed and she remained a medium-risk missing person.

The next day a pre-planned strategy meeting took place. There were increasing concerns about the girl's welfare.

Mid-morning, a detective inspector was informed of the need for a crime manager's review. This takes place 48 hours after a person has gone missing and is classed as medium-risk. This was not undertaken until the following day shortly after 3pm when the risk was reassessed as high.

At just after 9pm, reports were received of smoke coming from an address. Officers attended and the girl was found at the scene together with two men. She later disclosed that she had been raped by one of the men.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- What guidance do you give to officers on when and how to carry out risk assessments when dealing with missing person incidents?
- How does your force make sure that missing persons' incidents are reviewed as required?
- How does your force make sure that markers on intelligence systems are kept updated and reflect concerns, risks, and intelligence?
- HMIC had previously made recommendations to the force that all staff should receive training to help them identify high-risk missing persons. How does your force make sure that recommendations made by HMIC and other bodies are taken forward appropriately?

Action taken by this police force:


- The force has updated its missing persons' policy to include additional guidance on conducting risk assessments and clarifying officers' roles in an investigation.
- The force has introduced specific training on protecting vulnerable people.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- The acting sergeant who assessed the girl as being a medium-risk was found to have breached the standards of professional

behaviour and his duties and responsibilities about the missing person enquiry. He admitted the breach and therefore the case against him was formally found proven. No further action was taken against him.

- The detective inspector who did not complete the review of the case within the 48 hour period, was found to have breached his duties and responsibilities and received management advice.
- The temporary inspector who reviewed the missing person's report was found to have breached his duties and responsibilities and received management advice.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

2 Response to child grooming concerns



Police were called by a woman who was concerned that her son was being groomed online. The woman told the call centre operator that she was worried that her son was spending an increasing amount of time on an online gaming site, communicating with an older man. She believed that the older man was turning her son away from his family, interests, and religion.

The call centre operator checked the force intelligence system (a local database) for any references to the older man. He was not known to the force. The operator was only authorised to carry out Police National Computer (PNC) checks on vehicles, so was unable to search the PNC for any references to the older man. She did not request that one of her colleagues carry out a PNC check. The call handler assumed that the word 'grooming' was about incidents of sexual grooming. She felt there was nothing to indicate that this was happening in this case.

Shortly after, another staff member in the call centre closed the log stating there was 'nothing to suggest this is grooming'.

The woman's son was murdered by the older man two months after she called the police. Later checks revealed that this man had a PNC record for the alleged rape of a minor a few years earlier in a neighbouring police force area.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- When a parent reports concerns about a child being groomed, does your force routinely signpost them to organisations that can provide advice and support?
- Does your force provide all call centre operators with authorisation to carry out vehicle and person checks on the PNC? If not, is there a clear process for when and how additional checks should be requested?
- What guidance and training does your force provide call handlers and other staff with to help them identify and respond to grooming?
- When reports of child grooming are received, does your force advise call handlers to refer these to child abuse investigation teams for further investigation?
- How does your force make sure that any calls indicating that a child may be at risk of harm are not closed before they are investigated and appropriate action taken to safeguard a child's welfare?
- Does your force have arrangements with neighbouring forces to allow officers to search for intelligence on possible offenders who may be active locally?

Key questions for police officers/staff:


- Do you know the circumstances in which a PNC check is necessary?
- Are you confident that you would be able to recognise the signs of grooming? Do you know how best to respond to these?

Action taken by this police force:

- The force accepted the recommendations made to it following this investigation. It has arranged training days for all contact centre staff.
- All new contact centre staff are being given full access to PNC checks. This is being rolled out to existing staff.
- The force is developing a series of topic guides for its contact centre staff. These include information about the signs of grooming, and guidance on how to deal with child sexual exploitation (CSE).

Action taken by this police force:

- No action could be taken against either the call handler or the call operator as both resigned. Had they remained in post, both would have had a case to answer for misconduct.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

3 Responding to an abandoned 999 call



Around midnight, an emergency call was answered by a BT 999 operator who heard a woman making 'strange noises' in the background.

The operator performed an address check and then spoke to the local police force. She advised the police call handler that noises could be heard in the background of the call. The first 30 seconds of the call were replayed to the call handler.

A unique reference number (URN) was created for the call, graded as 'urgent', and transferred to the local control room to allocate to a police response unit. Attempts were made to re-call the home phone number and a message was left.

Background checks on the address revealed no previous interactions with the police.

No units were initially available but a unit was dispatched at 12.20am. This unit was redeployed to another call graded as 'immediate response'.

As the call system had recorded that a unit had been sent, the system did not automatically escalate the URN. In this situation, the URN should have been manually escalated to the control room sergeant so they could try to find a unit to attend. This did not happen.

A number of attempts were made to contact the caller by phone throughout the night. These were unsuccessful. Various call handlers also tried to find police units to attend, but none were available at those times.

At 5.23am, a police unit was sent to the address. It arrived at 5.40am. The curtains were drawn at the property but all the lights were on and there was a dog barking inside.

Entry was forced and a woman was found dead. There was no evidence of foul play.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- How does your force make sure that dispatchers do not lose sight of incidents where officers have been dispatched but were unable to attend?
- What guidance does your force give to call handlers on when to escalate matters to the control room sergeant?

Action taken by this police force:

- The learning from this incident was delivered via team training days.
- All control room operators were debriefed on this incident and the process of escalation.
- A new call handling system is being developed and supervisory processes will be included.



Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

4 Responding to a 999 call from an unknown location



A man called 999 from a mobile telephone. He stated that he was unwell and was going to kill himself.

The man did not give an address and stopped engaging with the officer who answered the call. The line was cleared and the officer tried to call the man back several times. The calls were not answered.

Research was carried out on the number, but an exact location could not be identified as the man was calling from an unregistered pay-as-you-go mobile.

The man's phone was called again and was answered. The person who answered did not speak but noise could be heard in the background.

The call was graded as requiring a priority response. This was the practice in the call room when an emergency call had no address associated with it.

A potential address was found but the call log was not upgraded to an emergency response.

A unit was sent and arrived at the property 96 minutes after the address was identified.

When officers arrived at the property, they found the man had died. He had taken his own life.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- Do you have a clear policy on how calls from unknown locations should be graded?
- How does your force make sure that calls are graded and responded to appropriately?

Key questions for police officers/staff:

- Are you familiar with the policy for dealing with 999 calls from an unknown address?

Action taken by this police force:

- The force has updated its call handling policy to include explicit guidance on 999 calls from unknown addresses.
- The force has introduced a quality assurance process to monitor call grading and responses.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- There were no criminal, disciplinary or misconduct outcomes for any of the police officers or police staff involved in the handling of this incident.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report

5 Record keeping in custody



A woman appeared unwell after being arrested.

The woman was searched after being brought into custody. However, officers failed to complete the 'safety/evidence body search' checklist to show that a search had been fully completed.

The woman was booked into custody and told the custody sergeant that she was unwell. The custody sergeant placed her in a CCTV cell under constant observation and informed the custody nurse.

The officer initially responsible for observing the woman did not complete any paperwork to record any observation. When another officer took over observations, she was not shown a copy of the custody record or told why the woman was under constant observation.

While responsible for observations, the second officer also failed to record any observations, and used a mobile phone on a number of occasions, contrary to force policy.

The custody nurse visited the woman three times. On the third visit, he advised that she should be taken to hospital as she was in pain.

Two officers escorted the woman to hospital. The custody sergeant completed a Person Escort Record (PER) form and gave this to the escorting officers. No further entries were made on this record as the escorting officers were not familiar with this form.

The woman was bailed that evening at her hospital bed and remained in hospital. She was found unconscious the following morning by hospital

staff. The woman was transferred to the intensive care department but died three days later.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- What guidance do you give to officers on recording and responding to behaviour witnessed when carrying out constant observation? How do you make sure this is dealt with appropriately?
- What guidance are officers given when they take over responsibility for carrying out constant observation?
- What guidance have you given to officers about their responsibilities for completing the PER form?

Key questions for police officers/staff:

- Are you aware of your responsibilities when carrying out constant observation?
- Are you aware of your responsibilities about completing the PER form?

Action taken by this police force:

- 'Safety/evidence body search' check lists are now available in all holding cells for officers to complete.
- The force has introduced refresher training for staff undertaking custodial duties. They have also introduced a briefing sheet detailing officers' responsibilities when undertaking constant observation.
- Custody officers now instruct escorting officers on how to complete the PER form outside the custody environment.
- A new form has been introduced to all custody suites, forming part of the custody record. This requires custody sergeants to give officers conducting constant supervision a briefing on why it is being required, and actions that must and must not be undertaken. This is signed by all and repeated by the custody sergeant if the original person conducting constant supervision is relieved.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- There were no criminal, misconduct, or disciplinary outcomes for any of the police officers or staff involved in the handling of this incident. The force was asked to consider the performance of a number of officers in respect of this matter, all of whom received words of advice.

 Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report



Police officers obtained a warrant under Section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) to carry out a search of a residential address. It was believed that drugs were being kept at the property.

During the search, the occupant was strip searched. She complained about the way in which the search was conducted and the manner of the officers who conducted it.

The complaint was investigated but was not upheld. However, it was identified that officers carrying out the warrant wrongly believed they had a right under Section 8 to carry out a search of a person. Further enquiries uncovered that this was a commonly held belief throughout the force – both for officers authorising and using the warrants.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- What guidance do you give to officers on using warrants under Section 8 of PACE?

Action taken by this police force:

- The Professional Standards Department (PSD) issued a force-wide message clarifying that a Section 8 warrant allowed the attending officers to search the premises only. It did not allow them to search the occupants unless they were actually placed under arrest.



Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report



Police received intelligence that two men, wanted by the police, were inside a house together with the homeowner. The intelligence suggested that there were firearms in the property hidden in the loft.

As a result of this information, armed police attended. The incident was managed by a Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC) using the National Decision Model (NDM) as guidance for his decisions and tactics.

The homeowner and one of the other men left the property when police attended and were arrested.

The men told officers that the remaining occupant was in the loft space.

The TFC tried to find trained negotiators to attend at approximately 4pm. However, no one was immediately available. A negotiator was found and arrived at approximately 6pm.

Noises could be heard coming from the loft space. Eventually, these stopped.

The loft space was extremely hot and officers became concerned about the man's welfare. As a result they lifted the loft hatch to try to reduce the temperature. While doing this they saw a man hanging within the loft space.

The officers entered the loft area. The man was pronounced dead at the scene.

There was some confusion about who should be informed about the man's death. As a result, some members of the family were not notified of the death until much later that evening.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- Does your force have an on-call rota for negotiators?
- How does your force make sure that next of kin are notified of a sudden death in a timely and appropriate manner?

Action taken by this police force:

- TFCs are provided with training on the siege command model.
- The force has implemented a rota for trained negotiators.
- All command logs are reviewed for compliance with force policy and authorised professional practice by a chief inspector who is a qualified TFC.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- There were no criminal, misconduct or disciplinary outcomes for any of the police officers or staff involved in the handling of this incident.



Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report



Police applied for a search warrant to search a property occupied by a man they suspected of supplying Class A drugs.

The officer in charge of the case obtained a data subject report which suggested that the man was living at his mother's address.

No additional checks were carried out to check that the address for the warrant was correct, even though another address was listed as either a previous or forwarding address.

The search warrant was granted by the magistrates' court. Officers forced entry to the man's mother's property. However, the man was not there.

The woman later complained to police that insufficient checks had been carried out before the warrant was obtained.

The force did not uphold the woman's complaint, so she appealed to the IPCC. The IPCC upheld the woman's appeal and decided to carry out an independent investigation.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- Does your force provide officers with clear guidance on the checks that may be carried out before applying for a search warrant?

Action taken by this police force:

- The force has developed a prompt sheet listing typical checks that may be undertaken when applying for a search warrant.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- There were no criminal, disciplinary, or misconduct outcomes for any of the police officers or staff involved in the handling of this incident.

 [Click here](#) for a link to the full learning report

9 Making sure that a receipt for seized property is provided



The complainant was driving a car towing a caravan when he collided with a cyclist.

The cyclist fell underneath the caravan and was dragged along the road. They suffered serious injury, spending a significant time in hospital recovering.

The complainant was arrested on suspicion of driving dangerously and his car, caravan,

and mobile phone were seized by police. The complainant requested a receipt for his belongings but this request was refused.

When charges were brought against the driver, these were ruled to be in excess of jurisdiction and therefore invalid. The case against him was dropped.

A complaint was made to the police force involved about a number of issues, including not giving a receipt for goods seized. These allegations were locally investigated.

The investigation report upheld none of the allegations and the complainant subsequently appealed to the IPCC.

The appeal was partially upheld by the IPCC. Despite the force having no local policy in place to issue receipts for seized goods, Section 21 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) is clear that a receipt should be provided for retained goods if requested.

The IPCC recommended that the force 'should draft a policy to cover the issuance of a receipt when property is seized by the police, or incorporate this into existing force policy'.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- Does your force have clear policies in place about issuing receipts when goods are seized?

Key questions for police officers/staff:

- Are you aware of the obligation under Section 21 of PACE to issue a receipt in respect of seized goods?

Action taken by this police force:

- The force has updated its force recovery policy to include guidance on issuing receipts when items are seized.

 [Click here](#) for a link to the full learning report

10 Making clear the police's role in evictions



A man was living in accommodation that was owned by a private landlord but managed by an agent on behalf of the university that he was studying at.

The man contacted the police to report that his landlord was threatening to change the locks at his property.

An officer attended and spoke to the landlord and the man. The officer advised them that the matter was a civil one, suggesting that the man approach the citizen's advice bureau or a solicitor to seek legal advice.

The landlord contacted the police to say that the man was not paying his rent and was sub-letting the property. He advised the police that his wife (who owned the property) was in possession of a Section 8 court order giving her permission to evict the man.

The locks on the property were changed and the man was prevented from re-entering to collect his belongings.

The man called the police. The police attended and spoke with the landlord who advised them that all procedures had been followed and that the eviction was lawful. This information was given to the man and he was told again that this was a civil matter and that he should seek legal advice.

Further enquiries revealed that the man had been evicted illegally.

The man made a number of complaints against officers alleging discrimination, rudeness, and a specific complaint against the officers who attended on the day of his eviction. He stated that they had knowingly given him inaccurate advice, not dealt with the matter as a criminal act, and had caused him mental distress.

The investigating officer found no evidence of misconduct on behalf of any of the officers complained about. While officers had wrongly identified this as a civil matter, they could not have dealt with this as a criminal offence.

Harassment and illegal eviction are criminal offences under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. The police can act to stop a breach of the peace but prosecution of the offence and reinstatement of the tenancy (if applicable) rests with the local authority. Therefore, even if the police had treated this as an unlawful eviction, their actions would have been extremely limited. Their role would have been to prevent a breach of the peace, not to reinstate the man's tenancy.

The investigating officer did, however, make a recommendation that 'consideration (be given) to a bulletin to all officers outlining that although illegal eviction and associated harassment are both criminal offences, they are enforced by the local authority, not the police'.

The man appealed to the IPCC. His appeal was upheld because the force's proposed action was insufficient and further action by the force was recommended.

Key questions for policy makers/managers:

- What guidance do you give to officers on dealing with unlawful evictions and tenant disputes, including how to identify the difference between civil and criminal matters?
- How do you make sure that officers are able to signpost people experiencing housing law difficulties to the appropriate bodies for advice and support?

Key questions for police officers/staff:

- Are you clear on your role when attending an eviction?
- Do you know where to get information about the agencies you should direct someone to if they are looking for advice on housing and tenancy matters?

Action taken by this police force:

- It was recommended that all front line officers in the local area should read the local authority's protocol about unlawful evictions and tenant disputes.
- It was also recommended that attending officers should request a copy of the court order from the landlord. If no court order is produced, the officer should tell the local housing advice centre.
- The recommendations were accepted and implemented by the force.

Outcomes for the officers/staff involved:

- There were no criminal or misconduct outcomes for any of the police officers or staff involved in the handling of this incident.



Click [here](#) for a link to the full learning report



Related reading

The Learning the Lessons pages on our website (www.ipcc.gov.uk/learning-the-lessons) contain links to a variety of research and other publications relating

to the cases featured in this bulletin, as well as previously published bulletins, and copies of the more detailed learning reports which accompany each case.

For Information	
Public/Non Public*	Public
Report to:	Audit and Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	November 2015
Report of:	PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS REPORTING PROCEDURE ('WHISTLE BLOWING')
Report Author:	DI Rob ALLISON
E-mail:	robert.allison@nottinghamshire.pnn.police.uk
Other Contacts:	
Agenda Item:	07

PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING PROCEDURE

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To inform the PCC regarding the above procedure and outline how the organisation in general and the Professional Standards Directorate manages and deals with those members of the organisation who make reports concerning breaches of Professional Standards. In particular how they can be provided with support and confidentiality, when appropriate and necessary.

2. Recommendations

- 2.1 That the Panel receive assurance from the processes in place relating to confidential reporting as detailed within the report.

3. Reasons for Recommendations

- 3.1 To provide the PCC with relevant information and oversight in respect of how Nottinghamshire Police ensures that appropriate systems are in place to both encourage and support officers and staff to report concerns in respect of unethical behaviour or 'wrong doing'.

4. Summary of Key Points (this should include background information and options appraisal if applicable)

- 4.1 There can be no more important qualities for members of the police service than that they are honest and act with integrity. Without these key attributes public trust and confidence will be eroded. The reputation of any organisation must always be considered as one of its most cherished assets.
- 4.2 The Procedure for Professional Standards Reporting aims to create a climate where staff feel a genuine commitment to openness and transparency when reporting breaches of Professional Standards, their motivation arising from a desire to maintain the integrity of the police service and in the knowledge that such action will be universally acknowledged as 'doing the right thing'.

- 4.3 This force professional standards reporting procedure defines how Nottinghamshire Police will protect and support its staff by providing a broad range of options for reporting breaches of Professional Standards and providing consistent and meaningful support to colleagues who report concerns.
- 4.4 Staff have a clear responsibility to report suspected breaches of Professional Standards by others in Nottinghamshire Police and should feel that they can report such breaches openly and with the support of their colleagues and managers in line with our PROUD Values and Code of Ethics
- 4.5 The procedure identifies guiding principles and some examples of what activity or conduct should be reported, before outlining the different mechanisms for making such reports which can be done anonymously, confidentially or in an open report.
- 4.6 Professional Standards Directorate have a key part to play in this procedure once information comes into the Directorate, including agreeing a 'Statement of Expectations' with the member of staff and including offering support from a group of trained 'Supporters'.
- 4.7 For any officers and staff who are concerned coming forward to report any suspicion of 'wrong doing' or unethical behaviour, the force has provided an anonymous and confidential e-reporting system called 'Integrity Messenger'. This system allows two-way communication with the force counter-corruption unit while preserving the anonymity of the referee for as long as they feel the need. It also allows rapport and confidence to be built which may lead to the referee providing personal details in due course.
- 4.8 In the relevant period (October 1st 2015 to March 31st 2016) 42 referrals were made to the Counter Corruption Unit comprising of Integrity Messenger, Confidential Reporting Line & anonymous internal contact. This compares to 30 referrals in the previous six months.

5. Financial Implications and Budget Provision

- 5.1 No specific financial implications are noted

6. Human Resources Implications

- 6.1 No specific HR implications are noted

7. Equality Implications

- 7.1 This document has been drafted to comply with the general and specific duties in the Equality Act 2010; Data Protection Act; Freedom of Information Act; ECHR; Employment Act 2002; Employment Relations Act 1999 and other legislation relevant to policing.

- 7.2 This procedure is robust and the evidence shows there is no potential for discrimination and that all opportunities to promote equality have been taken.

8. Risk Management

- 8.1 It is essential the public have confidence in the service Nottinghamshire Police provide.
- 8.2 The overwhelming majority of individual members of police personnel including Police Officers, Police Staff and members of the Special Constabulary within the Nottinghamshire Police are dedicated, hard working, compassionate, and deliver policing services with a high degree of integrity. Regrettably, there are a small number of police personnel that are guilty of and vulnerable to, unethical behaviour, dishonesty and corruption. The harm they do far outweighs the numbers they represent
- 8.3 We all have a part to play in enhancing the integrity and reputation of the Force. This process starts with recognition that we are all individually accountable for our actions and responsible for our behaviour

9. Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

- 9.1 By having a Professional Standards Reporting Procedure we are able to set out ways that staff can make reports concerning breaches of Professional Standards and ensure we support the organisations 'Vision', 'Values' (PROUD) and 'Plan' 'To cut crime and keep you safe', 'To spend your money wisely' and 'Earn your trust and confidence', ensure all relevant parts of the organisation are given help to improve our service and ultimately achieve the force priorities.

10. Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

- 10.1 None

11. Details of outcome of consultation

- 11.1 None

12. Appendices

- 12.1 None

For Information	
Public	
Report to:	Audit and Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	30 June 2016
Report of:	R. Adams, Commercial Director, East Midlands Strategic Commercial Unit
Report Author:	R. Adams, Commercial Officer
E-mail:	Ronnie.adams@emscu.pnn.police.uk
Other Contacts:	emscuenquiries@emscu.pnn.police.uk
Agenda Item:	8

*If Non Public, please state under which category number from the guidance in the space provided.

ANTI-FRAUD & CORRUPTION POLICY – REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE (Oct 2015 – March 2016)

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 The East Midlands Strategic Commercial Unit (EMSCU) published their policy entitled Prevention of Fraud and Corruption in the Procurement Process (the Policy) on 16th May 2013 – see Appendix A. The policy is written for both partner Forces and whilst written to be applicable to procurement activity conducted by EMSCU for contracts with a total value of £25k and above, the principles are equally applicable to lower level procurements. The two partner Forces are Nottinghamshire Police and Northamptonshire Police.
- 1.2 The report informs the Audit and Scrutiny Panel of the level of compliance against the EMSCU Fraud and Corruption Policy for the period October 2015 until March 2016.

2. Recommendations

- 2.1 It is recommended that the Panel notes the following:
- 2.2 That EMSCU's Commercial Director has received no reports of any fraudulent activity following any audit of procurement activity undertaken by the Force.
- 2.3 That EMSCU's Head of Supplier Services (to which the Policy directs any individual wishing to report any suspicion of fraudulent activity) has advised that there have been no reports of any fraudulent activity in relation to procurement activity undertaken within Nottinghamshire Police.
- 2.4 That EMSCU's Head of Supplier Services has written to Suppliers to re-iterate the Force position in relation to Gifts, Gratuities and Hospitality. The relevant Force procedure states that Police Officers and Staff should not accept the offer of any gift, gratuity, favour or hospitality as to do so might compromise their impartiality or give rise to a perception of such compromise.

2.5 That EMSCU's Commercial Awareness training programme continues to be delivered on an on-going basis and includes content on the prevention of fraud and corruption in the procurement process.

2.6 In addition EMSCU have included reference and guidance to Conflicts of Interest and Gifts & Hospitality on procurement documents in relation to suppliers notifying us if they have any 'relationship' with any member of the Forces. We have also included links to the Code of Ethics.

PQQ – Conflict of Interest, Gifts & Hospitality

ITT - Conflict of Interest, Gifts & Hospitality

RFQ - Conflict of Interest, Gifts & Hospitality

Evaluation Code of Conduct - Conflict of Interest

Tender Evaluation Panelist Declaration – Conflict of Interest

3. Reasons for Recommendations

3.1 To give the Panel confidence that there is policy, guidance and training in place to mitigate the risk of fraudulent activity occurring during the procurement process.

4. Summary of Key Points

4.1 Nothing further to note.

5. Financial Implications and Budget Provision

5.1 Not applicable

6. Human Resources Implications

6.1 Not applicable

7. Equality Implications

7.1 Not applicable

8. Risk Management

8.1 EMSCU maintains its own Risk Register and manages and controls all identified commercial risks. Currently, there are no high risks recorded in relation to fraud and corruption.

9. Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

9.1 Not applicable

10. Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

10.1 None to note at present.

11. Details of outcome of consultation

11.1 Not applicable

12. Appendices

12.1 The Policy is attached to this report.
APPENDIX A

East Midlands Strategic Commercial Unit



TITLE OF DOCUMENT	PREVENTION OF FRAUD AND CORRUPTION IN THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS
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VERSION CONTROL

Version No	Published Date	Review Date	Document Owner	Document Author	Reason for issue
1.0	16 th May 2013	16 th May 2014	Graeme Unwin (Procurement Policy Manager)	Graeme Unwin (Procurement Policy Manager)	New process
1.1	18 th Nov 2013				New Form created
1.2	23 rd Jan 2014				Minor amendment
1.3	23 rd June 2014				Signposting how to report fraud

PROCUREMENT FRAUD

Procurement is a particularly high risk area in terms of fraud. It is important that EMCSU officers, Force officers and staff involved in the procurement process are aware of procurement fraud risks and able to recognise and report potentially fraudulent activity.

There are two basic types of procurement fraud:

- i) Collusion between procurer and supplier
- ii) Collusion between suppliers

Listed below are the specific fraud risks that fall under these two general headings (based on information provided by CIPFA), including controls for mitigating the risks. Whilst the Force(s) Contract Procedure Rules and Standing Orders embed these controls, Force officers and staff should be conscious of the risks and the reasons for the controls.

COLLUSION BETWEEN PROCURER AND SUPPLIER

The principle Risks that could exist in relation to fraud during the relationship between the procurer and the supplier are as follows -:

- A need / requirement is invented
- Matching a specification to favour a particular supplier
- Supplier introduced to selection / evaluation process by single officer
- Tender invitations only made to preferred supplier
- Provision of information is only provided to preferred supplier
- Tender documents disappear or are altered
- Inadequate records showing, for example, when tenders were received
- Undeclared interests of members of the evaluation panel or bidders
- Tender assessment criteria not established, allowing manipulation of the evaluation
- Use of non-standard contracts, including an overly complex / vague schedule of charges.
- Payment risks, e.g. payment for goods that were not received or were of lower quality, over ordering, duplicate invoices, suspicious invoices (no valid VAT no., mobile phone no. only, little / vague information, round sum amounts, sequential invoice nos. over extended period).

Controls:

- Specifications drafted wherever possible, as a result of the Force Procurement Business Partner consulting with users and the supply market (not just one provider), encouraging innovation by stating outcomes wherever possible, and stating 'or equivalent' wherever appropriate
- Documented policies and procedures. For example, how and in what circumstances shortlists are compiled (see Clause 7.6 and 7.14 of the Contract Procedure Rules)
- Authorisation and documentation of exceptions from policy and procedure (see Clause 8.4 of the Contract Procedure Rules and specifically Clause 7.5 – Exemptions to normal procedures/single tender action)
- Standing / Approved List membership being subject to authorisation, and adherence to submission, financial and technical criteria (see Clause 7.8 of the Contract Procedure Rules)
- Standing / Approved List / Framework Agreement usage monitored to track for example contract awards
- Equality of opportunity for all suppliers to submit tenders (see Clause 7.6 of the Contract Procedure Rules)
- Management trail – documented evidence of how suppliers were selected (see Clause 7.18 of the Contract Procedure Rules)
- Clear instructions in independently despatched tender invitation documents

- Any clarifications following the issuing of the Request for Quotation or Invitation to Tender are provided to all potential bidders
- Declaration of interests of evaluation panel members – completion of Tender Panellist Declaration form (Form Ref EMSCU 002) as per Appendix A (see Clause 2.3.2.1 of the Contract Procedure Rules)
- Declarations of interests of tenderers. The following question (or similar) should be asked in the Pre-Qualification Questionnaire or Invitation to Tender:
 - *To the best of your knowledge, does any director or senior officer of your organisation have any personal or financial connection with any member or senior officer of Nottinghamshire Police / Derbyshire Constabulary / Northamptonshire Police?*
- Procedures for tender receipt, e.g. fully auditable for every stage of the tender process using the Proactis e-tendering system, including recording, date/time stamping, opening, custody (see Clause 7.11 of the Contract Procedure Rules)
- Evaluation methodology and criteria formally established prior to issuing Request for Quotation or Invitation to Tender (see Clause 7.14 of the Contract Procedure Rules)
- Policy for post tender negotiation (see Clause 7.15 of the Contract Procedure Rules)
- Contract conditions approved by Legal Services
- Documentation of the recording, authorisation, acceptance (see Clause 7.11), notification to tenderers (see Clause 7.16) and retention of tender documents (see Clause 7.18)
- Ordering, receipt and invoicing in compliance with approved electronic system, whether National Police Procurement Hub (NPPH), Force(s) Financial System, Procurement Card

Valuation of works and services

Risks:

- Valuations are made at face value without checks and / or verification to supporting documentation
- Authorisation of payments is made without assurance that checks have taken place
- Inflated claims for payment
- Due damages and credits not being deducted

Controls:

- Checking and sign off of interim valuation certificate
- Full supporting documentation provides completeness, for example how the valuation was compiled, calculated, that deductions (such as for defective work) are included and mitigating actions taken on delays
- Adherence to Force(s) Financial Regulations and the necessary checks of the above prior to payment certification
- Documentation and approval of decisions to deduct damages/apply credits

Collusion between suppliers

Risks:

- Suppliers are part of a cartel and divide up contracts between them by sharing tender information
- Pressure on non-cartel members to not submit tenders

Controls:

- Suppliers appointed on the basis of quality as well as price – most economically advantageous tender
- Monitoring of tender activities and market awareness by Procurement Services – to identify suspicious behaviour, e.g.:
 - patterns of successful tenderers
 - high margins between tenders
 - same price, discounts, service, credit terms offered by tenderers
 - unexpected refusal to tender
- Maintain the confidentiality of tenderers

How do you report suspected collusion between procurer and supplier or between suppliers?

*Inform Ronnie Adams, Commercial Director, EMSCU
(Ronnie.adams@emscu.pnn.police.uk) Mobile: (07702 141531)*

Or

Employees should use their internal Force reporting system for incidents of suspected corruption. This is usually signposted on the Force Intranet or employees can contact their Professional Standards Department for further information.

EMSCU FORM 002

**TENDER EVALUATION PANELLIST
DECLARATION REGARDING ANY CONFLICT OF INTEREST
AND CONFIDENTIALITY UNDERTAKING**

I, (Title) (Name) (Surname)
(Job title) (Organisation/Department)
(Email address) (Contact phone number)

Conflict of Interest

Conflict of Interest refers to situations in which personal interests (which may include financial interests) may compromise, or have the appearance of, or potential for, compromising professional judgement and integrity and, in doing so, the best interests of Nottinghamshire Police and Northamptonshire Police.

Examples of conflicts of interest include: *(This is not an exhaustive list)*

- Having a financial interest (e.g. holding shares or options) in a potential tenderer or any entity involved in any tendering consortium
- Having a financial or any other personal interest in the outcome of the evaluation of any tender evaluation process
- Being employed by (as staff member or volunteer) or providing services to any potential tenderer
- Being a member of a potential tenderer's management/executive board
- Receiving any kind of monetary payment or non-monetary gift or incentive (including hospitality) from any tenderer or its representatives
- Canvassing, or negotiating with, any person with a view to entering into any of the arrangements outlined above
- Having a close member of your family (which term includes unmarried partners) or personal friends who falls into any of the categories outlined above

Having any other close relationship (current or historical) with any potential tenderer

It is the individual's responsibility to ensure that any and all potential conflicts are disclosed to the EMSCU (the Chair of the Tender Evaluation Panel) in writing prior to them becoming involved in any procurement process. Individuals will be excluded from the procurement process where the identified conflict is in the EMSCU's opinion material and cannot be mitigated. The decision as to whether the identified conflict is material, and whether any mitigating arrangements are required, is to be made by the line manager of the Chair of the Tender Evaluation Panel (with support from the respective Commercial Officer).

Option 1:

"I do not have any conflicts of interest that prevent my full and unprejudiced participation in any procurement process.

I also declare that I will inform the EMSCU immediately, should my circumstances change in any way that effects this declaration."

Signature

Date

Option 2:

"I **do have** a conflict of interest that may prevent my full and unprejudiced participation in a procurement process. The nature of this conflict of interest is described below:

I also declare that I will inform the EMSCU as soon as is practicable, should my circumstances change in any way that effects this declaration."

Signature

Date

Confidentiality Undertakings

"Procurement process" encompasses any formal and informal meetings, associated discussions, meeting preparation and follow up or any other related activity.

"Information" means all information, facts, data and other matters of which I acquire knowledge, either directly or indirectly, as a result of my activities as an evaluator of any supplier Pre-Qualification Questionnaire or Tender submissions or tender interviews/presentations etc.

"Documents" means all draft, preparatory information, documents and any other material in either paper or electronic form, together with any information contained therein, to which I have access, either directly or indirectly, as a result of my participation in any procurement process. Furthermore, any records or notes made by me relating to information or documents shall be treated as Confidential Documents.

I understand that I may be invited to participate either directly or indirectly in the procurement process and agree:

1. To treat all information and documents under conditions of strict confidentiality
2. Not to disclose, make copies of, or discuss any received information with any person who is not a member of the Tender Evaluation Panel (without the prior written approval of the Chair of the Tender Evaluation Panel)
3. Not to use (or authorise any other person to use) information and documents other than for the purpose of my work in connection with the procurement process
4. To return documents to the Chair of the Tender Evaluation Panel as soon as the evaluation process is complete

Unless otherwise agreed with the Chair of the Tender Evaluation Panel, and subject to relevant legislation, this undertaking applies until the end of the contract, including any contract extensions.

This undertaking shall not apply to any document or information that becomes public knowledge otherwise than as a result of a breach of any of the above undertakings.

Signature

Date

**PLEASE FORWARD THE COMPLETED AND SIGNED FORM
TO THE CHAIR OF THE EVALUATION PANEL**

DRAFT

For Decision	
Public/Non Public*	Public
Report to:	Audit and Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	30th June 2016
Report of:	Chief Finance Officer
Report Author	Charlotte Radford
Other Contacts:	Ch Insp Andrew Burton, Corporate Development Julie Mair, Head of Corporate Development Martin Bakalarczyk, Planning and Policy Officer
Agenda Item:	10

Draft Group Annual Governance Statement 2015-16

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 This is to provide members with the opportunity to identify anything that should be included from the assurance that they have received during the year and not currently identified within the draft statement.

2. Recommendations

- 2.1 Members are requested to approve the draft group annual governance statements for 2015-16.

3. Reasons for Recommendations

- 3.1 To meet the requirement to publish an approved AGS in accordance with the Accounts and Audit (England) Regulations 2011, Regulation 4 (3), to report publicly on the extent to which the organisation complies with its Joint Code of Governance.
- 3.2 This complies with the principles of good governance.

4. Summary of Key Points

- 4.1 Both legal entities are required to produce annual governance statements as evidence of the assurance being given relating to the operation of both legal entities and the resources used.
- 4.2 The draft statement from the Chief Constable is fed into the overall joint statement, which includes the Police & Crime Commissioners statement. These are provided at **Appendix A and B**.
- 4.3 The continuing financial climate for policing is resulting in significant changes to the way in which the service and its support functions will be provided in the future. It is therefore imperative that there are sound systems of governance in place.

- 4.4 Both statements identify significant governance issues identified by internal audit and other external agencies that have been identified in the year and are in the process of being addressed as a priority. Updates on the progress made against these recommendations will be reported to the Audit & Scrutiny Panel through 2016-17.

5. Financial Implications and Budget Provision

- 5.1 None as a direct result of this report.

6 Human Resources Implications

- 6.1 None as a direct result of this report.

7 Equality Implications

- 7.1 None as a direct result of this report.

8 Risk Management

- 8.1 None as a direct result of this report. By producing these statements we mitigate any risk associated with non-compliance of statutory regulations and our ability to demonstrate the application of good governance principles within the functions and operations of the OPCC and Force.

9 Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

- 9.1 This complies with regulatory requirements and best practice for good governance.

10 Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

- 10.1 None

11 Details of outcome of consultation

- 11.1 For the overall group and PCC statement the Chief Executive, Chief Constable and the Chief Finance Officer provide assurance through the completion of governance review questionnaires. The outcomes of which are included within the statement.
- 11.2 For the Force statement all Divisional and Departmental Heads, and some members of their respective Senior Management Teams, were consulted throughout the annual governance review process. The outcomes were included in the individual Assurance Statements and the final AGS, which is approved by the Chief Officer Team.

12. Appendices

- A – Draft Group and PCC Annual Governance Statement 2015-16
- B – Draft Chief Constable Annual Governance Statement 2015-16

DRAFT



Nottinghamshire Police Annual Governance Statement 2015/16

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1.0 Introduction

1.1 Scope of responsibility

Nottinghamshire Police is responsible for ensuring that its business is conducted in accordance with the law and proper standards, and that public money is safeguarded and properly accounted for, and used economically, efficiently and effectively. The Force has a duty under the Local Government Act 1999 to make arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the way in which its functions are exercised.

In discharging this overall responsibility, Nottinghamshire Police is responsible for putting in place proper arrangements for the governance of its affairs, facilitating the effective exercise of its functions, and which includes arrangements for the management of risk.

The Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police and the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) for Nottinghamshire have adopted a Joint Code of Corporate Governance, which is consistent with the principles of the CIPFA/ SOLACE Framework 'Delivering Good Governance in Local Government'. A copy of the Code of Governance can be obtained from the Nottinghamshire Office of Police and Crime Commissioner (NOPCC) website at <http://www.nottinghamshire.pcc.police.uk>.

This Statement explains how the Force has complied with the Code and also meets the requirements of Accounts and Audit (England) Regulations 2011, regulation 4(3), which requires all relevant bodies to prepare an annual governance statement.

1.2 The purpose of the governance framework

The governance framework comprises the systems and processes, culture and values by which the Force is directed and controlled and the activities through which, it accounts to and engages with the community. It enables the Force to monitor the achievement of its strategic objectives and to consider whether those objectives have led to the delivery of appropriate services and value for money.

2.0 The governance framework

The principles which form the basis of the governance framework and how they are applied within the Force are described in the following sections.

2.1 Principle 1: Focusing on the purpose of the Force, and on outcomes for the community, and creating and implementing a vision for the local area

2.1.1 The Police and Crime Plan

The local direction and priorities for the Force are set in the Police and Crime Commissioner's (PCC's) Police and Crime Plan, which was created following a comprehensive multi-agency strategic assessment. The Force and local partner organisations each completed a Local Profile assessment. Local Profiles were aggregated together with outcomes of community consultation and engagement, to inform the Police and Crime Needs Assessment (PCNA) and subsequently the refresh of the Police and Crime Plan.

The PCC has provided a commitment to the public to deliver safer communities; improved trust and confidence in policing and value for money policing services.

2.1.2 Strategic Policing Requirement

At a national level, the Force work to the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) which is issued by the Home Office to articulate current national threats and the appropriate

national policing capabilities required to counter those threats. The SPR is considered as part of the Force Strategic Crime Intelligence Assessment which in turn informs the PCNA and the Police and Crime Plan.

2.1.3 Delivery and monitoring

The monthly Performance and Insight Pack (P&I Pack) reports against the strategic priority themes set out in the Police and Crime Plan. This considers performance against target as well as trends over time. Additional insight is also given for those areas of performance which are of concern to the Force.

The P&I Pack is reported to the Force Executive Board (FEB) and the Force Performance Board on a monthly basis. It is also presented to the NOPCC's Strategic Resources and Performance Meeting to inform them of the key performance headlines. The minutes of this meeting, along with the P&I Pack, are made available on the NOPCC website so they are accessible to members of the public.

A review of the Force's approach to performance management was commissioned during 2015/16 to focus on the commission, production, circulation and consumption of performance management information. The review will also examine the types of performance decisions that are made across the organisation. Additionally, and in order to deliver a performance framework that aligned to future changes, there are opportunities to link in with and help shape regional developments in performance management. This review is still on-going.

2.2 Principle 2: Leaders, officers and partners working together to achieve a common purpose with clearly defined functions and roles

2.2.1 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (PRSR)

Each PCC and their respective Chief Constable is established in law as a corporation sole within the PRSR 2011 Act. As such, both are enabled by law to employ staff and hold funds in their official capacity. Chief Constables are charged with the impartial direction and control of all constables and staff within the police force that they lead.

2.2.2 The Policing Protocol

The Force is compliant with the Policing Protocol, which was issued in accordance with the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and sets out how the functions of the PCC, Chief Constable and Police and Crime Panel will be exercised in relation to each other.

2.2.3 Scheme of Good Corporate Governance and Working Together

The NOPCC and Force operate under a comprehensive 'Working Together Agreement' which comprises of the scheme of consent, the Joint Code of Corporate Governance, Financial Regulations and Contract Standing Orders. The document was introduced in 2014 to give clarity to the way the NOPCC and the Force will govern both jointly and separately to ensure that they are conducting business in the right way, for the right reason at the right time.

Scheme of Consent

The Scheme of Consent sets out the extent of, and any conditions attached to, the PCC's consent to the Chief Constable and their respective staff. It outlines the Chief Constable's functions and powers and any statutory restrictions on the powers and conditions of consent from the PCC.

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The Force's internal auditors, Mazars, undertook a review of the Force's Core Financials during 2015/16. It was identified that the current Scheme of Delegation does not reflect the purchasing embedded within the Multi Force Shared Services (MFSS) process and therefore there is a risk that spending is not authorised and controlled in line with Financial Regulations. A recommendation was made to for the NOPCC, the Force and MFSS to establish how the current authorisation limits, as agreed within the scheme of delegation, can be embedded into the current purchasing process. This is highlighted as an action for improvement during 2016/17.

Mazars also identified lack of up to date guidance for staff with regard to expenses, which may lead to inappropriate or invalid claims being made. The Force's Expenses Policy will be reviewed and updated during 2016/17 to ensure it is fit for purpose and includes clear guidance on all categories of expenses and consequences for staff who breach the policy. The policy will be reissued via Weekly Orders to all staff and officers to ensure awareness and compliance.

Joint Code of Corporate Governance

The Joint Code of Corporate Governance (the Code) has been developed by the PCC and the Chief Constable using the six principles of Good Corporate Governance as the framework for setting out local arrangements to deliver the 'Delivering Good Governance in Local Government' framework.

The Force's internal auditors reviewed the Code in 2015 and found that it is fully embedded within the governance framework and supports the focus and direction of both corporations sole. However, it was identified that the PCC's 'Governance and Decision Making Framework', which was last reviewed in November 2012, is not up to date and that it conflicts with the 'Working Together' document. This may lead to decisions not being made in line with current guidance and expectations and not subject to the correct approval and accountability process.

It was recommended that the NOPCC should undertake a review of the Governance and Decision Making Framework to ensure it remains up to date and fit for purpose in terms of the way decision are required to be made. This applies particularly to those with non-financial impact, or of significant public interest, which are not currently covered in the Working Together Document. This action will be progressed under the Governance Workstream of the Strategic Alliance.

Financial Regulations

The Force's Financial Regulations are designed to establish overarching financial responsibilities, to confer duties, rights and powers upon the PCC, the Chief Constable and their statutory officers and to provide clarity about the financial accountabilities of groups or individuals. They apply to every member and officer of the service and anyone acting on their behalf.

Contract standing orders

Procurement at a local level is carried out in line with the Contract Procedure Rules and Standing Orders. The document updates the previous standing orders and reflects how the East Midlands Strategic Commercial Unit (EMSCU) manage strategic procurement across partner forces. The Orders set out the Business Code of Conduct for the NOPCC and the Force to advise on the minimum standards expected of all staff to ensure fairness and consistency of approach in line with sound commercial practice.

During an audit of procurement activity in 2015/16 Mazars identified some areas in the control environment where there is scope for improvement.

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- The Force should consistently ensure that contracts are in place for all purchases over £25000 and these should be signed prior to commencement of the contract.
- A formal approval process should be established within the Force before new suppliers are entered onto the Oracle system.
- Management should look to implement an exception reporting system in conjunction with the MFSS to monitor payments which are outside of the approved process.

These actions are being robustly managed and reported to the FEB on a quarterly basis.

2.2.4 The role of the Chief Financial Officer

The role of Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is fulfilled by the Assistant Chief Officer for Finance and Resources for Nottinghamshire, Northamptonshire and Leicestershire.

As a key member of the leadership team, the CFO helps to develop and implement strategy and resource, and deliver the PCC's strategic objectives sustainably and in the public interest. They are actively involved in and able to bring influence to bear on, all business decisions to ensure immediate and longer term implications, opportunities and risks are fully considered, and aligned with the financial strategy. They lead and encourage the promotion and delivery of good financial management so that public money is safeguarded at all times and used appropriately, economically, efficiently and effectively.

2.2.5 Partnership working

The Force is committed to working in partnership to deliver its priorities. By working with other organisations and agencies the Force can provide the very best service to its communities. It is essential that working in partnership with others is underpinned by a common vision that is understood and agreed by all parties.

City partnerships

There are strong governance processes in place for the City partnerships. Each of the partnerships under the One Nottingham umbrella, including the Crime Drugs Partnership (CDP), have clear terms of reference including a clearly defined purpose, arrangements for information sharing, community engagement and governance and finance.

The CDP Plan 2015-20 sets out the overall aims and delivery and performance framework of the partnership to deliver the 'safer' agenda of the 'Nottingham Plan to 2020'. The Partnership Plan has been developed with regard to the priorities of the Police and Crime Commissioner. It is informed by an annual assessment of threat, risk, harm, volume and response, which identified priorities for the City.

There is a robust governance framework in place to oversee the delivery of the Plan. This is directed by the Partnership Board, which provides strategic governance of the partnership. There is also a Citywide Priority Tasking Group, which provides leadership in operational matters and Themed Strategic Groups and Task and Finish Groups, which coordinate action at an operational level. Neighbourhood Action Teams coordinate action with a strong focus on high impact neighbourhoods.

The Partnerships Support Team have a clear remit to build and manage strategic and tactical plans, monitor performance, identify risks and provide coordination between agencies.

County partnerships

There is robust governance in place to manage County partnership working. The strategic partnerships to which the Division belongs are underpinned by a common

vision and objectives, which are outlined in terms of reference for the Safer Nottinghamshire Board (SNB).

The SNB is responsible for setting strategic direction for community safety and substance misuse. The Board ensures the effective delivery of the Nottinghamshire Community Safety Strategy, supports the statutory local Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) to deliver their community safety strategies and ensures effective performance management arrangements are in place.

The four statutory CSPs are responsible for the delivery of local community safety strategies and action plans. The SNB Delivery Groups support the SNB and CSPs to implement the community safety strategies.

Each of the three CSPs in the County produce performance information on a monthly basis. This includes reporting on current performance against targets, comparison against most similar force peers and performance of Partnership Plus areas. The SNB Performance Group brings together the CSP Chairs to discuss performance risks and highlights.

Performance is managed through a process of Strategic Assessment which highlights the business areas that need addressing. Problem profiles support a greater understanding of established and emerging crime or incident series, priority locations and other identified high risk issues in an area. Action plans are developed from this process to help deliver measurable outcomes for local communities.

2.2.6 Collaborative working

Collaborative opportunities are increasingly being explored and arrangements put in place within the East Midlands region in order to maintain and improve service delivery whilst continuing to deliver significant cost savings.

The Collaboration Programme has established a governance structure to support the development of collaboration. This includes the East Midlands Police and Crime Commissioners Board (EMPCCB), which meets every two months and is attended by the regional PCCs, their Chief Executives and Finance Officers and the Chief Constables. The Board is constituted as a business meeting to coordinate strategic oversight and performance management of strategic assets. Members receive updates on collaborative projects, performance, threat and risk assessment and collaboration budgets. This is supported by the PCC and CEO Business Meeting, attended by the CEOs and PCCs and the Collaboration Efficiency Board.

In September 2015 the EMPCCB agreed to nominate a lead Police and Crime Commissioner for each area of regional collaboration to provide further scrutiny and assurance across that specific area. It was proposed that each head of each service would provide access to all appropriate strategic, tactical and performance information including finance reports and budgets to provide the level of assurance necessary to enable appropriate support and challenge through the PCC Board.

Building on the success of existing regional collaborations such as EMOpSS, EMCJS, Legal Services and EMSOU, a Strategic Alliance is now being pursued between Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire to explore the potential of further collaboration, to share resources and better protect the public.

Clear roles, responsibilities and meeting structures have been established to ensure robust governance arrangements as the Strategic Alliance is developed. The three DCCs and PCC Chief Executives have been given lead responsibility for developing a detailed design for each of the proposed portfolios within the Strategic Alliance.

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A Design Authority meeting is held every two weeks, chaired by the Leicestershire DCC, this meeting brings together the three DCCs, three Chief Executives and the Programme Director. The Strategic Alliance Board meeting is held monthly, and allows the three Chief Constables and three Police and Crime Commissioners to hear the latest programme developments and make key decisions, based on recommendations from the Design Authority.

Each of the established collaborations has a Collaboration Agreement in place in line with Section 22a of the Police Act 1996 which outlines arrangements between two or more forces when working in collaboration. This includes the aims of the collaboration, the governance and accountability framework, roles and responsibilities, financial contributions, audit and inspection and information management arrangements. The Agreements are formally signed off by the PCCs and Chief Constables for the forces concerned and are continually reviewed and amended by the East Midlands Police Legal Services (EMPLS) to ensure they are fit for purpose.

2.3 Principle 3: Promoting values for the Force and demonstrating the values of good governance through upholding high standards of conduct and behaviour

2.3.1 Our Values and the Code of Ethics

The PROUD Value campaign, which was launched in 2012, included a full communications plan, personal briefings to teams by managers and incorporation of PROUD values in promotion processes.

When the Code of Ethics was introduced in July 2014, the Force explicitly linked it to the PROUD values. An email was sent to all officers and staff from the DCC informing them of the Code of Ethics, with links to the video and information from the College of Policing.

A clear structure of responsibility was established for embedding the Code by appointing strategic, operational and tactical leads.

The plan for the initial phase of embedding the Code was informed by national best practice from the College of Policing, as well as links with regional forces. It included briefings to senior managers and the NOPCC, communications on the intranet page and identification of business area champions across the organisation. The approach focused upon making staff aware of the Code of Ethics and how to use it, it was not a process based approach of a 'standing item' on policy documents and operational orders.

In 2015, the Force moved to the next phase of embedding the Code. This included a review of best practice from other forces. The next stage of communications, involving ethical dilemmas on the force intranet was started in March 2015. This included a weekly dilemma to encourage staff to consider and apply the Code of Ethics to.

The force Professional Standards and Integrity Board was amended to a 'Professional Standards, Integrity and Ethics Board'. The first ethical issue considered at this board was the offer of free bus travel to officers by local bus companies.

The Code of Ethics sits at the centre of the National Decision Model, so is explicitly referenced and considered in any decision making situation. It is emphasised during training such as Officer Safety Training, where decision making about use of force is

covered. It is clearly set out in the policy booklets used by officers in command situations. It is also applied to personnel processes, policies and explicitly included in areas of work such as dealing with grievances.

2.3.2 Monitoring standards

Conduct and behaviour

Standards of conduct and personal behaviour required of all officers and staff are embedded in the Police Conduct Regulations, 2012, and the Police Staff Misconduct Policy and Procedure.

Standards are governed by the Professional Standards, Integrity and Ethics Board, which is chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable (DCC). The meeting's remit is to oversee integrity and monitor standards of behaviour and conduct within the Force, ensuring that they are in line with the Force values and have a positive impact on Force reputation and public confidence.

A report on IPCC investigations is presented at the NOPCC's Audit and Scrutiny Panel to inform the PCC on cases the Force has referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). It also details any outcomes and recommendations the IPCC has referred back to the Force during this period, and other learning identified.

The 'early intervention process', which was introduced in 2014/15, has proved effective in enabling PSD to intercede as soon as possible where Officers or members of staff highlighted at being at particular risk of breaching conduct standards.

Complaints

There are robust mechanisms in place with respect to the governance of complaints in Force. Complaints are managed in accordance with statutory guidance provided by the IPCC. To provide internal assurance, a Performance and Insight Report, monitoring the complaints process, is produced on a monthly basis. This report provides statistical data and analysis on public complaints and allegations recorded by Division and Department, diversity monitoring of complainants and Officers and Staff receiving complaints, mode of resolution, timeliness and outcomes. The report is discussed in detail at the Professional Standards, Integrity and Ethics Board. All learning is captured and fed into a service improvement plan. Full detailed reports are also produced on a quarterly basis, which are a retrospective of the previous 12 months.

A monthly progress report is provided for Divisional and Departmental Heads detailing officers who are currently under suspension notices and restricted duties, outstanding local resolutions, employees subject to three or more complaints and stop and search complaint allegations.

The Force's AGS for 2014/15 highlighted a recommendation made by HMIC following the inspection of 'Police Integrity and Corruption', that the Force should 'review its capacity and capability to carry out proportionate investigations into public complaints to minimise delays¹'. Assurance has been provided that resources within PSD are regularly reviewed and fixed term contracts used where necessary to manage workload; recent data from the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) shows that the Force is now in line with national averages.

During 2015/16 HMIC inspected the Force to ascertain 'how legitimate the Force are at keeping people safe and reducing crime'. The overall judgement was 'good' and it was found that the Force dealt with complaints and misconduct fairly and consistently

¹ HMIC: Police Integrity and Corruption, November 2014, <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/>

and investigations were free from bias. Furthermore the report stated that 'there were procedures in place which ensured consistent decision-making complaint investigations across officers and staff'.

Confidential reporting

There are clear processes in place around confidential reporting. The Professional Standards Reporting Procedure sets out the ways in which individuals within the Force can report breaches of PSD in a supportive and confidential environment. The Procedure was reviewed and refreshed in 2014 to reflect the introduction of Integrity Messenger, the Force's online confidential reporting tool.

Local resolution

Where appropriate, for less serious conduct issues, a process of local resolution may be used to address a complainants concerns quickly and effectively, without the need for formal investigation. A 'guide to locally resolving complaints against police or police staff' is provided by PSD. The IPCC target time for locally resolving complaints is 28 days from the date it was first recorded. The Force's performance is measured against this target and against other forces.

Conflicts of interest

Force procedure regarding Business Interests and Additional Employment for Police Officers and Police Staff was revised during 2015/16 following HMIC's report 'Police Integrity and Corruption'. It was recommended that the Force should ensure that any secondary employment or business interest applications which have been declined or withdrawn are followed up on to ensure compliance. The Procedure has since been updated to ensure all refused interests are subject to review by line managers.

A redacted version of the Register of Approved Business Interests is published on the Force website annually; any changes are reported on a monthly basis to the Professional Standards, Integrity and Ethics Board.

The Notifiable Associations for Police Personnel Procedure was also reviewed during 2015/16. It identifies the procedures that should be followed should police personnel consider themselves the subject of, or suspect another member of staff to have, a notifiable association.

Integrity Health Check

A new process was introduced in 2014/15 whereby staff and officers receive an annual Integrity Health Check alongside their Personal Development Review (PDR). It has been identified, however, that as PDRs have not been carried out consistently during 2015/16 Integrity Health Checks have also not been completed for all officers and staff. A new electronic PDR process has now been introduced which incorporates the Integrity Health Check. It is recommended that the completion of PDRs is reported to Divisional and Departmental Heads to ensure compliance with the Integrity Health Check process.

2.3.3 Information assurance

Information management

Information management is governed through the Force Information Assurance Board (FIAB), chaired by the DCC as the Senior Information Risk Officer (SIRO). The role of the Board is to manage the effectiveness of information management arrangements to ensure that information held, processed and accessed by members of the Force and stakeholders is managed in line with legislative requirements.

During 2014/15 HMIC conducted 'Building the Picture', an inspection of police information management. As part of a local response to the 'Building the Picture'

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recommendations, a new Information Management Strategy (IMS) was developed and published. The purpose of the IMS is to set out a roadmap for further developing information management capability and effectively embedding an information assurance culture across the Force in line with guidance and standards issued as part of Authorised Professional Practice.

Information management training is managed and commissioned regionally via the Regional Information Assurance Group (RIAG). Due to the prioritisation of Niche implementation during this time it was decided that the new Information management training package will be scheduled for completion later in 2016.

Information Asset Owners (IAOs)

In 2014, the Force undertook an Information Asset Register Project. This project constituted of three stages, the first being engagement with identified IAOs in order to identify their information assets, their sensitivity/importance and through life management. Stage 2 constituted engagement with nominated Information Asset Delegates (IADs), who have day-to-day administrative responsibilities of each asset, in order to ensure correct protection and use of each asset.

The project has now entered Stage 3 'Continuous Improvement'. The sensitivity/importance of the identified information assets has been catalogued, allowing for closer scrutiny of each. This allows for the continual identification of Information Assurance improvements.

During the governance review it was identified that further training with IAOs is required during 2016/17 to ensure they fully understand their roles and responsibilities, including ownership of information risk and attendance at FIAB.

Data protection and 'Freedom of Information'

Nottinghamshire Police as a public authority have a legal responsibility to respond to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Data Protection Subject Access Requests (DP SARs) within legislative deadlines. An annual report is presented to the Audit and Scrutiny Panel to provide the Panel with data on legislative compliance with the FOIA and DP SARs. This data is also presented at the FIAB quarterly.

The Force has a number of Information Sharing Agreements (ISAs) in place with partners and other agencies. ISAs identify the statutory or common law basis for sharing personal information and the extent and nature of the personal information to be shared. They also set out common standards for the processing and handling of such information, including quality, retention and security considerations.

All ISAs are formally approved by the SIRO who holds the National Police Chief's Council (NPCC) Portfolio for Information Sharing. In order to ensure all ISAs are fit for purpose they were reviewed during 2015/16.

Records Management requirements are currently identified as an area for review under the Standards and Change programme for the Strategic Alliance. A Strategic Initiative Plan for Records Management has also been established under the umbrella of the Information Management Strategy. Each action is allocated ownership and the progress against actions is reported on quarterly at the FIAB.

Information security and assurance

The Information Security Team ensures that the Force continues to meet the required security standards to allow it to connect to the Public Services Network for Policing (PSNP) in line with Codes of Connection. The team engages with the National Accreditors and maintains a current PSN certificate of accreditation.

The team liaises with the National Policing Information Risk Management Team (NPIRMT), based at the Home Office, on national initiatives and projects. They also attend the local Regional Information Assurance Board (RIAG), chaired by DCC Fish, for regional initiatives and projects and the Police Information Assurance Forum (PIAF), biannually.

Information risk

An Information Risk Management Strategy was developed and published in 2015/16. The Strategy describes how the Force Risk Management Policy will be applied across all business areas, so that the management of risk becomes an integral part of the management of information assets. An Information Risk Register has been developed and risks are reported quarterly to FIAB.

It is acknowledged that the Information Risk Management process requires further development and this has been identified in an earlier action with the development of Corporate Risk Management.

2.4 Principle 4: Taking informed and transparent decisions which are subject to effective scrutiny and managing risk

2.4.1 Decision making

Corporate Development and Finance are jointly responsible for implementing mechanisms to ensure all appropriate considerations are made when making a key decision, for example when writing business cases, scopes, project initiation documents, policies, procedures and strategy.

Decision making is recorded as part of minutes, action plans and decision logs. Key decisions from the FEB are no longer published on the Force's intranet, it is recommended that this requirement is reviewed and addressed in 2016/17. Additionally it is a requirement of the ICO Publication Scheme that the Force publish how key decisions are made on the external website. This should take the form of minutes of key Force meetings, such as the FEB. This is not currently done and has also been identified as an area for improvement for 2016/17.

An internal review of the current Force meeting structure was commissioned following a Chief Officer Team restructure in 2015. The objective of the review is to streamline the current meeting structure to facilitate an efficient and effective decision making framework. Outcomes will also include up to date, concise terms of reference for each meeting, standardised templates for agendas and action and decision recording and clear meeting guidelines. This review is on-going.

Business planning

The Force has made significant developments in the introduction and governance of new activity during 2015/16. The 'Activity Request' process has been developed to implement further control over the introduction of new activity, outside of business as usual. The objective of this process is to ensure prioritisation of available resource in supporting departments, including Finance, HR, Assets and IS, and full oversight of improvement activity taking place in Force. This process has omitted duplication of activity and appropriate allocation of resource for prioritised activity.

There has also been improved governance and oversight of efficiency savings with a more robust process for identification and subsequent monitoring of realisation. Senior Responsible Officers (SROs) are responsible for producing business case for the efficiency targets and how these will be achieved; it will then be validated by both Finance and HR. This process ensures that all costs are accounted for and staff savings are accurately identified and not double counted across departments.

Delivery of the savings programme and the achievement of efficiency targets are monitored and reported to the Transformation Board. To ensure comprehensive management overview of the DtF Programme and associated efficiency savings, a dashboard has been developed which will be presented at the Board on a monthly basis. This includes an update on workstreams, key risks and issues and individual updates from Finance, HR and Procurement. This tool will enable proportionate monitoring and achievement of savings for the forthcoming year.

2.4.2 Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel

In accordance with the Financial Management Code of Practice for the police service, issued by the Home Office, the PCC and the Chief Constable established a Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel (the Panel) in 2013. The role of the Panel is to advise the PCC and Chief Constable on the adequacy of the corporate governance and risk management arrangements in place and the associated control environment, advising according to good governance principles and proper practices.

The Panel also assist the PCC and the Chief Constable in fulfilling their responsibility for ensuring value for money and they oversee an annual programme of scrutiny of key areas of policing activity on behalf of the PCC.

The Panel meets four times a year and consists of five independent members. The terms of reference for the Panel, meeting agendas, minutes and associated reports are published on the NOPCC's website in the interests of transparency and accountability.

The role of the Head of Internal Audit

In compliance with CIPFA guidance, the NOPCC and the Force have appointed a Head of Internal Audit. This role is contracted out to Mazars, who are responsible for the organisation's internal audit service, on behalf of the CFO, including drawing up the internal audit strategy and annual plan and giving the internal annual audit opinion.

2.4.3 Risk management

The joint Risk Management Policy of the Force and the Office of the PCC has been in place since mid-2015. A Risk Management Process Guide has been produced alongside this to support managers in understanding how to apply the policy to the decision making process. Since the departure of the registered Risk Practitioner in July 2015, professional support and advice on corporate risk management has been provided to the Force and the NOPCC by the Planning and Policy Team within the Corporate Development department.

Whilst the current process satisfies the Force's risk management responsibilities it is not as effective or proactive as the agreed procedure was. It has been agreed with the DCC that the formal risk reviews process will be reintroduced and that the process for identifying potential new risks would be further developed.

An Information Risk Management Strategy has been approved by the FIAB and is now being implemented by IAOs. Risk management strategies for other business portfolios and programmes are still in development. Risk management maturity within the Force remains relatively low, but is expected to improve as processes becomes embedded and experience in its use increases.

The Planning and Policy Team provides a quarterly report on strategic risk management to the FEB and the Audit and Scrutiny Panel. This includes a summary of current strategic risks and an overview of risk management activity during the reporting period.

2.4.4 Audit and inspection

Internal audit

The Force's risk based Internal Audit Plan (the Plan) for 2015/16 was agreed and presented to the Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel (the Panel) in June 2015. The Plan was informed by the assurance mapping process which gives a dashboard view of assurance levels against functional areas and Force risks. Where an area is deemed to have limited assurance it will be recommended for inclusion in the Plan.

External audit

In respect of external audit, progress reports are provided to the Panel by KPMG to provide a summary of the work they plan to undertake for the audit year, together with a high level assessment of the risks that have been considered as part of the initial planning process.

KPMG conduct an 'interim audit visit', which takes place in April, and a 'final accounts visit', which takes place in July. Communication is on-going with the Force Finance team throughout the year and feedback is provided to the Panel on any potential risk areas arising during the year.

Outcomes from audit and inspection

An Audit and Inspection Report is presented to the FEB and the Panel on a quarterly basis to enable the Panel to fulfil its scrutiny obligations to oversee and consider Force arrangements to deliver against audit and inspection recommendations.

2.4.5 Managing legislative change

EMCHRS L&D provide a monthly horizon scanning report for the East Midlands Region. 'Skyline' draws on a number of sources including West Yorkshire's 'On the Horizon', the IPCC 'Learning the Lessons Bulletin' and the 'College of Policing Digest'.

Any changes to finance legislation is monitored through professional network subscriptions, such as CIPFA. Potential changes are discussed by the Finance team and action taken as appropriate.

Planning and Policy have identified a requirement for improvement in the proactive identification of risk and opportunity arising from changes to legislation and national crime and justice policy. It is recommended a process is implemented to ensure robust oversight of horizon scanning outcomes and subsequent identification and assessment of risk and opportunity in consultation with the relevant lead officer.

2.5 Principle 5: Developing the capacity and capability of the Force to be effective

2.5.1 Delivering the Future (DtF)

The Capacity and Capability workstreams which were launched in 2015, they are key to the Force meeting its objectives under 'Principle 5' 'developing the capacity and capability of the Force to be effective'. The Capacity workstream will look to ensure that the Force understands the workforce as it is now and how it will be until 2020 and how to match resource to demand. It will explore our current systems and processes, allowing the Force to identify how to make them lean, yet effective, releasing capacity for the Force.

The workstream aims to review the Force's capacity, with a view to ensuring it can meet current and future demand, with the resources it has at its disposal. The Force needs to consistently review how it works and why (Check, Plan, Do), and by

reviewing the processes and systems in place, the work stream will aim to provide recommendations to improve/increase Force capacity, thereby ensuring the Force continues to deliver an efficient and effective service to the public and the communities it serves.

The workstream has initiated a formal review process, based on an annual continuous review cycle, with a right first time approach to dealing with and managing demand, reducing duplication, time delays and handovers, completing tasks in an effective and efficient way, reassessing proportionality, particularly concerning the investigation of crime and reduction in the victim journey.

The main aims of the Capability workstream are to understand what officers and staff can do, what skills they have and what skills will be required in the future. The Force must ensure that officers and staff have the training, equipment and technology to meet the demand faced in protecting its communities. To achieve this, the Force has recently agreed five recommendations:

- Explicitly use the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment as a specific category within all training request templates;
- Where there is an agreed minimum level of trained officers for statutory requirements e.g. Public Order and Civil Emergencies; the force monitors these levels and reports by exception to the Training Priorities Panel (TPP);
- Where the skills fall outside of the minimum levels prescribed by the National Policing Requirement the force agrees what levels the force requires and ensures these are both maintained and monitored via the TPP;
- The external training request template be amended to show current numbers of officers who are trained and currently hold that skill;
- To allocate an operational client lead for each area of training.

2.5.2 Induction

On commencement of 'employment' all new police officers complete the Police Constable Student Officer Learning and Assessment Portfolio (PC-SOLAP) as part of their Initial Police Learning and Development Programme (IPLDP). An equivalent SOLAP is also completed by PCSOs and Special Constables. The Professionalising Investigations Programme (PIP) provides accredited training for the development of investigative skills.

Following their initial training on the IPLDP programme all student officers complete the Police Constable Student Officer Learning and Assessment Portfolio (PC-SOLAP). A role-focused assessment portfolio is also completed in a similar way by PCSO's and Special Constables. The Professionalising Investigations Programme Level 1 (PIP) forms a part of the PC-SOLAP, and is an accredited assessment of initial investigative skills for priority and volume crime.

An 'Induction Checklist' was developed by HR which all line managers are required to complete within three months of new members of staff commencing their role, however, this was never fully implemented. It is recommended that this action is refreshed to ensure a robust and consistent induction process for new starters.

2.5.3 Training

Learning and development is delivered collaboratively by EMCHRS L&D. Each force within the collaboration holds quarterly Training Priority Panels which set the learning and development priorities. Training priorities are based on consideration of risk and forthcoming legislative changes; they are informed by both emerging national issues and local priorities.

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Completion of training is formally monitored with regular reports being produced and completion / non completion records sent to BCU and department leads. Completion is discussed at every TPP meeting as part of the KPI reports.

The National Centre for Applied Learning Technologies (NCALT) Managed Learning Environment (MLE) is used to provide a range of e-learning courses to officers and staff, who are required to complete mandatory packages on topics such as Health and Safety and Information Assurance.

A link to the force e-learning calendar is provided on the EMCHRS L&D intranet page to give advanced notification of the release of NCALT packages. E-learning is also promoted via Weekly Orders and the intranet to encourage completion. Reports are received from EMCHRS on staff and officer who have completed NCALT exercises. This is also reported to the Training Priorities Panel.

Individual training needs should be assessed as part of the PDR process however there is limited assurance that PDRs have taken place consistently across the Force during 2015/16. This finding is supported by HMIC's PEEL Legitimacy Inspection. In response to this, a new PDR process went live in April 2016 which will allow officers and staff to store evidence and update objectives online throughout the year. Competency gaps can also be recorded and training and development needs identified as a result. Reports will be generated for divisional and departmental heads to assess the level of compliance within their respective areas.

2.5.4 Career pathways

Career pathways have been introduced for investigating officers during 2015/16. There is also a Senior Detective Panel which seeks to identify requirements and develop officers in specific areas. 2015/16 is also the second year of the Annual Detectives Conference which comprises of four days training for all Force detectives.

2.5.5 Succession planning

A Succession Planning Framework was agreed at the FEB in June 2015. The existing process for senior detective succession planning was extended and enhanced to include all senior police officer posts within the Force at Chief Inspector and above. Due to limited resources, the agreed Framework has not yet been implemented. Succession planning does take place in Force although not in a consistent and structured manner, it is recommended this is reviewed as part of the Strategic Alliance.

2.6 Principle 6: Engaging with local people and other stakeholders to ensure robust public accountability

2.6.1 Community engagement and consultation

Neighbourhood policing engagement

There are a number of engagement mechanisms in place for services delivered in the community. Formal mechanisms include Victim Satisfaction Surveys, Neighbourhood Watch Meetings, Locality Boards, Key Individual Networks and Independent Advisory Groups.

The Force has developed a robust structure of strategic and local Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs) which represent different community groups across the City and County Divisions. They provide an invaluable service to the Force in three core areas; critical incidents, building trust and confidence and advising on strategies, policies and procedures.

The Neighbourhood Alert Electronic Communication System is designed to help members of the public communicate with their local Neighbourhood Policing Team and their local Neighbourhood Watch Coordinator. The system can be used to report information about suspicious behaviour and antisocial behaviour and to allow users to be sent information about crime trends in their area and community safety and crime reduction advice. The aim is to provide up-to-date information direct to registered members to support two-way communication between members of the public, Nottinghamshire Police and Neighbourhood Watch.

There are also a number of partnership mechanisms in place to consult and engage with communities in the City. The City Council Community Cohesion Team work to reduce inequalities, discrimination and levels of deprivation and increase community engagement, promote interaction and increase safety and respect of individuals and communities.

The Respect for Nottingham Survey is commissioned by the CDP. The Survey explores the views of local residents about their local area in relation to ASB, crime and community safety and the strategic partnership between the Police and Council.

HMIC's PEEL Legitimacy inspection identified that officers and staff have a good understanding of the people they serve, however this understanding is not formally recorded, which means it cannot be shared across teams. It was recommended that 'the Force should ensure that its local teams have sufficient information available to them to improve their understanding of local communities²'. This action is being progressed by the City and County divisions to ensure adequate assurance can be provided in this area.

Digital media

At a universal level engagement takes place through social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. The Force website also provides a forum for local updates from each Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) area along with priorities, contact details and details of engagement events. The Neighbourhood Priority Survey was introduced as part of a commitment to creating safer neighbourhoods; it allows individuals in the community to influence how their area is policed by completing a short survey which is available on the Force website.

Thematic online events are held regularly to enable the public to interact with the Chief Officer Team, with other members of the Force and the NOPCC on relevant matters.

Victim Satisfaction Surveys

The Market Research Team currently undertakes a large survey project with victims of crime, in addition to other ad hoc pieces of consultation, such as Staff Surveys, Professional Standards Directorate External Complainant Survey and engagement support.

Market Research currently manage the sampling, feedback and reporting of approximately 5,500 telephone surveys with members of the public, per year, for victim satisfaction purposes. Victim Satisfaction Surveys are structured around a number of core questions, exploring satisfaction around contacting the police, the actions taken by the police, being kept informed, how the victim was treated. The results are reported within monthly the Performance & Insight Report, Confidence and Satisfaction dashboard, Satisfaction by Team report and also at Organisation Performance Review meetings.

² HMIC: PEEL Legitimacy, February 2016, p.29, <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/>

2.6.2 Workforce engagement and consultation

The Force consults with the trade unions when proposing changes in pay and conditions which are not set nationally. Consultation with Police Staff Associations takes place at the Joint Negotiating and Staff Consultative Committee, chaired by the Chief Constable.

A Memorandum of Understanding between the Force and the Diversity Staff Support Associations (DSSAs) documents agreed arrangements between the Force and DSSAs in terms of funding, use of ICT and facilities and the implementation of a DSSA Support Manager who will receive regular updates on DSSA agendas.

The People Survey, which was developed by Durham University, took place in June 2015. Outcomes were explored by Senior Managers through further interviewing of officers and staff. The resulting data was assessed qualitatively by the Research function and discussed at a Senior Leadership Conference in order to identify and prioritise actions. Implementation of the actions is being monitored via the People Board, which provides a forum for attendees from across the organisation to discuss ideas and suggestions to improve the working environment.

The Force intranet provides an informal forum for internal feedback including online chats and discussion forums which enable staff to voice issues that matter to them with members of the Chief Officer Team or relevant department such as the MFSS discussion forum.

3.0 Review of effectiveness

Nottinghamshire Police has responsibility for conducting, at least annually, a review of the effectiveness of its governance framework. The review of effectiveness is informed by the work of the Chief Officer Team, the Heads of Divisions and Departments and other senior managers within the Force who have responsibility for the development and maintenance of the systems of internal control. It is also informed by the reports of the Force's internal auditors and external inspectorates, such as HMIC.

During the review, each Chief Officer Team member and Divisional and Departmental Head have provided the Chief Constable with a comprehensive, signed Statement of Assurance which outlines their compliance with the Force's governance framework during 2015/16. An overall Force response has been summarised in this Statement.

Where weaknesses in internal controls have been identified, improvement actions have been established, which will be addressed during the forthcoming financial year. Outcomes will be monitored by the FEB and the Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel, on a quarterly basis.

4.0 Improvement actions

The review process to support the production of the Annual Governance Statement in 2015/16 identified a number of improvement actions, which are summarised in Appendix A of this report. These have been agreed with the respective Divisional and Departmental Heads to address weaknesses identified in the Force's systems of internal control. These issues are significant in that they cover a large proportion of the organisation's activities and/ or are key risk controls and therefore require a corporate solution.

Please see Appendix B to this Statement for an update on the improvement actions identified in the Force's 2014/15 Statement.

Chief Constable and Chief Finance Officer Declaration

We propose over the coming year to take steps to address the improvement actions identified in Appendix A to further enhance our governance arrangements. We are satisfied that these steps will address the need for improvements that were identified in our review of effectiveness and will monitor their implementation as part of our next annual review.

Signed _____

Signed _____

Date _____

Date _____

Chris Eyre
Chief Constable

Paul Dawkins
ACO Finance and Resources
Chief Financial Officer

Appendix A: Identified improvement actions from 2015/16

The following improvement actions were identified for 2015/16, these are summarised according to the relevant governance principle.

Principle 2: Leaders, officers and partners working together to achieve a common purpose with clearly defined functions and roles

Identified improvement action(s):	Lead Dept.
Negotiation should take place between the PCC, Nottinghamshire Police and MFSS to establish how the current authorisation limits, as agreed within the scheme of delegation, can be embedded into the current purchasing process. All approval of purchases should then be in line with the agreed Scheme of Delegation and Financial Regulations. (Mazars, Core Financials)	Finance
The Force should review its Expenses Policy to ensure it remains fit for purpose and includes clear guidance on all categories of expenses and those which are appropriate to be claimed through the self-serve systems. The review should also ensure that authorised limited for categories of expenditure remain valid. (Mazars, Core Financials)	Human Resources
The NOPCC should undertake a review of the Governance and Decision Making Framework to ensure it remains up to date and fit for purpose in terms of the way decisions are required to be made. Particularly those with a non-financial impact (or of significant public interest) which are not currently covered in the Working Together document. (Mazars, Joint Code of Corporate Governance)	NOPCC
Contracts should be in place for all purchases over £25000 and these should be signed by all parties prior to the commencement of the contract. (Mazars, Procurement)	EMSCU
A formal approval process should be established within the Force before new suppliers are entered into the Oracle system. (Mazars, Procurement)	Finance
Management should look to implement an exception reporting system in conjunction with the MFSS to monitor payments which are outside of the approved process. (Mazars, Procurement)	Finance

Principle 3: Promoting values for the Force and demonstrating the values of good governance through upholding high standards of conduct and behaviour

Identified improvement action(s):	Lead Dept.
Conduct further training with IAOs during 2016/17 to ensure they fully understand their roles and responsibilities, including ownership of information risk and attendance at FIAB.	Information Management
Implement a strategy for the further development of MoPI in Force, which provides a detailed improvement delivery plan.	Information Management

Principle 4: Taking informed and transparent decisions which are subject to effective scrutiny and managing risk

Identified improvement action(s):	Lead Dept.
Introduce a mechanism for publishing key decisions made at the FEB, both internally and externally, in line with the ICO Publication Scheme.	Corporate Comms
Ensure consistency in publishing key decisions from the FEB on the intranet to promote internal transparency and engagement.	Corporate Comms
Introduce a quarterly update to the FEB on improvement actions identified in the AGS to ensure robust oversight of implementation.	Corporate Development
Evaluate, review and further develop the risk management and information risk management process to enable effective decision making within the Force and the NOPCC.	Corporate Development
Re-establish a formal quarterly risk review and reporting process and further develop the process for identifying potential new risks.	Corporate Development
Implement a process to ensure robust oversight of horizon scanning outcomes and subsequent identification and assessment of risk and opportunity in consultation with the relevant lead officer.	Corporate Development

Principle 5: Developing the capacity and capability of the Force to be effective

Identified improvement action(s):	Lead Dept.
It is recommended that proper recording and reporting mechanisms are developed for skills and training of officers and staff through MFSS. This is critical to ongoing delivery of appropriate training.	MFSS
Review the requirement for formal succession planning framework as part of the Strategic Alliance.	Human Resources

Principle 6: Engaging with local people and other stakeholders to ensure robust public accountability

Identified improvement action(s):	Lead Dept.
The Force should ensure that its local teams have sufficient information available to them to improve their understanding of local communities. (HMIC: Legitimacy)	City and County Division

Appendix B: Update of improvement actions from 2014/15

The following is a summary of recommendations for improvement identified in the 2014/15 AGS alongside the Force's response.

Identified improvement action(s)	Force response
<p>The Force should implement its plans for a new and affordable operating model in order to reduce long term risks to policing services.</p> <p>(HMIC: Valuing the Police Inspection, October 2014)</p>	<p>This recommendation continues to be addressed under the Designing the Future Programme (DtF). New Response and Public Protection operating models were implemented during 2015. A new Thematic Policing Model is set to be introduced during mid-2016.</p>
<p>Address concerns about inconsistencies with investigation offending, the importance of supervision and the need for professional training.</p> <p>(HMIC: Crime Inspection, October 2014)</p>	<p>The Force is dedicated to professionalising investigations, in order to address inconsistencies and to improve supervision the following has been implemented. Every month there is a Professionalising Investigations meeting that has several work streams including Disclosure, Investigative Interviewing, Proportionality and Investigations Standards. These areas are dip tested to ensure consistency and high standards are maintained.</p> <p>Supervisors' briefings have been implemented for Investigations, which include hints and tips around the Golden Hour and the 5 Building Blocks. Sergeants have also been on a back to basics training course that looks to refresh their knowledge on disclosure and file quality. The Force has also implemented Career Pathways which aims to rotate the skills of the DC's and DS' to ensure an omni-competent workforce. In March 2016 there were four Crime Conferences for DC's, PIO's and DS' which delivered CPD learning to about 400 officers.</p>
<p>Address the potential for improvements in management oversight of child protection work, including the benefits of service reviews and the use of performance data to improve services and develop work with partner agencies.</p> <p>(HMIC: National Child Protection Inspections, September 2014)</p>	<p>Work continues in this area to address a number of interdependent recommendations from HMIC with regard to child protection. Implementation of actions will be overseen by the FEB and the Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel.</p>
<p>The Force should review its capacity and capability to carry out proportionate investigations into public complaints to</p>	<p>Action complete. Resources within PSD are regularly reviewed to manage workload; recent data from the</p>

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<p>minimise delays.</p> <p>(HMIC: Police Integrity and Corruption, November 2014)</p>	<p>Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) shows that the Force is now in line with national averages with regard to investigations into public complaints.</p>
<p>Recommend development of an information management strategy, which should clarify responsibilities and procedures across areas including records management, information security and data quality.</p> <p>(Baker Tilly: Information Management, July 2014)</p>	<p>Action complete. An Information Management Strategy was developed in 2015/16 to set out a roadmap for further developing IM capability and effectively embedding an information assurance culture across the Force. Implementation is on-going.</p>
<p>Recommend tighter procedures and documenting of actions taken in compliance with the Code of Practice for Victims, and also a more formal approach to the delivery and monitoring of training with the Code.</p> <p>(Baker Tilly: Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, July 2015)</p>	<p>Action partially complete. A briefing has been published on the Force intranet to give officers and staff 'Important Victim of Code of Practice Pointers' to ensure compliance with the Code. Sergeants on Division have also been asked to brief their teams with regard to changes and requirements. These will also be communicated through weekly orders.</p> <p>Officers are required to document details of the needs assessment at the point of entering a crime occurrence onto Niche, unless there are extenuating circumstances.</p> <p>Training continues to be monitored through EMCHRS.</p>
<p>Develop and deliver the Force's Special Constabulary and Volunteers Strategy.</p> <p>(Baker Tilly: Volunteering, April 2015)</p>	<p>Action complete. The Citizens in Policing Department Strategic Plan and associated delivery plan is now being implemented.</p>

For Comment	
Public/Non Public*	Public
Report to:	Audit and Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	30th June 2016
Report of:	Chief Finance Officer
Report Author:	Charlotte Radford
Other Contacts:	Brian Welch
Agenda Item:	11

INTERNAL AUDIT ANNUAL ASSURANCE REPORT 2015-16

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To provide members with the assurance from Internal Audit work undertaken during the year 2015-16.

2. Recommendations

- 2.1 Members are recommended to consider the attached report and make comment.

3. Reasons for Recommendations

- 3.1 This report complies with the principles of good governance in providing assurance to the panel members.

4. Summary of Key Points

- 4.1 This is the first annual report from Mazars and provides adequate assurance rating for the OPCC and the Force.
- 4.2 Areas of weakness have been identified during the year, which will need to be addressed by the Force. These will be followed up during 2016-17.

5. Financial Implications and Budget Provision

- 5.1 None as a direct result of this report.

6. Human Resources Implications

- 6.1 None as a direct result of this report.

7. Equality Implications

- 7.1 None as a direct result of this report.

8. Risk Management

8.1 The areas of improvement do include audit recommendations flagged as red.

9. Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

9.1 This complies with good governance and financial regulations

10. Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

10.1 None.

11. Details of outcome of consultation

11.1 Not applicable

12. Appendices

12.1 Appendix A – Annual Internal Audit Report 2015-16

Office of the Police & Crime Commissioner for Nottinghamshire and
Nottinghamshire Police

Draft Internal Audit Annual Report 2015/16

May 2016

This report has been prepared on the basis of the limitations set out on page 13.

Contents

- 01 Introduction
- 02 Head of Internal Audit Opinion
- 03 Performance

Appendices

- A1 Audit Opinions and Recommendations 2015/16
- A2 Audit Projects with Limited and Nil Assurance 2015/16
- A3 Definition of Assurances and Priorities
- A4 Contact Details
- A5 Statement of Responsibility

01 Introduction

Purpose of this Report

This report summarises the work that Internal Audit has undertaken and the key control environment themes identified across Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Nottinghamshire and Nottinghamshire Police during the 2015/16 financial year, the service for which is provided by Mazars LLP.

The purpose of the Annual Internal Audit Report is to meet the Head of Internal Audit annual reporting requirements set out in the Public Sector Internal Audit Standards (PSIAS) and the Accounts and Audit Regulations 2011. The PSIAS requirements are that the report must include:

- An annual internal audit opinion on the overall adequacy and effectiveness of the organisation's governance, risk and control framework (the control environment);
- A summary of the audit work from which the opinion is derived (including reliance placed on the work by other assurance bodies); and
- A statement on conformation with the PSIAS and the results of the internal audit quality assurance and improvement programme (QAIP), if applicable.

The report should also include:

- The disclosure of any qualifications to that opinion, together with reasons for the qualification;
- The disclosure of any impairments or restriction in scope;
- A comparison of the work actually undertaken with the work that was planned and a summary of the performance of the internal audit function against its performance measures and targets;
- Any issues judged to be particularly relevant to the preparation of the annual governance statement; and
- Progress against any improvement plans resulting from QAIP external assessment.

The Police and Crime Commissioner and Chief Constable are responsible for ensuring that the organisations have proper internal control and management systems in place. In order to do this, they must obtain assurance on the effectiveness of those systems throughout the year, and are required to make a statement on the effectiveness of internal control within their annual report and financial statements.

Internal audit provides the Police and Crime Commissioner and Chief Constable, through the Joint Audit & Scrutiny Panel (JASP), with an independent and objective opinion on governance, risk management and internal control and their effectiveness in achieving the organisation's agreed objectives. Internal audit also has an independent and objective advisory role to help line managers improve governance, risk management and internal control. The work of internal audit, culminating in our annual opinion, forms a part of the OPCC and Force's overall assurance framework and assists in preparing an informed statement on internal control.

Responsibility for a sound system of internal control rests with the Police and Crime Commissioner and Chief Constable and work performed by internal audit should not be relied upon to identify all weaknesses which exist or all improvements which may be made. Effective implementation of our recommendations makes an important contribution to the maintenance of reliable systems of internal control and governance.

02 Head of Internal Audit Opinion

Opinions

From the Internal Audit work undertaken in compliance with the Public Sector Internal Audit Standards (PSIAS) for the year ending 31st March 2016, we can provide the following opinions:



Basis of the Opinion

Internal Audit applies a risk-based approach and our audits assess the governance framework, the risk management process, as well as the effectiveness of controls across a number of areas. Our findings on these themes are set out below. Overall, we can provide assurance that management have in place a generally effective control environment and, whilst further remedial actions are needed in some areas, we are assured that management have in place an effective processes for the implementation of identified areas of weakness.

Corporate Governance

As part of our work this year, we undertook an audit of the controls and processes in place in respect of the Joint Code of Corporate Governance. The specific areas that formed part of this review included: legislation and guidance, production of the annual governance statement's, performance monitoring, roles and responsibilities and the decision making framework. We provided a significant assurance opinion and concluded that risks in terms of the joint corporate governance framework are overall being managed effectively. The arrangements are clearly defined within the 'Corporate Governance and Working Together 2014/18' document which is widely available and published on the Nottinghamshire Police & Crime Commissioner's website.

Risk Management

During the course of delivering the audit programme a key element of each audit scope is to evaluate the control environment and, in particular, how key risks are being managed. As summarised in the 'Internal Control' section below, we were, on the whole, able to place reliance on the systems of internal control, albeit there are a number of areas where remedial action is required in order to strengthen the control environment. More details are provided in Appendix A2 – Audit Projects with Limited and Nil Assurance 2015/16.

Internal Control

In summarising the opinions provided as part of the 2015/16 audit programme, as illustrated in the tables below, we have carried out ten audits of which one was of an advisory nature and no opinion was provided. Of the remaining nine audits, one (Core Financials) was split into five separate area opinions and covered both local controls and those in operation within the Multi-Force Shared Service (MFSS). In addition, we have carried out four collaborative audits, of which two were of an advisory nature and no opinion was provided.

The Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Nottinghamshire and Nottinghamshire Police have a generally sound control environment, although we have noted areas where improvements are required. During the 2015/16 year, 54% of internal audit projects received “significant” or “satisfactory assurance”. During 2015/16 six (46%) internal audit areas were rated ‘limited assurance’. It should be noted, however, that some of the opinions reflect the control environment outside of local control, for example, within EMSCU (Procurement) and the Multi-Force Shared Service (Core Financials). Further details of these audits is provided in Appendix A2 – Audit Projects with Limited and Nil Assurance 2015/16.

Of the four collaborative audits covering the East Midlands policing region, one was rated ‘significant assurance’, one was rated ‘satisfactory assurance’ whilst in two instances they related to advisory work and no audit opinion was provided.

The following tables provide a brief overview of the assurance gradings given as a consequence of audits carried out during 2015/16, split between those specific to Nottinghamshire and those undertaken as part of East Midlands regional collaborative audits. More details of the audit opinions and the priority of recommendations for all 2015/16 Internal Audit assignments is provided in Appendix A1 – Audit Opinions and Recommendations.

Nottinghamshire Only

Assurance Gradings	2015/16	
Significant	1	8%
Satisfactory	6	46%
Limited	6	46%
Nil	0	0%
Sub-Total	13¹	
No opinion	1	
Total	14	

¹ Core Financials – issued as one report, although split into five areas / opinions.

Collaboration Audits

Assurance Gradings	2015/16	
Significant	1	50%
Satisfactory	1	50%
Limited	0	0%
Nil	0	0%
Sub-Total	2	
No opinion	2	
Total	4	

In arriving at our overall audit opinion, and whilst acknowledging that further remedial actions are needed in some areas, we have been assured by management that processes have been put in place for the implementation of recommendations to address identified areas of weakness.

Issues relevant to Annual Governance Statement

The work of internal audit, culminating in our annual opinion, forms a part of the OPCC and Force's overall assurance framework and assists in preparing an informed statement on internal control. Internal Audit, through its annual programme of activity, has a duty to bring to your attention any areas of weakness we believe should be considered when producing the Annual Governance Statement. As part of this responsibility, we have highlighted any limited or nil assurance reports within Appendix A2.

Restriction placed on the work of Internal Audit

As set out in the Audit Charter, we can confirm that Internal Audit had unrestricted right of access to all OPCC and Force records and information, both manual and computerised, cash, stores and other property or assets it considered necessary to fulfil its responsibilities.

03 Performance

The following table details the Internal Audit Service performance for the year to date measured against the key performance indicators that were set out within Audit Charter. This list will be developed over time, with some indicators either only applicable at year end or have yet to be evidenced.

No	Indicator	Criteria	Performance
1	Annual report provided to the JASP	As agreed with the Client Officer	Achieved
2	Annual Operational and Strategic Plans to the JASP	As agreed with the Client Officer	Achieved
3	Progress report to the JASP	7 working days prior to meeting.	Achieved
4	Issue of draft report	Within 10 working days of completion of final exit meeting.	90% (9/10) ¹
5	Issue of final report	Within 5 working days of agreement of responses.	100% (10/10) ¹
6	Follow-up of priority one recommendations	90% within four months. 100% within six months.	Achieved
7	Follow-up of other recommendations	100% within 12 months of date of final report.	N/A
8	Audit Brief to auditee	At least 10 working days prior to commencement of fieldwork.	100% (10/10) ¹
9	Customer satisfaction (measured by survey)	85% average satisfactory or above	100% (3/3)

¹ Core Financials – issued as one report, although split into five areas / opinions.

Quality and Conformance with the Public Sector Internal Audit Standards

In addition to the firm's overall policy and procedures, our internal audit manual and working papers are designed to ensure compliance with the Firm's quality requirements. Furthermore, our internal audit manual and approach are based on professional internal auditing standards issued by the Global Institute of Internal Auditors, as well as sector specific codes such as the Public Sector Internal Audit Standards.

Our methodology and work has been subject to review as part of our internal Quality Assurance Reviews undertaken by our Standards and Risk Management team as well as external scrutiny by the likes of external auditors, as well as other regulatory bodies. No adverse comments have been raised around our compliance with professional standards or our work not being able to be relied upon.

Appendix A1 - Audit Opinions and Recommendations 2015/16

Auditable Area	Report Status	Assurance Opinion	Priority 1 (Fundamental)	Priority 2 (Significant)	Priority 3 (Housekeeping)	Total
Nottinghamshire Only						
Joint Code of Corporate Governance	Final	Satisfactory	-	-	2	2
Core Financials ¹	Final		5	6	2	13
General Ledger		Satisfactory	-	-	-	-
Cash & Bank		Significant	-	-	-	-
Creditors		Limited	-	-	-	-
Debtors		Satisfactory	-	-	-	-
Payroll		Limited	-	-	-	-
Payment Processes & Procedures	Final	Limited	1	2	-	3
Integrated Offender Management	Final	Satisfactory	-	1	2	3
Victims Code of Practice	Final	Limited	2	6	2	10
Savings Programme	Final	Limited	2	3		5
Proceeds of Crime	Final	Satisfactory	-	2	2	4

Auditable Area	Report Status	Assurance Opinion		Priority 1 (Fundamental)	Priority 2 (Significant)	Priority 3 (Housekeeping)	Total
Procurement	Final	Local - Limited	EMSCU – Limited	3	7	1	11
Commissioning – Community Safety	Final	Satisfactory		-	3	2	5
Social Value Impact	Draft	No opinion given		-	-	-	-
Nottinghamshire Only				13	30	13	56

¹ Core Financials – whilst one report was issued which provided an overall limited assurance opinion, individual opinions were provided for each area of the audit. It should be noted that much of the work was carried out within the Multi-Force Shared Service (MFSS), with a number of the recommendations relating to processes within the MFSS.

Auditable Area	Report Status	Assurance Opinion	Priority 1 (Fundamental)	Priority 2 (Significant)	Priority 3 (Housekeeping)	Total
Collaboration						
Forensics	Final	Satisfactory	-	3	2	5
Officers in Kind	Draft	Significant	-	-	3	3
PCC Board Governance	Draft	N/A	-	3	4	7
Covert Payments	Draft	N/A	-	2	1	3
Collaboration Total			-	8	10	18

Appendix A2 - Audit Projects with Limited and Nil Assurance 2015/16

Project	Grading	Summary of Key Findings
Core Financial Systems	Limited	<p>Whilst one report was issued, the audit covered a number of specific areas – General Ledger, Cash & Bank, Creditors, Debtors and Payroll. A limited assurance opinion was given in respect of Creditors and Payroll, although it should be noted that part of the opinion reflects the control environment outside of local control, for example, within the Multi-Force Shared Service (MFSS).</p> <p>We raised five priority 1 recommendations, six priority 2 recommendations and two priority 3 recommendations where we believe there is scope for improvement within the control environment. The priority 1 recommendations are set out below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Segregation of duties should be introduced into the process for creating or amending supplier details within Oracle. <p>In addition, new suppliers should only be set up upon receipt of an approved new supplier form and this should include key details that then can be verified by MFSS, for example identification of directors of the company so the reputation and current financial status of the company can be verified.</p> <p>Consideration should be given to reviewing a sample of new suppliers set up since the implementation of MFSS processes to ensure appropriate checks have been made.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negotiation should take place between the Nottinghamshire Office of the Police & Crime Commission, Nottinghamshire Police and MFSS to establish how the current authorisation limits, as agreed within the scheme of delegation, can be embedded into the current purchasing process. All approval of purchases should then be in line with the agreed Scheme of Delegation and Financial Regulations. • The Purchasing Process and controls/ access within Oracle system should be reviewed to ensure that at least two members of staff are involved in the ordering, receipt and payment approval process for goods and services which exceed the value of £250. • Leaver notifications should be submitted by managers within the Force at the point the employee makes their resignation. MFSS should liaise with HR to ensure that notifications are forwarded to them at the earliest opportunity.

		<p>MFSS should ensure that service requests are timely allocated to Payroll to allow records to be updated and the Payroll closed.</p> <p>Payroll Officers should implement adequate checking processes to ensure that all requests for unpaid leave are actioned in a timely manner.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Force should review its expense policy to ensure it remains fit for purpose and includes clear guidance on all categories of expenses and which are appropriate to be claimed through the self-serve systems. <p>The review should also ensure that authorised limits for categories of expenditure remain valid.</p> <p>Consideration should also be given to instructing staff to provide uploaded receipts for all claims made to instil further accountability in the self-serve process and ensure claims identified through the spot check processes are not delayed through missing receipts.</p> <p>Following review and update, the policy should be reissued to all officers and staff to ensure awareness and compliance. This should include consequences for staff who breach the policy.</p> <p>Overpayments made to staff who have claimed invalid or inappropriate rates for expenses should also be recouped by the Force.</p>
Payment Processes & Procedures	Limited	<p>We raised one priority 1 recommendation and two priority 2 recommendations where we believe there is scope for improvement within the control environment. The priority 1 recommendation was in respect of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The NOPCC should request the following from the Force lead and MFSS: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The option to approve without authorisation is removed. ➤ That an analysis print is of all payments made to date without authorisation across the Force and OPCC. That this printout is checked in detail as to the validity of those payments.
Victims Code of Practice	Limited	<p>We raised two priority 1 recommendations, six priority 2 recommendations and two priority 3 recommendations where we believe there is scope for improvement within the control environment. The priority 1 recommendations are set out below:</p>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All victims should be provided with the Victim Information Pack and/ or referred to the information available on the Nottinghamshire Police Victim website. Confirmation that this information has been communicated should be recorded on the VCOP working sheet within the CRMS. • The reports detailing officers who are still to complete the Victims Code training should be located and the system for following up non-compliance established to provide assurance that all officers are adequately trained to ensure compliance with the Code.
Procurement	Limited	<p>Our audit opinion was split between the control environment within the shared East Midlands Strategic Commercial Unit (EMSCU), who is responsible for procurement above £25k, and that which is the responsibility of Nottinghamshire Police at a local level. Responsibility for the recommendations raised were divided into EMSCU and local level action managers.</p> <p>We raised three priority 1 recommendations, seven priority 2 recommendations and one priority 3 recommendation where we believe there is scope for improvement within the control environment. The priority 1 recommendations are set out below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contracts should be in place for all purchases over £25,000 and these should be signed by all parties prior to the commencement of the contract. (EMSCU responsibility) • A formal approval process should be established within the Force before new suppliers are entered on the Oracle system. <p>The Force should ensure that the MFSS does not pay any supplier who has not already been approved. (Local Responsibility)</p> <p>Management should look to implement an exception reporting system in conjunction with MFSS team from the finance system. The exception reports should look to identify, as a minimum:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Duplicate invoice numbers; ➢ Invoices paid without a purchase order; ➢ Purchase orders raised without an approved requisition; ➢ Purchase orders raised after the invoice; ➢ Changes in supplier details; ➢ New suppliers added to the system. <p>The frequency and detail of these reports needs to be established. The responsibility for monitoring this information within the Force should be clearly identified. (Local Responsibility)</p>

Savings Programme	Limited	<p>We raised two priority 1 recommendations and three priority 2 recommendations where we believe there is scope for improvement within the control environment. The priority 1 recommendation was in respect of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management should produce a detailed procedural document to support the finance strategy setting out the exact process to be followed for developing, delivering and reporting against the savings programme. • Management should agree on the approach which is to be taken to address the shortfall. This should be formally approved at Board level and then monitored regularly to make sure the delivery of this is achieved.
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Appendix A3 – Definition of Assurances and Priorities

Definitions of Assurance Levels		
Assurance Level	Adequacy of system design	Effectiveness of operating controls
Significant Assurance:	There is a sound system of internal control designed to achieve the Organisation's objectives.	The control processes tested are being consistently applied.
Satisfactory Assurance:	While there is a basically sound system of internal control, there are weaknesses, which put some of the Organisation's objectives at risk.	There is evidence that the level of non-compliance with some of the control processes may put some of the Organisation's objectives at risk.
Limited Assurance:	Weaknesses in the system of internal controls are such as to put the Organisation's objectives at risk.	The level of non-compliance puts the Organisation's objectives at risk.
No Assurance	Control processes are generally weak leaving the processes/systems open to significant error or abuse.	Significant non-compliance with basic control processes leaves the processes/systems open to error or abuse.

Definitions of Recommendations	
Priority	Description
Priority 1 (Fundamental)	Recommendations represent fundamental control weaknesses, which expose the organisation to a high degree of unnecessary risk.
Priority 2 (Significant)	Recommendations represent significant control weaknesses which expose the organisation to a moderate degree of unnecessary risk.
Priority 3 (Housekeeping)	Recommendations show areas where we have highlighted opportunities to implement a good or better practice, to improve efficiency or further reduce exposure to risk.

Appendix A4 - Contact Details

Contact Details

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Appendix A5 - Statement of Responsibility

Status of our reports

The responsibility for maintaining internal control rests with management, with internal audit providing a service to management to enable them to achieve this objective. Specifically, we assess the adequacy of the internal control arrangements implemented by management and perform testing on those controls to ensure that they are operating for the period under review. We plan our work in order to ensure that we have a reasonable expectation of detecting significant control weaknesses. However, our procedures alone are not a guarantee that fraud, where existing, will be discovered.

The contents of this report are confidential and not for distribution to anyone other than the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Nottinghamshire and Nottinghamshire Police. Disclosure to third parties cannot be made without the prior written consent of Mazars LLP.

Mazars LLP is the UK firm of Mazars, an international advisory and accountancy group. Mazars LLP is registered by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales to carry out company audit work.

For Decision	
Public/Non Public*	Public
Report to:	Audit and Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	30th June 2016
Report of:	Chief Finance Officer
Report Author:	Charlotte Radford
Other Contacts:	
Agenda Item:	12

UPDATE ON THE CLOSE OF ACCOUNTS 2015-16

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To assure members that the process for closing the accounts is progressing well.

2. Recommendations

- 2.1 That members of the Audit & Scrutiny Panel review the draft statements of accounts and provide feedback or ask questions of the CFO by the 31st July. This will ensure assurance is provided prior to the final statements being produced.

3. Reasons for Recommendations

- 3.1 Good governance and financial management

4. Summary of Key Points

- 4.1 Each year the draft statement of accounts is provided to the Audit & Scrutiny panel members for their comments prior to the final version being provided to the panel in September. The latest DRAFT statement of accounts will be tabled at the meeting or issued to members on the 30th June.
- 4.2 This year the draft accounts have been produced using the new accounting system. This significant change has been possible thanks to the hard work of the finance team and the assistance provided by Cheshire Police Finance team and the MFSS team.
- 4.3 This has been a key year for ensuring that the system can provide the necessary detail for the closedown process, particularly with the early closure of accounts by 2018.
- 4.4 It will be necessary to undertake a post closure review to ensure the process can be brought forward in 2017 as a step change to having audited final accounts by the end of July in 2018.

5. Financial Implications and Budget Provision

5.1 None as a direct result of this report.

6. Human Resources Implications

6.1 None as a direct result of this report.

7. Equality Implications

7.1 None as a direct result of this report.

8. Risk Management

8.1 None as a direct result of this report.

9. Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

9.1 None as a direct result of this report.

10. Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

10.1 None as a direct result of this report.

11. Details of outcome of consultation

11.1 Not applicable

12. Appendices

12.1 A - Draft Statement of Accounts 2015-16 (to follow)

For Decision	
Public/Non Public*	Public
Report to:	Audit and Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	30th June 2016
Report of:	Chief Finance Officer
Report Author:	Charlotte Radford
Other Contacts:	Simon Lacey
Agenda Item:	13

EXTERNAL AUDIT – Progress Report 2016-17

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To inform members of the progress made in relation to the External Audit work plan 2016-17.

2. Recommendations

- 2.1 Members are requested to note the progress report attached at **Appendix A**.

3. Reasons for Recommendations

- 3.1 This complies with good governance.

4. Summary of Key Points

- 4.1 The External Auditors have reported on their initial review of the financial systems and their planned audit work during 2016-17.

5. Financial Implications and Budget Provision

- 5.1 None as a direct result of this report.

6. Human Resources Implications

- 6.1 None as a direct result of this report.

7. Equality Implications

- 7.1 None as a direct result of this report.

8. Risk Management

- 8.1 None as a direct result of this report.

9. Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

9.1 The work of the External Auditors indirectly supports all of the Police and Crime Plan priorities.

10. Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

10.1 None

11. Details of outcome of consultation

11.1 Not applicable.

12. Appendices

A – External Audit Progress Report



2015/16 External Audit Progress Report and Technical Update

**Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Nottinghamshire
Nottinghamshire Chief Constable**

Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel - June 2016

2015/16 external audit progress report – June 2016

This document provides the Joint Audit & Scrutiny Panel (JASP) with a high level overview of our progress against our 2015/16 external audit plan.

Since the last meeting of the Joint Audit & Scrutiny Panel (JASP) we have substantially completed our 2015/16 interim audit. We will continue to liaise with management on the significant financial and operational issues at the PCC/CC and relevant current and emerging issues in respect of the accounts and value for money conclusion.

Accounts Audit

We undertook our interim audit work during March 2016. The planned audit work has included:

- Updating our understanding and performing walk through and controls testing on key financial systems;
- Testing of controls for significant accounts;
- Determining our approach for data and analytics testing; and
- Discussing the accounting requirements for 2015/16, including relevant changes to the CIPFA guidance.

Interim Work – Financial Statements

We are pleased to report that our interim audit work on the financial statements has progressed well against the plan and we do not have any significant issues that may impact on our opinion at this stage.

We have, however, identified three issues that we wish to bring to your attention that we identified during our work:

- **Bank Reconciliations** – Through our testing of the bank reconciliations we identified that since moving to the electronic format within MFSS there was no longer any evidence maintained of who had prepared the bank reconciliation at MFSS and who had reviewed the bank reconciliation at Nottinghamshire Police. The Finance team agreed to include a text box to record the name and date of the review of the bank reconciliation in future and to request MFSS do the same when they prepare the bank reconciliation which has now been implemented.
- **Journals** – When we undertook testing of journals it was identified that following the move to MFSS all journals are now self-authorising and the hierarchy function to set limits for posting was not being used. As a result of this and the Internal Audit report the Finance team have agreed to undertake a quarterly review of journals and seek explanations on a sample basis to review the validity of such journal postings.
- **Data migration from e-fin to Oracle** – We reviewed the processes for information and balances being transferred to the new financial system, Oracle. This data migration was undertaken internally by the Finance team. A working paper was provided as evidence that balances transferred had been tested independently by another member of the Finance team. In view of the importance of these transitions we needed to review that all opening balances and month one balances had been appropriately transferred from e-fin to Oracle. This testing was completed satisfactorily but we took additional audit time to complete this process and test the results.

We have raised the points above with the Finance team and we will review developments during our final accounts visit. Where appropriate, we will raise recommendations within our ISA260 report in September 2016.

2015/16 external audit progress report – June 2016

This document provides the Joint Audit & Scrutiny Panel (JASP) with a high level overview of our progress against our 2015/16 external audit plan.

Interim Work – Value for Money

We have carried out an initial risk assessment against the new criterion specified by the National Audit Office for 2015/16 onwards. The Government's Spending Review continues to provide a challenging financial future for the PCC and CC.

The 2015/16 budget of £191.2m was established on the basis that £11.14m of efficiency savings would be achieved during the year and that this would result in £1.6m use of reserves. However, during the year the anticipated savings have not been achieved and at the time of completing our interim visit the shortfall was estimated at approximately £3.5m. At the same point in time the anticipated outturn was estimated to be £198.9m which would result in a £7.7m overspend against the original budget. Initial discussion with the Chief Finance Officer indicate that the final outturn may be slightly better than the previously reported figures.

These results add to the budget pressures in future years and with on-going inflation, commitments and funding reductions results in budget deficit for 2016/17 of £23.7m and will continue to provide significant challenge over the life of the Medium Term Financial Plans unless recurrent savings are not only identified but achieved.

Our 2015/16 VFM work is ongoing and the focus of our work will be around your Medium Term Financial Planning arrangements and achievement of the anticipated outturn position. We will update our VFM assessment during the year and report our conclusions in the ISA260 report to the Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel in September 2016.

2015/16 external audit progress report – June 2016

Audit fee update and other work

At this stage there are no changes planned to the 2015/16 scale audit fee of **£35,220 and £15,000** for the PCC and CC respectively in April 2015 and in our February 2016 Audit Plan. No other audit related or non-audit work is in progress or planned for 2015/16.

We have not undertaken any other work as part of our engagement.

Actions

We ask the Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel to:

- **NOTE** this progress report and technical update.

Contacts

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Local Government External Audit

2015/16 Technical update

Financial sustainability of police forces in England and Wales	
Level of impact ●	KPMG perspective
<p>Further to the NAO report on the Financial sustainability of police forces in England and Wales, published in June 2015, and the hearing of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in July 2015 on the same topic, the PAC has now published its report on the matter.</p> <p>The PAC report considers issues of devolution and accountability, and demand on police forces and the availability of information, and makes a number of recommendations. Forces may wish to be aware of the report in order to inform their planning considerations, particularly in relation to value for money arrangements.</p> <p>The PAC report can be found here: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmpubacc/288/288.pdf</p> <p>A copy of the original NAO report can be found here: www.nao.org.uk/report/financial-sustainability-of-police-forces-in-england-and-wales/</p>	<p><i>The Committee may wish to seek assurances how their Force is addressing the issues raised in the reports.</i></p>



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For Information / Consideration	
Public/Non Public*	Public
Report to:	Audit and Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	30th June 2016
Report of:	Chief Finance Officer
Report Author:	Charlotte Radford
Other Contacts:	Brian Welch
Agenda Item:	14

INTERNAL AUDIT PROGRESS REPORT

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To provide members with an update on progress against the Internal Audit Annual Plan for 2015-16 and the findings from audits completed to date.
- 1.2 To also provide members with an initial update on progress against the Internal Audit Plan for 2016-17.

2. Recommendations

- 2.1 Members are recommended to consider the report and where appropriate make comment or request further work in relation to specific audits to ensure they have adequate assurance from the work undertaken.

3. Reasons for Recommendations

- 3.1 This complies with good governance and in ensuring assurance can be obtained from the work carried out.

4. Summary of Key Points

- 4.1 The attached report details the work undertaken to date and summarises the findings from individual audits completed since the last progress report to the panel.

5. Financial Implications and Budget Provision

- 5.1 None as a direct result of this report.

6. Human Resources Implications

- 6.1 None as a direct result of this report.

7. Equality Implications

7.1 None as a direct result of this report.

8. Risk Management

8.1 None as a direct result of this report. Recommendations will be actioned to address the risks identified within the individual reports and recommendations implementation will be monitored and reported within the audit and inspection report to this panel.

9. Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

9.1 This report complies with good governance and financial regulations.

10. Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

10.1 None

11. Details of outcome of consultation

11.1 Not applicable

12. Appendices

12.1 Appendix A – Internal Audit Progress Report 2015-16 and initial progress in 2016-17.



Office of the Police & Crime Commissioner for Nottinghamshire and
Nottinghamshire Police

Internal Audit Progress Report 2015/16 & 2016/17

June 2016

Presented to the Joint Audit & Scrutiny Panel meeting of: 30th June 2016

Contents

- 01 Introduction
- 02 Summary and conclusions from Internal Audit work to date
- 03 Performance 2015/16

Appendices

- A1 Summary of Reports 2015/16
- A2 Internal Audit Plan 2015/16
- A3 Internal Audit Plan 2016/17
- A4 Definition of Assurances and Priorities
- A5 Contact Details
- A6 Statement of Responsibility

01 Introduction

- 1.1 The purpose of this report is to update the Joint Audit & Scrutiny Panel (JASP) as to the progress in respect of the Operational Plan for the year ended 31st March 2016, together with progress on delivering the 2016/17 Internal Audit Plan which was considered and approved by the JASP at its meeting on 11th February 2016.
- 1.2 The Police and Crime Commissioner and Chief Constable are responsible for ensuring that the organisations have proper internal control and management systems in place. In order to do this, they must obtain assurance on the effectiveness of those systems throughout the year, and are required to make a statement on the effectiveness of internal control within their annual report and financial statements.
- 1.3 Internal audit provides the Police and Crime Commissioner and Chief Constable with an independent and objective opinion on governance, risk management and internal control and their effectiveness in achieving the organisation's agreed objectives. Internal audit also has an independent and objective advisory role to help line managers improve governance, risk management and internal control. The work of internal audit, culminating in our annual opinion, forms a part of the OPCC and Force's overall assurance framework and assists in preparing an informed statement on internal control.
- 1.4 Responsibility for a sound system of internal control rests with the Police and Crime Commissioner and Chief Constable and work performed by internal audit should not be relied upon to identify all weaknesses which exist or all improvements which may be made. Effective implementation of our recommendations makes an important contribution to the maintenance of reliable systems of internal control and governance.
- 1.5 Internal audit should not be relied upon to identify fraud or irregularity, although our procedures are designed so that any material irregularity has a reasonable probability of discovery. Even sound systems of internal control will not necessarily be an effective safeguard against collusive fraud.
- 1.6 Our work is delivered in accordance with the Public Sector Internal Audit Standards (PSIAS).

02 Summary of internal audit work to date

- 2.1 We have issued two final reports in respect of the 2015/16 plan since the last progress report to the JASP, these being in respect of Commissioning and the Savings Programme, the latter being an additional audit to that in the approved plan. A summary of the Savings Programme report was provided in the progress report presented at the 11th February 2016 meeting of the JASP. Additionally, the draft report in respect of Social Impact & Value has been issued and we await management's response. Further details in respect of these reports are provided in Appendix A1.

Nottinghamshire 2015/16 Audits	Report Status	Assurance Opinion		Priority 1 (Fundamental)	Priority 2 (Significant)	Priority 3 (Housekeeping)	Total
Joint Code of Corporate Governance	Final	Satisfactory				2	2
Core Financials	Draft	Limited		5	6	2	11
Payment Processes & Procedures	Final	Limited		1	2		3
Integrated Offender Management	Final	Satisfactory			1	2	3
Victims Code of Practice	Final	Limited		2	6	2	10
Savings Programme	Draft	Limited		2	3		5
Proceeds of Crime	Final	Satisfactory			2	2	4
Procurement	Final	Local - Limited	EMSCU – Limited	3	7	1	11

Nottinghamshire 2015/16 Audits	Report Status	Assurance Opinion	Priority 1 (Fundamental)	Priority 2 (Significant)	Priority 3 (Housekeeping)	Total
Commissioning	Final	Satisfactory		3	2	5
Social Impact & Value	Draft	N/A	-	-	-	-
Total			13	30	12	44

- 2.2 As reported in the last progress report, Internal Audit were tasked with undertaking four audits of collaborative arrangements across the region. At the time of writing we have issued one final report, in respect of Forensics, whilst draft reports have been issued in respect of the other three audits and we are awaiting management's comments. Further details are provided in Appendix 1, including the scope of the three reports that are currently in draft, the details of which will be presented at the next JASP.

Collaboration 2015/16 Audits	Report Status	Assurance Opinion	Priority 1 (Fundamental)	Priority 2 (Significant)	Priority 3 (Housekeeping)	Total
Forensics	Final	Satisfactory	-	3	2	5
Officers in Kind	Draft					
Covert Payments	Draft					
PCC Board Governance	Draft					
Total			0	3	2	5

- 2.3 Work in respect of the 2016/17 internal audit plan is underway and, to date, we have issued three draft reports in respect of the Implementation of DMS, Estates Strategy and Establishment Reconciliation, the latter two being additional requests for advisory work from that in the original approved plan, where we await management's response.

Nottinghamshire 2016/17 Audits	Report Status	Assurance Opinion	Priority 1 (Fundamental)	Priority 2 (Significant)	Priority 3 (Housekeeping)	Total
Implementation of DMS	Draft					
Estates Strategy	Draft					
Establishment Reconciliation	Draft					
Total						

- 2.4 We are in the process of agreeing the scopes of a number of audits that will be carried out over the coming months. These include Risk Management, Savings Programme Follow-up, Data Protection Act Compliance and Effective Audit & Scrutiny. Further details are provided within Appendix A3.

03 Performance 2015/16

- 3.1 The following table details the Internal Audit Service performance for the year ending 31st March 2016 measured against the key performance indicators that were set out within Audit Charter. This list will be developed over time, with some indicators either only applicable at year end or have yet to be evidenced.

No	Indicator	Criteria	Performance
1	Annual report provided to the JASP	As agreed with the Client Officer	Achieved
2	Annual Operational and Strategic Plans to the JASP	As agreed with the Client Officer	Achieved
3	Progress report to the JASP	7 working days prior to meeting.	Achieved
4	Issue of draft report	Within 10 working days of completion of final exit meeting.	90% (9/10) ¹
5	Issue of final report	Within 5 working days of agreement of responses.	100% (10/10) ¹
6	Follow-up of priority one recommendations	90% within four months. 100% within six months.	Achieved
7	Follow-up of other recommendations	100% within 12 months of date of final report.	N/A
8	Audit Brief to auditee	At least 10 working days prior to commencement of fieldwork.	100% (10/10) ¹
9	Customer satisfaction (measured by survey)	85% average satisfactory or above	100% (3/3)

¹Core Financials – issued as one report, although split into five areas / opinions.

Appendix A1 – Summary of Reports 2015/16

Final Reports

Below we provide brief outlines of the work carried out, a summary of our key findings raised and the assurance opinions given in respect of the final reports issued since the last meeting of the JASP relating to the 2015/16 Internal Audit Plan:

Commissioning – Community Experience

Assurance Opinion	Satisfactory
Recommendation Priorities	
Priority 1 (Fundamental)	-
Priority 2 (Significant)	3
Priority 3 (Housekeeping)	2

Our audit considered the risks relating to the following areas:

Governance Arrangements

Roles and responsibilities, decision making processes, monitoring and reporting requirements are clearly defined within the Commissioning process to ensure a transparent and well managed 'end to end' process.

Commissioning end to end service.

The approach to Commissioning provides a holistic end-to-end service for Community Safety (reference Commissioning Academy best practice and guidance).

Partnership Arrangements

There are effective oversight and governance arrangements to ensure effective partnership arrangements in relation to the Commissioning process.

Information sharing exists between the partner organisations to ensure that utilisation of Community Safety monies are effective and in line with associated objectives.

Opportunities for joint spending are identified to effectively utilise the available budget and maximise outcomes for Community Safety.

Financial Monitoring/ Funding Impact

Expenditure is monitored to ensure that it is in line with fund requirements.

There is a transparent decision making process across the organisations in respect of allocation of budget to individual projects.

The considerations arising from the Grant Thornton Funding and Impact report have been embedded in current processes.

Outcomes

Monitoring and reporting of projects is undertaken to ensure that outcomes are being achieved and to minimise the risk of duplication.

We raised three significant (priority 2) recommendations where felt that the control environment could be improved. These related to the following:

- A Commissioning Framework should be finalised, including best practice, and communicated to the OPCC's partners to support effective commissioning across the County.
- A performance reporting framework should be in place to provide a clear and consistent approach that could be adopted by all partners to ensure the OPCC is able to have an efficient and effective performance monitoring of all Community Safety Funds.
- The Independent Review Report should be discussed with partner organisations to ensure that the recommendations that it raises have been fully understood and actions agreed to ensure that weaknesses are addressed and opportunities to improve processes are taken.

Management have confirmed that all agreed actions will be completed by 30th June 2016.

Forensics

Assurance Opinion	Satisfactory
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Recommendation Priorities	
Priority 1 (Fundamental)	-
Priority 2 (Significant)	3
Priority 3 (Housekeeping)	2

The East Midlands Special Operations Unit (EMSOU) is a regional tasking structure which has, for more than a decade, made use of expertise and resources from within the East Midlands police forces to investigate many of the most serious crimes which affect the region. EMSOU is an amalgamation of certain key resources provided by the forces to be deployed throughout the region as and when there is an investigative need. Forensic Services (EMSOU-FS) is one of five main branches of EMSOU's work.

Our audit considered the following area objectives:

- *Governance, Performance Monitoring and Accountability* - There are effective arrangements in place to ensure performance (both operational and financial) is effectively monitored with regular reporting and accountability measures through an appropriate governance structure.
- *Expenditure and budget management processes* - Roles and responsibilities in respect of budget management and oversight of expenditure are appropriate. Appropriate internal control systems and delegations exist to ensure that expenditure from the retained Force Forensic budgets is appropriately managed and there are adequate controls around the ordering, receipting and payment processes in respect of those budgets.
- *Work for external bodies and associated income* - Work for external bodies is appropriately approved, managed and monitored. Processes ensure that debtors are raised for the provision of services provided by Forensics and that income is subsequently realised within the associated budget.

We raised three priority 2 recommendations where we believe there is scope for improvement within the control environment. These are set out below:

- The current dip sampling process should be documented to include the percentage of invoices subject to verification each month and the approach taken for selection of the sample. In addition, the outcome of the checks should be evidenced to provide assurance that these have been completed and reliance can be placed on this risk-based approach.

It is noted, however, that the new marketing approach proposed for Forensic Services for implementation in August 2016, would negate the need for the dip sampling process in this regard, as procurement would be based on a fixed annual contract value rather than the current 'pay as you go' model.

- Official orders should be raised for goods or services or alternatively be agreed within the list of exemptions approved by Derbyshire Police.
- All works for external bodies (current and future) should be formalised in an agreement to include outline agreed services, associated charges and insurance arrangements. This should be approved by the Director of Finance (where works are not expected to exceed £200k per annum).

Management confirmed that all actions will be undertaken by 30th June 2016.

Draft Reports

In this section we provide brief summaries of the scope of those audits relating to the 2015/16 Internal Audit Plan for which the reports are currently in draft. Management are currently considering their responses and full details will be included in the next progress report once the final reports have been issued.

Social Impact & Value

In line with the approved Internal Audit Plan for 2015/16 for the Office of the Nottinghamshire Police and Crime Commissioner and Nottinghamshire Police, we have undertaken an audit of controls in place in respect of Social Value as prescribed in the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012.

In agreement with Senior Management within the OPCC, this review has been undertaken as an advisory piece of work to assess the current requirements of the Act against the processes already in place within the OPCC and Force and to advise on action to be taken to address any gaps in compliance or opportunities for improvement.

The specific areas that formed part of this review included: Social Value strategies, associated methodologies, governance and purchasing arrangements and measurement and reporting of requirements.

It was concluded that although the OPCC and Force have wider policies in place which go some way to addressing the requirements of the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012, there are areas that need to be addressed to ensure full compliance and embed processes as business as usual. The documentation, approval and roll out of a dedicated Social Value Policy will allow guidance for those with key procurement and commissioning responsibilities and ensure social value forms part of routine procurement processes, tender requirements and ongoing contract monitoring. Once this has been introduced, it will provide a basis for ongoing compliance to be monitored and a further internal audit review can be undertaken to ensure new controls are operating effectively.

We provide an action plan which included recommendations for areas where controls in respect of Social Value can be improved or implementation to ensure compliance with the Public Services (Social Value) Act for future procurement and commissioning within the OPCC and Force:

- Nottinghamshire OPCC should document a social value policy in consultation with both the Force and EMSCU as their procurement partner. This should act as a framework and guidance to inform social value commissioning across the organisation and have defined links to the organisational priorities, well-being of the local area and also EMSCU procurement strategies.

The policy should also outline requirements of a procurement strategy, public consultation and needs analysis and also define roles and responsibilities for key staff.

- For further tender adverts where expenditure is expected to exceed the EU threshold, the suggested template as defined by the Social Enterprise UK should be included so that potential bidders are aware of requirements in this area. In addition, specific weighting allocation should be assigned to the Social Value elements of bids to demonstrate compliance with the Act and to ensure value for money is achieved in this area.

- The OPCC should ensure that for all contract extensions, EMSCU are giving consideration to social value requirements and, where these do not exist, reviews should be undertaken at the time of extension or renewal to ensure clauses are added where appropriate.

Effective contract management/ monitoring arrangements should be in place to measure social value in terms of contract outcomes, with reporting to management to ensure value for money in this area to be quantified and reported.

- The requirements of Social Value should be communicated to key staff with responsibilities for procurement, commissioning and contract monitoring to ensure they understand the required approach in terms of achieving value for money and compliance with the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012.

Officers in Kind

The audit review considered the following control objectives:

- There are clear and agreed procedures in place between EMSOU and each regional force with regards the funding model for officers in kind.
- Costings in respect of officer in kind funding are understood, accurate, supported by a clear funding model and are communicated to the regional forces in a timely manner.
- Estimates of each forces contribution are given at the outset and supported by monthly outturn projections.
- Charges made to the regional forces are supported by clear documentation / funding assumptions.
- Variations to the number and grade of officers provided by each regional force are taken into account within the funding model, including year-end adjustments.
- There is clear, timely and complete management information in place to support the funding model and to enable forces to manage their budgets.
- Each regional force has sound budget processes in place that enable them to manage officer in kind payments, including projected year-end adjustments.
- The current accounting procedure and process for the treatment of Officers in Kind is an efficient and effective model for the secondment of officers working in regional units.

Covert Payments

The audit review considered the following control objectives:

- Procedures and policies are in place to support the effective administration of the function and are communicated to all relevant staff.
- There are clear and understood procedures in place for the authorization and setting up of bank accounts.
- Transfers between bank accounts are approved and documented.
- Systems and data are adequately protected to reduce the risk of them being open to abuse.
- New and amended vendor details can only be processed by authorised officers.
- There are agreed and effective processes in place for the authorisation of covert payments.
- Payments made in respect of covert activities are valid and appropriate.
- There are effective controls in place with regards accounting for covert payments.
- Timely and accurate management / payment information is available to support the delivery of covert activities.

PCC Board Governance

Our audit considered the following area objectives:

- *Governance Arrangements* - There are defined arrangements for the Board with documented roles and responsibilities, accountability and decision making processes. Structure of meetings is effective and outcomes, actions and decisions are well documented.
- *Collaboration Arrangements* - There is effective oversight of Section 22 collaboration arrangements to ensure the effective use of resources and delivery of required outcomes.
- *Decision Making* - Decision making processes are clearly defined and operate effectively to ensure transparency in terms of value for money and effective use of resources.
- *Change Management* - Horizon scanning is undertaken to ensure informed change managements. Considerations of changes in responsibility and 'churn' of officers is embedded with the board operations.
- *Performance Management and Accountability* - There is a consistent approach to performance management and ensuring accountability of Chief Constables. Financial planning and budget approval for regional collaboration is consistent and effective.

Appendix A2 Internal Audit Plan 2015/16

Auditable Area	Planned Fieldwork Date	Draft Report Date	Final Report Date	Target JASP	Comments
Core Assurance					
Joint Code of Corporate Governance	Aug 2015	Sept 2015	Nov 2015	Dec 2015	Final report issued.
Financial Controls – MFSS	Oct / Nov 2015	Nov 2015	Dec 2015	Feb 2016	Final report issued.
Financial Controls – PBS	Postponed	Postponed	Postponed	Postponed	Due to Strategic Alliance developments, audit postponed.
Strategic & Operational Risk					
Integrated Offender Management	Sept 2015	Oct 2015	Dec 2015	Dec 2015	Final report issued.
Social Impact / Value	Feb 2015	March 2016		June 2016	Draft report issued; awaiting management response.
Proceeds of Crime	July 2015	Sept 2015	Jan 2016	Dec 2015	Final report issued.
Commissioning	Feb 2016	Feb 2016	May 2016	June 2016	Final report issued.
Code of Practice for Victims of Crime	Sept 2015	Oct 2015	Dec 2015	Feb 2016	Final report issued.
Collaboration					
Procurement	Aug 2015	Oct 2015	Jan 2016	Dec 2015	Final report issued.
Officers in Kind	Nov 2015 – Mar 2016	Apr 2016	May 2016	June 2016	Draft report issued.
Forensics	Nov 2015 – Mar 2016	Apr 2016	May 2016	June 2016	Final report issued.
Covert Payments	Nov 2015 – Mar 2016	Apr 2016	May 2016	June 2016	Draft report issued.

Auditable Area	Planned Fieldwork Date	Draft Report Date	Final Report Date	Target JASP	Comments
PCC Board Governance	Nov 2015 – Mar 2016	Apr 2016	May 2016	June 2016	Draft report issued.
Other					
Payments Processes & Procedures	July 2015	Sept 2015	Oct 2015	Dec 2015	Final report issued.
Savings Programme	Aug 2015	Sept 2015	Feb 2016	Dec 2015	Final report issued.

Appendix A3 Internal Audit Plan 2016/17

Auditable Area	Planned Fieldwork Date	Draft Report Date	Final Report Date	Target JASP	Comments
Core Assurance					
Risk Management	July 2016			Sept 2016	
Core Financial Systems	Oct 2016			Dec 2016	
Procurement	Nov 2016			Feb 2017	
Strategic & Operational Risk					
Implementation of DMS	April 2016	May 2016		June 2016	Draft report issued.
Savings Programme Follow-up	Sept 2016			Dec 2016	
Human Resources	Jan 2017			Feb 2017	
Data Protection Act Compliance	Aug 2016			Dec 2016	
Data Quality	Dec 2016			Feb 2017	
Effective Audit & Scrutiny	July 2016			Sept 2017	
Collaboration					
Collaboration	Sept 2016 – Jan 2017			Dec 2016 & Feb 2017	

Auditable Area	Planned Fieldwork Date	Draft Report Date	Final Report Date	Target JASP	Comments
Other					
Estates Strategy	April 2016	May 2016		June 2016	Draft report issued.
Establishment Reconciliation	April 2016	May 2016		May 2016	Draft report issued.
Commissioning Framework	July 2016			Sept 2016	

Appendix A4 – Definition of Assurances and Priorities

Definitions of Assurance Levels		
Assurance Level	Adequacy of system design	Effectiveness of operating controls
Significant Assurance:	There is a sound system of internal control designed to achieve the Organisation's objectives.	The control processes tested are being consistently applied.
Satisfactory Assurance:	While there is a basically sound system of internal control, there are weaknesses, which put some of the Organisation's objectives at risk.	There is evidence that the level of non-compliance with some of the control processes may put some of the Organisation's objectives at risk.
Limited Assurance:	Weaknesses in the system of internal controls are such as to put the Organisation's objectives at risk.	The level of non-compliance puts the Organisation's objectives at risk.
No Assurance	Control processes are generally weak leaving the processes/systems open to significant error or abuse.	Significant non-compliance with basic control processes leaves the processes/systems open to error or abuse.

Definitions of Recommendations	
Priority	Description
Priority 1 (Fundamental)	Recommendations represent fundamental control weaknesses, which expose the organisation to a high degree of unnecessary risk.
Priority 2 (Significant)	Recommendations represent significant control weaknesses which expose the organisation to a moderate degree of unnecessary risk.
Priority 3 (Housekeeping)	Recommendations show areas where we have highlighted opportunities to implement a good or better practice, to improve efficiency or further reduce exposure to risk.

Appendix A5 - Contact Details

Contact Details

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A6 Statement of Responsibility

Status of our reports

The responsibility for maintaining internal control rests with management, with internal audit providing a service to management to enable them to achieve this objective. Specifically, we assess the adequacy of the internal control arrangements implemented by management and perform testing on those controls to ensure that they are operating for the period under review. We plan our work in order to ensure that we have a reasonable expectation of detecting significant control weaknesses. However, our procedures alone are not a guarantee that fraud, where existing, will be discovered.

The contents of this report are confidential and not for distribution to anyone other than the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Nottinghamshire and Nottinghamshire Police. Disclosure to third parties cannot be made without the prior written consent of Mazars LLP.

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For Information	
Public/Non Public	Public
Report to:	Audit and Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	30th June 2016
Report of:	Julie Mair Head of Corporate Development
Report Author:	Beverly Topham, Strategic Support & Review Officer
E-mail:	beverly.topham@nottinghamshire.pnn.police.uk
Other Contacts:	Ch Insp Paul Winter
Agenda Item:	15

AUDIT AND INSPECTION REPORT

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To provide the Audit and Scrutiny Panel with an update on progress against recommendations arising from audits and inspections which have taken place within the force.
- 1.2 To inform the Panel of the schedule of planned audits and inspections.

2. Recommendations

- 2.1 That the Panel notes the progress made against audit and inspection recommendations.
- 2.2 That the Panel takes note of forthcoming audits and inspections.

3. Reasons for Recommendations

- 3.1 To enable the Panel to fulfil its scrutiny obligations with regard to the Force's response to audits and inspections.
- 3.2 To keep the Panel informed about forthcoming audits and inspections.

4. Summary of Key Points

- 4.1 The actions referred to in this report are the result of recommendations made by the Force's internal auditors and external inspectorates, including Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). They are managed through the Force Activity Plan process and updated on a monthly basis.
- 4.2 Appendix 1 'Audit, Inspection and Review Status Report Quarter 4 2015/16' provides a summary of forthcoming audits and inspections that the Force is currently aware of.
- 4.3 Appendix 2 'Audit and Inspection Actions Update Report Quarter 4 2015/16' provides details of specific actions arising from audits and inspections that are either off target, at risk of being off target, proposed for closure, closed or new actions.

Overdue Actions

4.4 There are currently no actions showing as 'off target'.

Actions at risk of being Overdue

4.5 There are 9 actions showing as 'at risk' of being overdue. There are a further 6 in the 'New Actions' section. These are all recent final publications and Planning and Policy are in consultation with key stakeholders and subject matter experts seeking a response to the recommendations.

5 Financial Implications and Budget Provision

5.1 There are no direct financial implications. If financial implications arise from recommendations raised from audits, inspections and reviews, these implications are considered accordingly. Where an action cannot be delivered within budget provision, approval will be sought through the appropriate means.

6 Human Resources Implications

6.1 There may be policy implications in relation to the actions listed:

- Firearms Licensing: Targeting the Risk.
- Integrated Offender Management

7 Equality Implications

7.1 There may be equality implications arising from the following reviews of policy and process:

- Child protection and vulnerability in custody.
- Integrated Offender Management
- The depths of dishonour: Hidden voices and shameful crimes.
- Welfare of Vulnerable People in Custody.

8 Risk Management

8.1 Some current actions involve the completion of formal reviews of specific business areas. It is possible that some or all of these reviews will identify and evaluate significant risks, which will then be incorporated into the Force's established risk management process.

9 Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

- 9.1 Any policy implications will be subject to current policy development process.
- 9.2 The following actions relate to aspects of current Police and Crime Plan priorities:
- Vulnerable People in Custody.
 - Domestic abuse action plan.

10 Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

- 10.1 There are no potential legal implications arising from the actions.

11 Details of outcome of consultation

- 11.1 Following receipt of a final audit or inspection report a member of the Planning and Policy team consults with the Force lead and other responsible stakeholders to plan appropriate actions in response to each relevant recommendation, or to agree a suitable closing comment where no action is deemed necessary.
- 11.2 All planned actions are added to the Force's action planning system, 4Action, for management and review until completion.

12. Appendices

- 12.1 Appendix 1: Audit and Inspection Status Report Q4 2015/16
- 12.2 Appendix 2: Audit and Inspection Actions Update Report Q4 2015/16

Appendix 1: Current and forthcoming audits and inspections. Quarter 4 2015/16

Current Audits and Inspections

Date	Scrutiny Body	Title	Update
September 2015	HMIC	PEEL - Legitimacy	Actions captured and on 4action for scrutiny and monitoring.
September 2015	HMIC	PEEL - Effectiveness	Out for management decision of actions or awaiting COT approval.
August 2015	HMIC	National Child Protection Inspection. Post Inspection Review 3rd-7th August 2015.	Out for management decision of actions
April 2016	HMIC led	The tri-service review of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP)	Out for management decision of actions
February 2016	HMIC	Leadership	Out for management decision of actions
April 2016	CJJI	Delivering Justice in a Digital Age.	Out for management decision of actions
20th April 2016	MAZARS	Audit Follow up	Awaiting draft report.
December 2015	MAZARS	Expenses-Light Review	Decision needed on what to record on 4action for on-going monitoring
November 2015	MAZARS	Credit Cards-Light review	Decision needed on what to record on 4action for on-going monitoring

March 2016	MAZARS	Commissioning-Community Safety.	A piece of regional work that the treasurers requested. Derbyshire Treasurer Helen Boffy leads. Awaiting final report
March 2016	MAZARS	Social Value Impact	Decision needed on what to record on 4action for on-going monitoring
3rd May 2016	MAZARS	DMS	Draft report received. Out for management decision of actions
October 2015	HMIC	Efficiency - Local Report	DCC scrutiny and approval. No action required.

Forthcoming Audits, Inspections and Reports

Date	Scrutiny Body	Title	Update
tba	MAZARS	Financial Controls-PBS	Delayed and yet to be scoped due to Strategic Alliance
tba	MAZARS	POCA-Light Review	Draft Terms of Reference received.
tba	MAZARS	Risk Management	Audit delayed at the request of Julie Mair.
28/04/2016	HMIC	Insight visit	Observe Performance Board to identify key lines of enquiry (KLOE) for the Spring Inspection.

W/C 20th June 2016	HMIC	Spring Inspection 2016: Legitimacy, Leadership and Efficiency.	Document and data submission returned to HMIC. Timetable being constructed.
April 2016	MAZARS	HR Establishment	Awaiting Draft Terms of Reference
Autumn 2016	HMIC	Effectiveness - File Review Crime Occurrences	Data and document submission 20/05/2016.

Audit and inspection thematic reports

Date	Scrutiny Body	Title	Update
July 2015	HMIC	In Harms Way. The Role of the Police in keeping children safe	Out for management decision of actions
December 2015	CJJI	Meeting the needs of victims in the criminal justice system.	This report consolidates relevant findings and recommendations from individual and joint reports which were first published by the CJ inspectorates between April 2014 and July 2015 (inclusive). Planning and Policy have cross referenced against 4action and can confirm action has been taken or is on-going to all the relevant reports
March 2016	HMIC	Missing children: who cares? The police response to missing and absent children.	Out for management decision of actions

March 2016	IPCC	Police use of force: evidence from complaints, investigations and public perception.	Out for management decision of actions
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Appendix 2: Audit and Inspection Actions Update Report

Quarter 4:

NB. Actions include those arising from recommendations highlighted by audit or inspection

Summary	Current	Previous	Trend
Action(s) off target	0	0	↑
Action(s) at risk of being off target	9	1	↑
Action(s) proposed for closure	1	0	↑
New Action(s)	6	17	↓
Total closed action(s)	35	13	↑
Total actions	51	31	↑

RAG Key

On target to deliver within constraints, including target completion date, budget and resource allocated. It is also anticipated that any expected efficiency savings will be met. No further action required at this time.
At risk: It is anticipated that there will be some slippage from the original target completion date and / or other constraints such as budget, available resource or expected efficiency saving. To be highlighted to the Portfolio Board as an issue for monitoring.
Off target: Target date and / or other constraints such as budget or available resource have been exceeded, or it is anticipated that an expected efficiency saving will not be met. Issue to be highlighted to the Portfolio Board and corrective action sought to meet business objectives.

Action(s) off target						
Target date	Action	Manager Responsible	Source originator.	Source title	Action Status	Action update
	No actions off target					
Action(s) at risk of being off target (Overdue within the next 3 months)						
Target date	Action	Manager Responsible	Source originator.	Source title	Action Status	Action update
31/07/2016	Action: Shelley Foy MFSS Accounts and Purchasing Service Delivery Manager. Review and update map and desk instructions. Introduce a regular updating process to include revisions to instructions to be communicated to all relevant staff	ACO Paul Dawkins	Mazars	Core Financials February 2016	At Risk	Update Shelly Foy MFSS 12/05/2016: The review and update to maintain consistency across all force areas nearly complete.
15/06/2016	Action: Review how chief constables, and their senior officers, give full effect to their forces' stated priority on domestic abuse. If there are any shortcomings they should be included in the action plan as in recommendation 2. (as below)	Det Supt Robert Griffin	HMIC	Increasingly everyone's business: A progress report on the police response to domestic abuse	At Risk	Working with Leigh Sanders to compile a DA action plan. Peer review has been arranged with Lancashire Police to review aspects of Public Protection, in line with new Head of Department. The action plan will incorporate all DA activity and take into account the issues and recommendations in the HMIC publication Increasingly everyone's business: A progress report on the police response to domestic abuse.
15/06/2016	Action: Review, update and publish the domestic abuse action plan. This action plan should be developed: a) in consultation with police and crime commissioners, domestic abuse support organisations and victims' representatives; b) after close consideration of all the recommendations in this report; c) with reference to all relevant domestic homicide reviews and IPCC findings, whether in connection with the force in question or another force; and d) drawing on relevant knowledge acquired or available from other sources such as CPS scrutiny panels and MARAC self assessments	Det Supt Robert Griffin	HMIC	Increasingly everyone's business: A progress report on the police response to domestic abuse	At Risk	Working with Leigh Sanders to compile a DA action plan. Peer review has been arranged with Lancashire Police to review aspects of Public Protection, in line with new Head of Department. The action plan will incorporate all DA activity and take into account the issues and recommendations in the HMIC publication Increasingly everyone's business: A progress report on the police response to domestic abuse.
31/07/2016	Action: A review of the Governance and Decision Making Framework will be undertaken to ensure it is up to date and fit for purpose. The Governance and Decision Making Framework will also be combined with the Working Together document to create a single document and prevent the risk of conflicting information.	Kevin Dennis	Mazars	Joint Code of Corporate Governance	At Risk	DCC Scrutiny update18/05/2016: Review of the Governance and Decision Making Framework is complete and recommendations for Corporate Governance will be presented to the relevant work stream in the Strategic Alliance in July 2016. Paul Stock from Leic is the Ch Exec. Please show the end date as end July 2016.
30/06/2016	4.8 Action: Work to be undertaken to identify specialist agencies able to provide additional support to victims. (All victims should be considered for referral to specialist agencies in addition to Victim Support Services. These referrals and proactive support provided should be evidenced within the CRMS system). This to be communicated via the Communication Strategy and reiterated in a Weekly Order. Ensure Niche incorporates the requirement to record any specialist referrals.	T/Ch Insp Andrew Goodall	Mazars	Victim Code of Practice	At Risk.	Work has been completed to identify specialist agencies. (Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence Services are already in place). In relation to generic Victim Support services a table which explains the process of referral for officers and relevant staff to follow is out for consultation. The final amendments are being added and we await the City Council feedback. It is anticipated this should be ready by the end of May to be communicated via a weekly order, if required. The communications strategy was implemented on the 21st March with a News item on the Intranet containing key messages. No significant changes so all divisional frontline Sgts have been emailed signposting them to the article and requesting they brief their staff with regard to the changes and requirements.

31/07/2016	<p>Action: 11.1 Develop clear policies and procedures to enable an integrated approach to HBV, FGM and FM between police forces and other agencies.</p> <p>Communicate the new documents via weekly orders and with corporate communications launch.</p>	Det Supt Robert Griffin	HMIC		At Risk.	<p>Nottinghamshire Police currently have procedures in place relating to the investigation of HBA, FGM and FM which include partnership working. The revised NPCC HBA strategy has identified three key areas in helping to eradicate offences of HBA. One of these critical areas is that all victims personal data will be stored, managed and handled with integrity and confidentially and access to this data should be controlled.</p> <p>The current procedures in place relate to actions to be taken by Nottinghamshire Police. This includes how we protect personal data. To comply with the HMIC recommendation we would need to develop procedures to protect victim information which is compatible with other forces. The ideal starting point for this would be for the region to develop procedures and practices within Niche, as this is the tool that holds victims' personal data.</p> <p>The issue is to have a consistent regional approach between forces and partners to record incidents on NICHE, this will then allow accurate recording / reporting. Policies and procedures need to reflect how NICHE should be utilised to enable an integrated approach to be followed. This issue is to be referred to the NICHE Design Authority meeting to achieve consistency.</p> <p>Update 18/05/2016 Insp Mark Turner: The Niche Design Document has been presented to the Five Force Authority Board on Tuesday 17th May. It has been approved so this will now be presented to the Regional Niche Team to build. This will take between 4-6 weeks. Derbyshire will go live with this on the 22/06/2016. Other forces have not agreed to go live on that date and they will review Niche before deciding.</p> <p>Both the region and the force will need to then look at how to implement the Niche changes for example training. Regional Lead: Det Sgt Claire Rimmer [Lincs] Force Contact: Det Insp Claire Dean.</p> <p>The Niche design will be built to fit the policy as the policy is a national one.</p>
31/08/2016	<p>Action 14. Nottinghamshire Police will work with Local Safeguarding Boards and local authorities to divert children away from custody. The force will also help to -</p> <p>a) develop joint strategies that equip frontline staff to manage the behaviour of children looked after by the local authority so that detention is a last resort; b) ensure that no child who is looked after by the local authority is denied accommodation by them; c) share data, as collected under recommendation 1, to inform local joint strategic needs assessments on safe accommodation requirements for children; d) record and report to the LSCB the number of children held in custody (and their legal status), the efforts made to secure alternative accommodation and the reasons for failing to do so (with plans to address them); and e) promote joint engagement with local Magistrates' Associations to support a common, cross-agency understanding of relevant terminology, in particular the distinction between 'safe' and 'secure' accommodation.</p>	Ch Supt Julia Debenham	HMIC	Welfare of Vulnerable People in Custody	At Risk.	<p>Local Safeguarding Children's Boards (LSCBs) hold Nottinghamshire Police to account. Notts are working with force safeguarding leads to establish a link into LSCB but as yet have not been asked to provide any information. This information if required is available. However if diverting from custody EMCJS may not be aware or involved in this activity.</p> <p>a) Notts are working with force safeguarding leads to establish a link into LSCB. b) EMCJS are working with LAs to reduce the denial of accommodation in all our suites. APP had recently changed to allow forces to charge for 'housing' a child, and the LA does not take this on board and EMCJS are in discussions at Strategic Custody Group (SCG) to see how this may be resolved. In the meantime therefore we are working through a process – discussed at SCG – to weekly review ALL children brought into custody via an Insp and look at their treatment and their issues vis a vis accommodation to ensure lessons are learnt and improvements – including those with the LA – are made. CH Insp Baker has also attended the National Forum over seeing these issues and adheres to guidance, and best practice down into EMCJS via SGC chaired by ACC Nixon. c) EMCJS are already sharing data via Force Safeguarding leads on children in custody. They have until Mar 15 provided numbers of children in custody and numbers remanded however as of April's data (presented in May) we have gone further to break down the data by age, ethnicity, nationality and gender and expanded our data sets to look at children strip searched and with mental health issues. EMCJS are also looking under the leadership of ACC Nixon at vulnerability in custody as a whole and are trying to understand via a vulnerability matrix issues like nos of children with mental health, learning difficulties for example. This new data will be presented on the 26th May to the SMT once approved it will also go out to forces. In line with the qualitative data from the Insp report this should improve our understanding of issues surrounding children in custody. d) EMCJS currently have an escalation procedure for this instance but it is not as yet reported universally to LSCBs, the Insp report once embedded will also assist on this. It is still work in progress until the data is embedded. e) EMCJS are currently clarifying the terminology of 'safe and secure' with our own staff in order to aid improvements and have concentrated on putting the APP changes around children in custody in to our Day one training sessions. These are currently on going but are standardised now across the region with the training plan having been agreed by ACC Nixon at the April SCG. We are not however working with the Magistrates Associations Court.</p>
31/08/2016	<p>Action 9: Nottinghamshire Police to establish a race equality governance framework linked to the force's risk register. The framework will include:-</p> <p>a) collection of core data sets by ethnicity as set out in recommendation 1; b) development of a common understanding of the current situation through analysis of the data and engagement with Independent Advisory Groups and local communities; c) plans to make improvements to practice where this is identified as being necessary; and d) appropriate leadership and governance structures to oversee and make sure the work is carried out.</p>	Ch Supt Julia Debenham	HMIC	Welfare of Vulnerable People in Custody	At Risk.	<p>The principles of a race equality and governance framework are managed at a departmental risk register has oversight by force risk leads and ultimately anything high or very high level in risk terms is escalated to ACC Nixon at Strategic Custody Group (SCG) and CC Rhodes at the Senior Leadership Board and will identify the risk to the relevant force.</p> <p>a) EMCJS are already sharing data and it now contains a break down per suite breaking down demand by ethnicity, nationality, race and gender. This data is present and as such will be reviewed at SMT and SCG by ACC Nixon. b) EMCJS are working with Lynne Woodward Equality lead for Leicestershire and with OPCC offices to be transparent about data and to involve an EIA process around key policies and to engage IAG around these key policies. A meeting with Lynne is scheduled for the 24th May to see how best to engage IAGs. This was discussed at SCG in April and ACC Nixon is aware of the approach towards better engagement around custody. Data sets are reported like use of force for example by ethnicity and age. There is further work to drive an approach to record data on adverse incidents and near misses also to enable a deeper understanding. In the first instance the data is reported to the operational custody group and any issues escalated to SCG. c) Data sets are reviewed annually and in line with the business plan and any drilling down to improve understanding can be done on an annual basis but would also be done on an ad hoc basis via requests from ops custody and SCG. d) Leadership and governance is strong. Governance exists as an Ops Custody Group, the SCG who ultimately reports from SCG into the Senior Leadership Board and the attendance at this by the OPCC and strategic partners.</p>
30/06/2016	<p>Action: Carry out a review to understand the level of resources required to report annually on activity against historic plans and refresh future forecasts and plans accordingly.</p>	Maria Fox (Archive & Exhibits Manager)	Mazars	Proceeds of Crime Act January 2016	At Risk	<p>Update DB 12/05/2016: Review completed. A business case has been refreshed to request an increase in staffing to enable the action activity to be fulfilled was submitted to the Programme Board on 11/05/2016. This will go to the Transformation Board on the 17th May.</p>
Proposed for closure.						
30/04/2016	<p>Action 10.1: Partially Implemented The Force complies with its duty to promote equality, as required in the Equality Act 2010, with action plans to recruit and promote people who have an interest in doing so. In addition, the force monitors recruitment against protected characteristics in order that its workforce reflects the communities in which it operates.</p> <p>Action: 10.2 The Force will Implement and publish robust equality impact assessments across custody operations which include an element of external challenge. These will be used to develop improvement action plans and address any issues of discriminatory treatment.</p>	Ch Supt Julia Debenham	HMIC	Welfare of Vulnerable People in Custody		<p>10.1: The Force complies with its duty to promote equality, as required in the Equality Act 2010, with action plans to recruit and promote people who have an interest in doing so. In addition, the force monitors recruitment against protected characteristics in order that its workforce reflects the communities in which it operates.</p> <p>10.2: EMCJS are working with Leics equality lead to develop equality impact assessments with the intention that the revised Custody procedural document is used to test the process. The custody procedural document has been re written and reviewed at the Leicestershire Independent Advisory Group.</p> <p>Recommend complete.</p>

Closed Actions						
30/6/2016	Action: Peter Fleet Accounts and Purchasing Team Leader. MFSS to send to Pam Taylor (Senior Financial Accountant) an Aged Debtors report monthly in excel format. Add additional columns to incorporate the latest debt chasing notes and to confirm Dunning Letters 1 & 2 have been sent. This would then enable decisions on how to progress. Cross ref with recommendation 4.9.	ACO Paul Dawkins	Mazars	Core Financials February 2016	Closed	Review complete. Regularly receiving debtors monthly reports. The process is established and an on going process which means monthly reviews can take place DCC Scrutiny 23/03/2016: Supports completion. Comment update from Recommendation 4.9 applies here too.
29/2/2016	Action: Shelly Foy Accounts and Purchasing Service Delivery Manager MFSS to ensure that staff are updated on the process regarding proforma invoices, all invoices are approved by a budget holder prior to payment and that a force agreement is put in place in relation to ' no scanning in of proforma invoices'	ACO Paul Dawkins	Mazars	Core Financials February 2016	Closed	The MFSS accounts payable team have now been instructed not to process proforma invoices and need authorisation from approve budget holder. Paul Dawkins reviewed and recommends action complete. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion
30/11/2015	Action: Review immediately the operation of the witness care unit in relation to the updating of victims. If required, the force should implement an action plan to ensure service improvement.	Janet Carlin	HMIC	Crime Inspection 2014 Nottinghamshire Police.	Closed	DCC Scrutiny: 05/01/2016: support completion please note that 9% non-compliance isn't yet satisfactory performance and that the changes being brought in should improve performance – anticipated to be around 99.55 % compliance.
30/4/2016	Action:- Superintendent to work with Management Information to develop an effective performance management framework, to monitor the activity and impact of the IOM scheme. A full performance protocol and framework needs to be agreed, introduced and evaluated.	Supt Adrian Pearson	Mazars	Integrated Offender Management	Closed	There is a national piece of work in progress to utilise the IDIOM system to provide near real time reoffending data for the IOM cohorts. Locally MI have developed a method of creating cohorts which can in the future be checked through IDIOM to identify specific IOM performance. The data will be harvested from admission/selection meetings from Q1 2016 onwards. It is hoped that this will provide a short to medium term solution whilst the longer term project around IDIOM is done. DCC Scrutiny 23/02/2016: supports completion.
31/3/2016	Action: A review of policies and procedures will be undertaken and a joint schedule will be developed for the Force and the PCC that identifies the review dates for these reviews. The schedule will also document any amendments that are made as a result of any review.	Martin Bakalarczyk	Mazars	Joint Code of Corporate Governance	Closed	DCC Scrutiny 23/03/2016: Ali Naylor is looking at high level conditions and over the summer there will be a detailed design and implementation put forward. Everything going forward is about convergence. Policy and Procedure holders should take personal responsibility and update their documents when necessary for example if a legislative change. The three force strategic alliance will take account of policies and procedures. Please close this action.
31/3/2016	Action: Check that Nottinghamshire Police have responded to all the CJJI relevant inspection reports from the reporting period as in annex A of this report.	Martin Bakalarczyk	CJJI	Meeting the needs of victims in the criminal justice system	Closed	24/02/2016 BT and AF reviewed all the relevant inspection reports in Annex A of the report and identified that Nottinghamshire Police had responded to the relevant reports and captured any activity as required. (18 reports). DCC scrutiny supports that no further action is needed against this report.
30/04/2016	Action: The force should decide who makes the decision not to proceed with a domestic abuse investigation and put in place a process to ensure greater consistency.	DCI Leigh Sanders	HMIC	Nottinghamshire Police's approach to tackling Domestic Abuse (local report)	Closed	All offences of ABH charging standards and below are gatekeeper by Sgt's (either DAIT or CPS). Any offences of GBH are referred to an Inspector (if NFA anticipated). The rationale as to why a decision not to proceed is made will be recorded on CRMS / CATS (now NICHE). DCC scrutiny 23/03/2016: Comment update noted. Please show this as complete.
11/2/2016	The relevant activity from the report has been captured as part of the CSE Strategy and action plan. This was one of many sources.	Supt Helen Chamberlain	HMIC	Online and on the edge: Real risks in a virtual world.	Closed	The relevant activity is being managed through the CSE action plan. Head of PP meets ACC Torr regularly to discuss. This was reported to FEB
31/3/2016	Action: EMSCU to ensure national contracts are designated in Crystal. Procurement Team to be briefed as appropriate. Audit to be undertaken every 3 months to ensure compliance.	Ronnie Adams (Commercial Director Procurement)	Mazars	Procurement January 2016	Closed	All national frameworks that EMSCU can use are clearly defined within the Crystal contracts management system. Initial audit taken place showing full compliance. The EMSCU business plan has been amended to ensure the compliance checks take place every 3 months. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.
31/3/2016	Action: Policy/Procedure to be amended to advise staff to attach quotes to requisition orders on the system. Amendment to be communicated via weekly orders to all appropriate staff	Ronnie Adams (Commercial Director Procurement)	Mazars	Procurement January 2016	Closed	The following message has now been sent for inclusion in weekly orders to everyone in the Notts force who could authorise a purchase requisition up to a value of £25,000: "Retaining of quotes: in line with the procurement policy, anyone authorising a purchase requisition must ensure that copies have been kept for audit purposes of all relevant supporting quotations – i.e. one quotation for spending up to ten thousand pounds, and three quotations for spending from ten thousand pounds to twenty-five thousand pounds." DCC Scrutiny 23/03/2016: Comment update noted support completion.
31/12/2015	Action: Present the new NCALT package to the Training Panel for a decision to adopt for local delivery.	Ch Supt Julia Debenham	CJJI	Provision of Charging Decisions	Closed	Presented by Terri Mitchinson and agreed at the Training Priorities Panel for March /April go live and to be launched by EMCHRS. Leah Johnson has written the communication for the intranet. The force lead is CH Supt Jebb. DCC Fish Scrutiny 13/01/2016. Supports completion.
30/04/2016	Action: Discuss with the CPS MI lead and incorporate the re write of the Prosecution Team Performance Meeting (PTPM) data.	Ch Supt Julia Debenham	CJJI	Provision of Charging Decisions	Closed	National report. Notts watching brief only. Data now available. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.

31/05/2016	<p>Action: EMCJS to carry out a review and research into what costs or delays would be incurred to engage with partners and the CPS to record the rationale and information on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - take no further action or - proceed by way of an out of court disposal. <p>To include the following information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the decision-maker's application of the full Code for Crown Prosecutors test; and • in relevant cases, consideration of the gravity matrix, and, that wherever possible, that record is included on the MG3 form 	Ch Supt Julia Debenham	CJJI	Provision of Charging Decisions	Closed	<p>The MG3 is intended for charged matters and would involve the OIC relating the facts and evidence of the offence in detail in writing along with details of persons and events required for the form for no benefit and that this form must take approx.. 20 mins. to complete. Notts record the NFA decision on the system at no opportunity cost to the officer and this is reportable as it is on a system – the MG3 would not be therefore the approach as it is bureaucratic for the OIC and is of no benefit to the force. Proposed for closure.</p> <p>DCC Fish Scrutiny 13/01/2016. Supports completion.</p>
30/4/2016	Action: Pam Rourke MFSS Payroll Service Delivery Manager. Checklist to be introduced. In mitigation the development of extracts from HR for upload into ePayfact has been accelerated and the team have been reminded in the interim of the care that needs to be taken when carrying out secondary checks.	ACO Paul Dawkins	Mazars	Core Financials February 2016	Closed	<p>A checklist has been developed and issued to all members of the payroll team.</p> <p>DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.</p>
31/07/2016	Action: Business Partner – Local Policing Danny Baker and Business Partner Tracey Morris Finance Nottinghamshire Police to review the purchasing process and controls within the Oracle system and decide if there is a requirement that at least two members of staff should be involved in the ordering, receipt and payment approval process for goods and services which exceed the value of £250. Report the findings to ACO Paul Dawkins Leicestershire Police and Charlie Radford Chief Financial Officer Office of the PCC. Nottinghamshire	ACO Paul Dawkins	Mazars	Core Financials February 2016	Closed	<p>The purchasing process and controls within the Oracle system review is now complete. The 'Go Live' date is 1st June 2016. A global communication email to all staff and police officers was sent out on 13th May 2016 with a link to further information.</p> <p>DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.</p>
30/4/2016	Action: Claire Delves MFSS HR Service Delivery Manager. Review service requests to identify if there is an adequate checking process in place to ensure that all requests for unpaid leave are actioned in a timely manner. The review should also comment upon that service requests are timely allocated to Payroll to allow records to be updated and the Payroll closed.	ACO Paul Dawkins	Mazars	Core Financials February 2016	Closed	<p>Process in place. MFSS will make the assumption that individuals will leave on a zero entitlement – that they will have taken all of the leave TOIL, Flexi for example owed to them.</p> <p>Duty Planning (Notts) will contact the line manager to make sure that all of the balances are taken.</p> <p>Any outstanding balances - the Line Manager must raise a separate service request to HR Support (Notts) with the details of what is outstanding, for consideration of a payment to be made confirming the what the business needs are. If granted HR support will inform MFSS payroll to make a payment (note that payment maybe received after the leave date in line with the payroll cut off dates).</p> <p>DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.</p>
29/4/2016	Action: Review the process of journal checking and introduce a periodic independent check to negate invalid or inaccurate journals being processed. Refresh the appropriate policy or procedure and communicate to relevant staff.	ACO Paul Dawkins	Mazars	Core Financials February 2016	Closed	<p>Review of a selection of journals completed from March and the documentation explaining process, observations and recommendations has been uploaded into 4action.</p> <p>The reviews will now be quarterly, with the next review being June 2016 month end however as we go into the new financial year of 2016/17 we are changing the way we work which should result in a reduction in the number of monthly journals produced.</p> <p>DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.</p>
30/04/2016	<p>Action (13.1): Complete tests on a link between VISION and the National Firearms Database so that officers know in advance that firearms are at a given location.</p> <p>Action (13.2): Update the Firearms Licensing Procedure to make reference to dispatching, risk assessments their use of power and when appropriate to seize firearms and certificates.</p> <p>Action (13.3): Communicate the new procedure through weekly orders.</p>	D Supt Mark Pollock	HMIC	Firearms Licensing: Targeting the Risk	Closed	<p>13.1: Recent testing has been successful. Go live date is 17/06/2016</p> <p>13.2: Consultation complete. Go live date 17/06/2016.</p> <p>13.3: This will go on weekly orders and communicated around the go live date.</p> <p>DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.</p>
29/2/2016	Action: Re-write the Firearms Licensing procedure to include information on the effective audit and monitoring process as required by the Authorised Professional Practice (APP).	D Supt Mark Pollock	HMIC	Firearms Licensing: Targeting the Risk	Closed	<p>Consultation complete. The effective audit and monitoring process as required by the Authorised Professional Practice (APP) is now embedded in the new procedure. Go live 17/06/2016.</p> <p>DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.</p>
31/05/2016	Action: Within three months, all chief constables should review the demand placed on their firearms licensing department to ensure it has the capacity to meet this demand and provide an efficient and effective service at all times	D Supt Mark Pollock	HMIC	Firearms Licensing: Targeting the Risk	Closed	<p>Review undertaken in response to staffing in the unit. Currently, the department has NO BACKLOGS of current applications. There is a risk around the number of investigations awaiting FLM outcome (estimated around 40 cases) and this is being monitored. Around 2700 renewals are expected for 2016 which relates to 528 applications per FTE Firearms Enquiry Officer. Areas of responsibility have been adjusted to ensure a more balanced workload across the team.</p> <p>A new procedure has been written and gone out for consultation.</p> <p>DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.</p>
31/5/2016	Action: Review the efficiency and effectiveness with partners of the current separate arrangements of the DART and the MASH. Ideally, two important outcomes would be: the identification of one central referral point; and a fluid and transparent process so safeguarding actions would reduce the risk from high to medium. This would mean cases did not have to be referred to the MARACs, therefore focusing valuable expertise on the most difficult and challenging cases.	DCI Leigh Sanders	HMIC	Nottinghamshire Police's approach to tackling domestic abuse. (local report)	Closed	<p>The force is reviewing the DASU. This is currently split between two sites at Oxclose and the MASH. We will review the need to join the team together at Oxclose and this will be in light of current force restructuring and the estates strategy</p> <p>Police / partner review of the DART has been completed, findings to be discussed. DCI Sanders and Teresa Godfrey have been meeting to discuss the MASH review. Marac – IDVA, police and social care triage City referrals to ensure the most difficult and challenging cases are taken. Similar process takes place in the county where immediate interventions take place to immediately reduce risk and therefore volume in the MARAC.</p> <p>DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.</p>

31/3/2016	Action: Action:- EMSCU to ensure contracts are in place for all purchases over £25,000 and that they are signed prior to commencement. Regular dip sampling to be undertaken and findings reported to senior management team for action.	Ronnie Adams (Commercial Director Procurement)	Mazars	Procurement January 2016	Closed	Audit or dip sampling performed to check that signed contracts are in place for all purchases over £25,000 before goods and/or services are provided. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Support completion.
29/2/2016	Action: In January each year, the Force will produce a full list of efficiencies with the budget report. This will agree the total required per the budget report. It will also identify which efficiencies are one-off savings and which are recurring within the base budget. Inform PA to CC and DCC Nottinghamshire Police to add this to forward planning agenda item for Force Exec Board.	ACO Paul Dawkins	Mazars	Savings Programme February 2016	Closed	ACO Paul Dawkins: A full list of efficiencies for 2016/17 was supplied to the OPCC for use in the annual budget report in January 2016. This list will be monitored on a regular basis going forward to ensure that targets are being met or where necessary identifying those at risk which are slipping with measures for mitigation ACO Paul Dawkins supports completion.
31/07/2016	Action:- Nottinghamshire Police to work with OPCC and partners to develop a public-facing strategic document to raise awareness and the positive impact of IOM. "IOM" is inherently a partnership approach, with Nottinghamshire Police and the OPCC significant contributors to it, but it remains firmly a multi-agency asset. Therefore, any strategy document needs to be positioned at that level, not at a single agency level	Insp Paul Harris	Mazars	Integrated Offender Management	Closed	As IOM is a partnership approach with the OPCC as significant contributors it is acknowledged that the public facing strategic document will take time to develop. IOM is an approach to working with groups of offenders which was introduced by the Home Office and is promoted by the Ministry of Justice. The approach contains three overarching priorities: • Catch and convict • Prevent and deter • Resettle and rehabilitate There are seven recognised pathways out of offending: • Accommodation • Education, training and employment • Health including mental health • Alcohol and drugs misuse • Attitude, thinking and behaviour • Finance, benefits and debt • Children and families of offenders The local model aspires to address these principles using the identified pathways. Partners have recently recognised that with changing priorities, organisational change, the impact of the austerity agenda and the impact of legislative changes which introduced Transforming Rehabilitation, it is timely to review the current approach. Police, NPS and DLNR CRC partners agreed at a meeting on 3rd December 2015 to adhere to the Ministry of Justice (2015) IOM key principles as follows: • All partners manage offenders together • Deliver a local response to local problems • All offenders potentially in scope • Offenders facing up to their responsibility or facing the consequences • Best use made of existing programmes and governance arrangements • Support long-term desistance from crime An evaluation of the existing, local IOM arrangements undertaken by PhD student Emily Evans in 2014 noted that; "The analysis of the quantitative data has showed a statistically significant reduction in the amount of offending and number of offenders between the pre and post IOM periods. These outstrip falls in crime both nationally and locally. In addition a change in the nature of offending pre and post can be observed. This shows a decrease in the categories of serious acquisitive crime which IOM targets, such as burglary, robbery, certain theft offences and drugs offences." At the IOM partnership meeting on 3rd December 2015 there was agreement that the local IOM priorities should reflect threat, risk and harm (TRH). It was also agreed that the shared understanding of the definition and application of TRH is as follows: • Threat – capability and intent • Risk – likelihood and imminence • Harm – impact and severity in order of physical, psychological, financial At the IOM Partnership meeting on 3rd December 2015, it was agreed that the current partnership base should be widened and consequently a set of recommendations / plan have been agreed. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.
31/01/2016	4.1 Action:- Communication strategy to be written and cascaded to relevant staff. Significant changes to be outlined and communicated via Weekly Order. (Officers should be reminded of the importance of creating and maintaining this working sheet which should be evidenced within the CRMS system.) Ensure victim figures are available and presented as part of the divisional OPR performance packs for monitoring and corrective action	T/Ch Insp Andrew Goodall	Mazars	Victim Code of Practice	Closed	The communications strategy was implemented on the 21st March with a News item on the Intranet containing key messages. All divisional frontline Sgts have been emailed signposting them to the article and requesting they brief their staff with regard to the changes and requirements. Victim figures are presented to the Divisional OPR and VOLT meetings and included in the performance packs. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.
31/01/2016	4.2 Action:- Communication strategy to be written and cascaded to relevant staff. (Needs assessments should be carried out with all victims of crime and results recorded on the Victim's Code of Practice working sheet within the CRMS system. This should then be used as the basis of support provision for the victim going forward). Significant changes to be outlined and communicated via Weekly Order. Ensure victim figures are available and presented as part of the divisional OPR performance packs for monitoring and corrective action	T/Ch Insp Andrew Goodall	Mazars	Victim Code of Practice	Closed	The communications strategy was implemented on the 21st March with a News item on the Intranet containing key messages. All divisional frontline Sgts have been emailed signposting them to the article and requesting they brief their staff with regard to the changes and requirements. Victim figures are presented to the Divisional OPR and VOLT meetings and included in the performance packs. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.
31/01/2016	4.3 Action:- Communication strategy to be written and cascaded to relevant staff. Significant changes to be outlined and communicated via Weekly Order. (Preferred method and frequency of contact should be established with each victim of crime to enable them to be updated on the progress of any on-going investigation. This should be recorded on the Victim's Code of Practice working sheet and evidence maintained that updates have been provided in line with this request) Ensure victim figures are available and presented as part of the divisional OPR performance packs for monitoring and corrective action	T/Ch Insp Andrew Goodall	Mazars	Victim Code of Practice	Closed	The communications strategy was implemented on the 21st March with a News item on the Intranet containing key messages. All divisional frontline Sgts have been emailed signposting them to the article and requesting they brief their staff with regard to the changes and requirements. Victim figures are presented to the Divisional OPR and VOLT meetings and included in the performance packs.. This recommendation relates to agreeing the method and frequency of victim update DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.
31/01/2016	4.6 Action:- Communication strategy to be written and cascaded to relevant staff. . (Officer should be reminded that when updates are provided to victims, acknowledgement should be made within the 'aggrieved updated' box on CRMS to support the update and prevent this being escalated via performance management information). Significant changes to be outlined and communicated via Weekly Order	T/Ch Insp Andrew Goodall	Mazars	Victim Code of Practice	Closed	The communications strategy was implemented on the 21st March with a News item on the Intranet containing key messages. No significant changes so all divisional frontline Sgts have been emailed signposting them to the article and requesting they brief their staff with regard to the changes and requirements. This recommendation relates to CRMS as Niche does not have the format to tick an aggrieved updated box. Guidance identifies the need to abide by any contact contract made with the victim. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.
31/01/2016	4.7 Action:- Communication strategy to be written and cascaded to relevant staff. (The offer/availability of a Victim Personal Statement (VPS) to the victim should be clearly communicated and acknowledged within the Victim Code of Practice working sheet). Significant changes to be outlined and communicated via Weekly Order.	T/Ch Insp Andrew Goodall	Mazars	Victim Code of Practice	Closed	The communications strategy was implemented on the 21st March with a News item on the Intranet containing key messages. No significant changes so all divisional frontline Sgts have been emailed signposting them to the article and requesting they brief their staff with regard to the changes and requirements. This recommendation refers to the offer of the Victim personal Statement. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.

31/5/2016	Action: Consult with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to final report. Police Legitimacy. Present findings to DCC for scrutiny and approval. Once approved input activity into 4action.	Julie Mair (Organisational Development Manager)	HMIC	Legitimacy 2015	Closed	Consultation with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to the final report is now complete. DCC and ACC approval of actions to go onto the force action plan (4action). DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.
30/04/2016	Action 11: Nottinghamshire Police to ensure they are included as members of Health and Wellbeing Boards in the City and County, which have a local focus on reducing the unnecessary use of police custody through inter-agency assessment and service planning	Ch Supt Julia Debenham	HMIC	Welfare of Vulnerable People in Custody	Closed	Nottinghamshire Police have representation on the Health and Wellbeing Board. EMCJS are seeking to establish a Clinical Governance Structure to deal with point 2 and are currently sending information when relevant to The Force Safeguarding Leads e.g. juveniles remanded. There is a process in place for reducing the unnecessary use of police custody, for example children remanded into Local Authority accommodation. (S.38). This is a regional Policy. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.
30/04/2016	Action 2: Nottinghamshire Police to plan and publish data on police detention. At a minimum the data should include (collated by gender, race and ethnicity and age): a) levels of stop and search, arrest and detention; b) use of police custody as a place of safety under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983; c) use of police custody as a place of safety under the Children Act 1989; d) levels of strip-searching, use of force and other control measures (with information on the means used – see also recommendation 7); e) numbers of children who are detained in police custody and for how long; f) numbers of requests for children to be transferred to local authority accommodation under PACE; and -g) numbers of children actually transferred to local authority accommodation	Ch Supt Julia Debenham	HMIC	Welfare of Vulnerable People in Custody	Closed	EMCJS scorecard for 2016/17 to include strip search data and more detail on children, also data on detainees to breakdown in terms of age, gender, race etc. First issue is in May to publish April 16 data. Update Ch Insp Phil Baker 10/05/2016: a) levels of stop and search, arrest and detention data is captured and published. b) use of police custody as a place of safety under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 data is captured and published. c) use of police custody as a place of safety under the Children Act 1989 data. Custody not used as a place of safety. d) levels of strip-searching, use of force and other control measures (with information on the means used – see also recommendation 7) data to be included in the monthly CJ OPR report submitted to Ch Supt Debenham. e) numbers of children who are detained in police custody and for how long. This data is captured but not the length of time ic custody. Not routinely published but a report can be ran upon request. f) numbers of requests for children to be transferred to local authority accommodation under PACE, again not routinely captured but can be produced if required. g) numbers of children actually transferred to local authority accommodation, not routinely published but a manual count can be carried out if required. The publication for the above is the monthly Regional OPR. Awaiting decision from OoPCC as to what data they require for a public facing publication. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.
29/02/2016	Action 7: National lead to establish a definition and monitoring framework on the use of force by police officers and staff, linked to force's risk registers. This to be used by the force and will:- Ensure that: a)more frontline officers and staff are trained in de-escalation skills; b) there is a common understanding, informed by College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice on definitions of restraint and thresholds for the purposes of record-keeping; c) the use of force in custody is recorded on CCTV and/or body worn cameras, and the recordings are monitored by senior managers, and made available to National Preventative Mechanism-visiting bodies as required; and d) data collected on the use of force is monitored routinely, examined for trends, reported to police and crime commissioners and published on force websites to promote transparency and accountability to community groups and the wider population.	Ch Supt Julia Debenham	HMIC	Welfare of Vulnerable People in Custody	Closed	Still awaiting National Lead established definition. However; a) All relevant staff are trained in de-escalation skills and tactical communications. From June 2016 all Nottinghamshire custody staff will be trained in force. (previously regionally trained). b) During training the College of Policing APP definitions of restraint and thresholds for the purposes of record-keeping are used. c) The use of force data in custody is captured and can be made available upon request to visiting bodies as required. d) Data is already collected and presented to DCC Bannister as lead of the regional Strategic Custody Group - reports on this also go out to Forces. EMCJS are also re writing their procedure in terms of how we record use of force - this will further be enabled by the adoption of Niche in February 2016. Data collection regionally is on going and being reviewed in the Strategic Custody Group quarterly. As Niche develops it is hoped use of force may become simple to report and therefore feature in the monthly scorecard. Awaiting decision from OoPCC as to what data they require for a public facing publication. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.
7/4/2016	Action: Review the process of reconciliation of POCA accounting records and funds, and ensure that full analysis of balances on all POCA financial accounting system control accounts are reconciled at the earliest opportunity.	Maria Fox (Archive & Exhibits Manager)	Mazars	Proceeds of Crime Act January 2016	Closed	Review complete of all accounting records and funds. Final reconciliation received for the year and all in place a process in place to ensure this continues. DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion.
31/07/2016	Action: Work with partners in both LA's to establish processes for more robust sharing of Return Interview information, in line with our agreed joint protocol for missing children.	Det Supt Robert Griffin	HMIC	PEEL: Police effectiveness 2015 (vulnerability National & Local)	Closed	A joint protocol is in place. " Missing from Home and Care Joint Protocol" This is in place for both the County and the City. The protocol defines the roles and responsibilities of all those concerned with the processes around children who go missing. It is derived from the Department for Education 'Statutory guidance on children who run away or go missing from home or care January 2014' and also incorporates key elements of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance, and which introduces the new definitions of 'missing' and 'absent'. The protocol responds to the concept of the 'hidden' missing as outlined within the DfE guidance. There is currently a secure email used for intelligence sharing. The protocol has a section on 'Return Interview' here it states: "During the course of a return interview, a child may provide information that may assist in quickly locating them should they go missing again and thus help prevent future harm. For example, locations visited, whom they associated with, vehicles they travelled in, etc. The professional undertaking the return interview, whilst not sharing the whole return interview, is required to feedback key information to the relevant police missing person coordinator in a timely manner so that it is readily accessible in the event of future episodes" DCC Scrutiny 18/05/2016: Supports completion
New Actions						
30/06/2016	Action: Consult with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to final report. Leadership 2015. Present findings to DCC for scrutiny and approval. Once approved input activity into 4action.	Julie Mair (Organisational Development Manager)	HMIC	Leadership 2015	At Risk	In consultation with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to the final report. DCC scrutiny taken place. Further information required.
30/06/2016	Action: Consult with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to final report. Effectiveness 2015 Present findings to DCC for scrutiny and approval. Once approved input activity into 4action.	Julie Mair (Organisational Development Manager)	HMIC	Effectiveness 2015	At Risk	In consultation with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to the final report. DCC scrutiny taken place. Further information required.
30/06/2016	Action: Consult with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to final report. Missing Children. Who Cares? Present findings to DCC for scrutiny and approval. Once approved input activity into 4action.	Julie Mair (Organisational Development Manager)	HMIC	Missing Children. Who cares?	At Risk	In consultation with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to the final report.

30/06/2016	Action: Consult with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to final report. National Child Protection Inspection. Post Inspection Review 3-7th August 2015. Present findings to DCC for scrutiny and approval. Once approved input activity into 4action.	Julie Mair (Organisational Development Manager)	HMIC	National Child Protection Inspection. Post Inspection Review 3-7th August 2015	At Risk	In consultation with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to the final report.
30/06/2016	Action: Consult with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to final report. The tri-service review of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP). Present findings to DCC for scrutiny and approval. Once approved input activity into 4action.	Julie Mair (Organisational Development Manager)	HMIC	The tri-service review of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP)	At Risk	In consultation with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to the final report. DCC scrutiny taken place. Further information required.
30/06/2016	Action: Consult with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to final report. In Harms Way. The Role of Police in keeping Children Safe. Present findings to DCC for scrutiny and approval. Once approved input if needed all activity into 4action.	Julie Mair (Organisational Development Manager)	HMIC	In harms way: The role of policing in keeping children safe.	At Risk	In consultation with stakeholders and subject matter experts to provide a response to the final report.

Consideration	
Public/Non Public*	Public
Report to:	Joint Audit and Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	30th June 2016
Report of:	Chief Finance Officer
Report Author:	Charlotte Radford
E-mail:	Charlotte.radford@nottinghamshire.pnn.police.uk
Other Contacts:	
Agenda Item:	16

RISK REGISTERS – EXTERNAL REVIEW

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 Attached at Appendix A is a review undertaken by KPMG of Local Authority Risk Registers.

2. Recommendations

- 2.1 Members are requested to
- Consider this report in conjunction with the Risk Register report the next item on this agenda.
 - Consider any further detail they may require in obtaining assurance relating to risks, their mitigation and the management of.

3. Reasons for Recommendations

- 3.1 This complies with the principles of good governance and risk management.

4. Summary of Key Points

- 4.1 Members of this Panel have regularly received reports on the corporate risks identified by the PCC and CC.
- 4.2 The purpose of these reports is to identify all significant corporate risks and how they are being managed/mitigated.
- 4.3 Members need to be assured that all significant corporate risks have been captured and that there are robust plans to manage the risks.
- 4.4 The report at Appendix A highlights 3 national “top risks”:
- Delivering the medium term financial plan/savings targets/delivering funding etc
 - Business continuity/disaster recovery incidents/emergency planning
 - Data loss/information security/information governance risks.

4.5 Within the Nottinghamshire Risk Registers the above risks are identified as:

- Reference:
- Reference:
- Reference:

4.6 Assurance can be obtained in that the main risk relating to financial planning is identified as our highest risk. This Panel regularly receives updated reports on financial performance and management.

4.7 The risks relating to Information Security and Business Continuity are being well managed mitigated against. Business continuity has specifically been reported on in the last 12 months to this Panel.

5. Financial Implications and Budget Provision

5.1 None as a direct result of this report.

6. Human Resources Implications

6.1 None as a direct result of this report.

7. Equality Implications

7.1 None as a direct result of this report.

8. Risk Management

8.1 This report identifies the most significant corporate risks nationally and provides assurance that the CC and PCC have included these within the joint risk register to ensure the risks are managed and mitigated against.

9. Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

9.1 The identification and management of all risks corporate and operational ensures that the police and crime priorities are achieved.

10. Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

10.1 None

11. Details of outcome of consultation

11.1 None

12. Appendices

A – Local Authority Corporate Risk Register Analysis (KPMG)



Local Authority Corporate Risk Register Analysis

**Police & Crime Commissioner
for Nottinghamshire and
Nottinghamshire Chief
Constable**

April 2016

Local authority corporate risk register analysis

Background

Risk management is a critical management tool to manage, assess and prioritise risks therefore enabling resources to be applied to minimise, monitor and control the probability and/or the impact of negative events.

An important component of the risk management process is the corporate risk register, which identifies those risks which are critical for management to minimise, monitor and control.

KPMG has used its extensive audit client base to undertake Corporate/Strategic risk register analysis. The exercise compared the corporate risk registers from a range of local authorities covering:

- Police bodies;
- Fire and Rescue Services;
- Single Tier Councils;
- County Councils; and
- District Councils.

The outcome highlights the most frequently featured risks across local authority risk registers and changes from 2014 when a similar exercise was carried out.

We also considered the arrangements in place to maintain and review risk registers at the local authorities and fire and police bodies.

Finally, we considered the degree to which risk registers are used as an integrated management and assurance tool, which is especially important given other parts of the Public Sector are increasingly using tools such as Board Assurance Frameworks and Assurance Mapping.

Purpose


Organisations should use the comparative information to help consider:

- Whether there are potential risks that may have been omitted from their own risk register;
- Whether potential risks are given sufficient priority;
- The mechanics of the risk management process at their organisations; and
- How managing risks and providing assurance can be developed further.

Our aim is that our clients, both Members and Officers, find this paper useful when considering what risks to include or not include in their risk registers and helping to keep those registers live and up to date. We hope that it will also help our clients, such as yourselves, to take a fresh look at their risk registers and facilitate a healthy and robust challenge as a result of being able to compare and contrast between yourselves and other similar organisations. Officers may wish to review their own risk registers in light of the comparative information contained here and Members may in turn wish to seek assurance from Officers that the contents of this report have been duly considered.

Local authority corporate risk register analysis (cont.)

Most frequently featured risks across all authority types



The top three residual risks occurring most frequently are:

- Delivering the medium term financial plan/saving targets/delivering funding cuts;
- Business continuity/disaster recovery incidents/emergency planning; and
- Data loss/information security/information governance risks.

A much higher number of bodies (80% compared to 62% in 2014) identified **Delivering the medium term financial plan/saving targets/delivering funding cuts** as a risk, although this is still not as high as might be expected given the significant reduction in grants seen in recent years and on-going financial pressures.

Risks in relation to **Business continuity and disaster recovery** were identified in 53% of risk registers (compared to 61% in 2014) and **Data loss/information security and information governance** were identified in 29% of risk registers (compared to 61% in 2014). So whilst these risks remain high in terms of frequently occurring risks – It is noticeable that both risks occur less often than in prior years. This fall is a surprise but may be as a result of investments in arrangements reducing the residual risks across the sector.

The risk that no longer features in the above analysis is **Partnership arrangements/governance**, which is surprising given the emergence and growth of initiatives such as the Better Care Fund.


Compared to the same analysis last year, the following risks are new for 2015:

- Asset management; and
- Planning and development issues.

Local authority corporate risk register analysis (cont.)

Most frequently featured risks across Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC) and Chief Constables (CC)

The chart below shows the eight most frequently identified risks at PCC and CCs included in the exercise.




Whilst we see **Delivery of the Medium Term Financial Plan** as the frequent common risk in both the cross authority analysis and police bodies analysis, the specialist nature of police focuses risks towards **Crime and community Safety**. **Safeguarding vulnerable children and adults** was seen as a significant risk in 30% of risk registers against a background of the significant reputational and business impact of safeguarding cases.

Given the difficulties reported by many PCCs and CCs in **Service Delivery** this was only noted in 23% of registers. We also noted that Staff morale was a less prevalent risk in police risk registers compared to the all authorities analysis but that **Corporate Capacity and Delivering Organisational change** was more of a concern.

Local authority corporate risk register analysis (cont.)

Survey Responses on Risk Register Reporting and Responsibilities




The chart above analyses the risk registers reviewed across all authorities. As expected, a high level of registers score risks on impact, probability and the controls in place and risks are allocated to lead officers.

However, less risk registers clarify when a risk is to be reviewed, which could result in the risk not being dealt with appropriately and provides less assurance. Further to this, risks do not appear to be regularly/widely allocated to lead members, which could reduce the scrutiny of these risks.

Local authority corporate risk register analysis (cont.)

Software used to support risk management

The chart below shows that 75% of authorities do not use specific risk management software, often preferring to use spreadsheet systems to record the risks. These systems are potentially less robust compared to specific software. Of the authorities that do use specific software, the most commonly used packages are Covalent, 4risk and MK Insight.



Moving forward

It is noted that in the wider Public Sector many bodies are now using Board Assurance Frameworks/Assurance Mapping. Assurance mapping is the process where risk reports set out the controls and assurances in place to confirm that risks are being addressed. Setting out the assurances can give lead Officers and Members confirmation that assurance is in place and that the quality of the assurance is sufficient against the risk.

Our work has identified limited use of such tools in the local authority sector.

- Risks were linked to strategic objectives in 57% of reports;
- Assurances were reported in 53% of the reports; and
- Effectiveness of controls were reported in 49% of the reports.

These are important elements of assurance mapping processes and our work suggests there is significant scope for local authorities to develop in this area.



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For Consideration	
Public/Non Public*	Public
Report to:	Joint Audit & Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	30th June 2016
Report of:	Paddy Tipping Police and Crime Commissioner
Report Author:	Kevin Dennis
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Other Contacts:	Kevin Dennis
Agenda Item:	17

POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER'S UPDATE REPORT – to March 2016

1. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

- 1.1 This report presents the Joint Audit & Scrutiny Panel (Panel) with the Police and Crime Commissioner's (Commissioner) Performance update report to March 2016.
- 1.2 It should be emphasised that the action taken by the Chief Constable may be the result of discussions held with the Commissioner during weekly meetings. The Commissioner is briefed weekly on all performance exceptions by his office staff which is then discussed with the Chief Constable the same week.
- 1.3 This report was also submitted to the Police and Crime Panel meeting on 6th June 2016, the format and style is in keeping with Panel Members requirements.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 2.1 The Panel to note the contents of this Performance update report consider and discuss the issues and question the Commissioner or Chief Constable on any issues Members have concerns with.

3. REASONS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS

- 3.1 To provide the Panel with performance information so Members can fulfil their scrutiny role and terms of reference.

4. Summary of Key Points

POLICING AND CRIME PLAN – (2015-18)

Performance Summary

- 4.1 Performance against refreshed targets and measures across all seven themes is contained in the Performance section of the Commissioner's web site to March 2016.^a This report details the end of year performance for 2015-16.
- 4.2 So far this year to March 2016, even though more incidents are recorded as crimes through increased compliance with the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) the Force is ranked 3rd best nationally in terms of % change i.e. -0.1%. Other force performance is estimated to range from -3.9% to +29%.^b
- 4.3 Crime types with a 10% or more reduction (and more than -100) are listed below:
- Burglary (Dwelling) -17.15%
 - Drugs (Possession) -15.87%
 - Drug Offences -13.71%
 - Theft from the Person -11.02%
 - Robbery (All) -10.19%
- 4.4 Crime types with a 10% or more increase (and more than 100) are listed below:
- Most Serious Violence 32.31%
 - Possession of Weapons Offences 26.94%
 - Theft of a Vehicle 21.30%
 - Rape 15.04%
 - Misc. Crimes Against Society 13.45%
 - Violence WITHOUT Injury 12.22%
- 4.5 Most Serious Violence was initially statistically masked by a reduction in robbery on account of no longer being an official Home Office Class, in the last quarter of 2015-16 successful work was introduced to combat the issue via the provision of the City knife Crime team and initial results are positive with a full scale analytical product due late May 2016.
- 4.6 The increase in Possession of Weapons reflects the increased pro-activity in terms of searches in the context of both Stop & Search and related impromptu on street searches and also in the context of structured procedural searches such as Section 18 and custody searches. The 'weapons' in question are not always possessed for the intention of use as a weapon and also relates to the possession and use of bladed implements for de-tagging by shop thieves and for use in the commissioning of other crimes such as burglary.

^a <http://www.nottinghamshire.pcc.police.uk/Document-Library/Public-Information/Performance/2016/Performance-and-Insight-Report-to-March-2016.pdf>

^b This data is subject to validation.

- 4.7 A large portion of the Vehicle thefts increase relates to increasing theft of scooters and motorcycles involving the use of vans and Lorries to transport the stolen items via lifting them on. There were reductions in this issue following some arrests and work is on-going with partners regarding further crime prevention.
- 4.8 Rape has seen an increase that correlates to increased confidence in reporting due to increased methods of approaching relevant authorities and associated support networks including partnership work providing support pathways, encouraging others to report rape and increased work in relation to partnerships with Universities, Taxi Licensing, the Night Time Economy (NTE), Street Pastors, Night Owls and club hosts. Historical reports are levelling off after a large surge due to assisted media report around Operation Yewtree. This is also set to be reviewed in the next Force Performance Board.
- 4.9 Misc Crimes Against Society has seen an increase due to increased reporting of matters related to breaking of prison regulations and attempts to smuggle goods in and out of prisons and Proceeds of Crime related offences.
- 4.10 Violence without injury reflects issues such as stalking and harassment and, 'sexting'. The former has resulted in misleading crime volumes in some localities where a single incident results in multiple crimes due to multiple victims being in the house(hold) at the time of the offence. This matter was identified through recent VAP related analysis and as such plans are in place within local policing to deal with the issue.

Reporting by Exception

- 4.11 The Commissioner's report has been simplified to focus on reporting by exception. In this respect, this section of the report relates exclusively to some performance currently rated red i.e. significantly worse than the target (>5% difference) or blue, significantly better than the target (>5% difference).
- 4.12 The table below shows a breakdown of the RAGB status the Force has assigned to the 33 sub-measures reported in its Performance and Insight report to March 2016.
- 4.13 It can be seen that 26 (79%) of these measures are Amber, Green or Blue (one less than the previous Panel report) indicating that the majority of measures are close, better or significantly better than the target. Only 21% (7) of measures reported are Red and significantly worse than target (slightly worse than the previous Panel report when it was 18%).
- 4.14 This report includes one new blue grade (Threat, Harm and Risk Assessment for Organised Crime - THR) and one new red grade (Proceeds of Crime Act - POCA).

KEY to Performance Comparators										
Performance Against Target			Aug-15	% of Total	Sep-15	% of Total	Jan-16	% of Total	Mar-16	% of Total
●	Significantly better than Target >5% difference		5	15%	6	18%	4	12%	5	15%
●	Better than Target		13	39%	11	33%	13	39%	12	36%
●	Close to achieving Target (within 5%)		4	12%	5	15%	10	30%	9	27%
●	Significantly worse than Target >5% difference		8	24%	8	24%	6	18%	7	21%
●	Data Issues prevent grading		3	9%	3	9%	0	0%	0	0%
Total			33	100%	33	100%	33	100%	33	100%

4.15 The table below provides an overview of the measures currently graded blue ● and details the change from previous Panel reports to show the trend as requested.

Objective / Target – RAGB Status Blue ●	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Jan-16	Mar-16
A reduction in the number of non-crime related mental health patients detained in custody suites	-86.50%	-76.70%	-76.7	-79%	-79%
Now Green: An increase in the Early Guilty Plea rate compared to 2014-15 – Magistrates Court	8.00%	7.90%	6.80%	3.40%	3.40%
Now Blue: An increase in the Early Guilty Plea rate compared to 2014-15 – Crown Court	1.90%	0.70%	1.50%	7.50%	7.50%
Now Red: A 10% increase in the number of POCA orders compared to 2014-15	-1.20%	65.60%	48.40%	5.60%	0.40%
Now Amber: To monitor the number of production and supply drug offences	33.50%	20.30%	9.70%	-2.50%	-5.80%
To be better than the national average for Early Guilty Plea rate for the Crown and Magistrates' Courts – Crown	4.90%	0.70%	6.00%	8.90%	8.90%
Reduce percentage of ineffective trials due to prosecution team reasons compared to 2014-15 – Crown Court	-8.20%	-6.80%	7.20%	7.70%	7.80%
New Blue: To reduce the Threat, Harm and Risk assessment below the 2014-15 level	5.70%	5.70%	5.70%	12.10%	17.60%

4.16 The Table above includes one new blue grade (Threat, Harm and Risk Assessment for Organised Crime - THR) which was previously graded amber and green. However, a review of the RAGB grades for this measure has highlighted that the THR measure should have been graded blue instead of amber in January's Performance and Insight Report.

4.17 There are now 5 measures graded blue. 1 is now graded green, 1 amber and 1 red.

4.18 The table below provides an overview of the measures currently graded red ● and details the change from previous Panel reports to show the trend as requested.

Objective / Target RAGB Status Red ●	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Jan-16	Mar-16
Now Green: A reduction in the number of repeat victims of domestic violence compared to 2014-15	10.10%	11.50%	5.40%	-4.00%	-4.00%
Now Amber: A reduction in the number of repeat victims of hate crime compared to 2014-15	110.00%	50.00%	38.50%	10.80%	2.90%
To monitor the percentage of Grade 1 and 2 incidents attended within the prescribed timescale	Grade 2 65.50%	Grade 2 65.10%	Grade 2 65.00%	Grade 2 65.50%	Grade 2 68.70%
Now Green: A reduction in All Crime compared to 2014-15	6.40%	5.80%	4.10%	0.60%	-0.20%
Now Amber: A reduction in Victim-Based Crime compared to 2014-15	9.40%	6.70%	4.90%	0.60%	0.40%
Now Amber: To monitor the detection rate for All Crime	-5.80%	-5.30%	-4.10%	-3.50%	-3.50%
To make £11.0m saving by March 2016	-£0.7m	-£0.8m	-£1.2m	-£2.5m	-£2.4m
Overall spend v budget	-£1.2m	-£2.8m	-£2.7m	-£6.1m	-£6.5m
2015/16 budget - £191.2m	-1.70%	-3.30%	-2.80%		
Total number of days lost to sickness - Officers	Not Available	Not Available	Not Available	19.10%	21.90%
Total number of days lost to sickness - Staff	Not Available	Not Available	Not Available	38.00%	38.90%
New Red: 90% of victims of crime are completely, very or fairly satisfied with the service they have received from the police	85.50%	85.60%	85.40%	85.80%	84.80%
New Red: A 10% increase in the number of orders compared to 2014-15	-1.20%	65.60%	48.40%	5.60%	0.40%

4.19 In summary, four of the original eight measures graded red in July 2015, have improved, two are now graded green and three are graded amber indicating an improved position. However, two measures are now graded red i.e. victim satisfaction levels and POCA (graded blue July to September 2015).

4.20 Panel Members require the Commissioner's update report to:

1. Explain the reasons for improved performance and lessons learned for blue graded measures and
2. Reasons/drivers for poor performance and an explanation as to what action is being taken to address underperformance in respect of red graded measures.

4.21 The Force has provided the following responses to these questions in sections 5 and 6 below.

5. Blue Rated Measures (● significantly better than Target >5% difference)

A reduction in the number of non-crime related mental health patients detained in custody suites - Improved Performance and Reason/Lessons Learned

- 5.1 So far in 2016 there have been no instances whereby people with mental health related illnesses have been presented to custody as a first place of safety.
- 5.2 As previously reported, this significant improvement in performance is a direct result of the introduction of the Street Triage Team which has previously been reported on. In addition the Force has carried out a review and revision of processes in accordance with national guidance, and has a joint protocol with partners which includes a Service Level Agreement with the East Midlands Ambulance Service, and a coordinated approach with the two nominated places of safety (Highbury Hospital and Millbrook).

- 5.3 Health and criminal justice partners in Nottinghamshire are bidding for a slice of £15m from the Government to prevent people in mental health crisis being held in police cells, it has been announced.
- 5.4 The Commissioner is backing the bid, which will be spent on creating safe, health-based facilities for vulnerable people who require mental health support if successful.^c The Commissioner is chair of Nottinghamshire's Mental Health Crisis Care Concordat Partnership Board, a body set up following a multi-agency agreement to improve the response to people in the grip of mental health crisis in the county, is very hopeful of securing funding to provide a boost to the service improvements the team had already delivered.

1. An increase in the Early Guilty Plea rate compared to 2014-15 – Crown Court - Improved Performance and Reason/Lessons Learned

2. To be better than the national average – Crown Court

3. To be better than the national average for Early Guilty Plea rate for the Crown and Magistrates' Courts – Improved Performance and Reason/Lessons Learned (Crown Court)

- 5.5 No further updates have been provided for these measures.
- 5.6 These measures are clustered together because the improvements are brought about by the same intervention. Please note some measures are reported quarterly.
- 5.7 The Early Guilty Plea rate recorded in the Crown Court year-to-date (YTD) to November 2015 was 42.3%, which is an improvement on the same period last year by 7.5%. The rate was also considerably above the national average rate of 33.4%.
- 5.8 The Ineffective Trial Rate in the Crown Court fell from 16.7% last year to 9.0%. There has been a slight improvement in the Effective Trial Rate from 48.4% last year-to-date to 48.7% this year-to-date.
- 5.9 Magistrates Courts' have seen less change in performance, with the Ineffective Trial Rate falling to 21.2%, and the Effective Trial Rate increasing by 2.1% to 41.6%.
- 5.10 As reported previously, the improvement in the above measures can be attributed to the success of Transforming Summary Justice (TSJ).^d The reasons for improved performance were fully explained in the previous Panel report.

New Blue: To reduce the Threat, Harm and Risk (THR) assessment below the 2014-15 level

- 5.11 This is a new blue graded measure as the THR assessment is considered to be 17.6% lower than the 2014-15 level.

^c <http://www.nottinghamshire.pcc.police.uk/News-and-Events/Archived-News/2016/PR-489.aspx>

^d https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/agencies/transforming_summary_justice_may_2015.html

- 5.12 A significant review between December 2013 to July 2014 of high risk Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) lead to an increase in the number of OCGs from December 2013 to August 2014 due to OCGs being broken down in to several smaller, more manageable OCGs.
- 5.13 This review was shortly followed by a National OCG Archiving Embargo from September 2014 to January 2016 where forces were not allowed to archive active OCGs.
- 5.14 This meant that forces that had disrupted OCGs, and removed the risk they presented, could not archive them and had to keep them active, albeit with a low threat score. As such, the “increase” in OCGs within this period is not indicative of an increased threat due to a number of disrupted OCGs “waiting” to be archived.
- 5.15 Thus, the current number of OCGs is -17.6% lower in March 2016 compared to March 2015. The number of OCGs assessed as ‘High Risk’ has reduced by just over 70% from 7 to 2; with numbers of Active OCG Nominals reducing by -10.5%, whilst there are 70% less Active Nominals in ‘High Risk’ OCGs in line with the overall reduction.

6. Red Rated Measures (● significantly worse than Target >5% difference)
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To monitor the percentage of Grade 1 and 2 incidents attended within the prescribed timescale^e - Reason for Performance and Action being taken (Grade 2 Incidents)

- 6.1 In terms of Grade 1 incidents, the Force attended 82.1% of Urban areas and 79.1% of Rural areas within the specified times. However, 68.7% of Grade 2 incidents were attended within 60 minutes falling short of the 80% target.
- 6.2 Grade 2 response times performance is not as positive as Grade 1 performance. In line with the Force’s Threat Risk and Harm approach, the more serious Grade 1 incidents are prioritised over Grade 2 incidents due to the nature of the incident; however the Force is committed to respond to all incidents within the appropriate targeted timescales.
- 6.3 The Force CRIM (Contact Resolution Incident Management) team aim to deal with all non-attend and standard grade incidents, allowing response officers to focus on attending immediate and urgent (Grade 1 and 2) incidents within the target times. The Force plans to increase the number of incidents dealt with appropriately through the CRIM. A review of Grade 2 incidents year-to-date reveals that the volume has actually reduced by 15.8%, although response times are fairly similar to those recorded last-year.
- 6.4 The Commissioner has been aware of the shortfall in Grade 2 response performance for some time and has discussed the issue with the Chief Constable on a number of occasions. He is aware that there have been radical changes to

^e *Historically the targets for attendance to incidents have been as follows: 85% attendance to Grade 1 incidents in Urban areas within 15 minutes and Rural areas within 20 minutes; and, 80% attendance to Grade 2 incidents within 60 minutes.*

the response model and the creation of new response hubs which take time to embed. Sometimes, the plans require tweaking.

- 6.5 In addition, the Commissioner's staff are represented at the Divisional and Force level performance meetings and are assured that the Force are taking steps to fully understand the causes for the dip in performance and are taking various actions to improve it.
- 6.6 For example, the recent launch of the OPTIK (Operational Policing Tool and Information Kit) mobile data solution will further support response officers to manage their daily business effectively, and it is anticipated that response times will improve as a result of officers spending more time away from their base station. Senior managers are taking action to address any cultural practices e.g. officers being drawn back to the Police Station to complete administrative tasks rather than using new technology to complete such tasks out on patrol.
- 6.7 The Force demand profile is currently being refreshed in line with the national demand work stream in order to inform a review of resource allocation. This will ensure that Response Hubs are appropriately resourced in order to meet demand.
- 6.8 In addition the Force is currently reviewing its performance management and monitoring process in order to align performance information with the new response hubs. This will enable the Force to better understand and address specific issues where identified.
- 6.9 In terms of performance per response hub, the Riverside hub responds to nearly a fifth of all Grade 2 incidents recorded by the Force, and is attending just over 73% of calls within the 60 minute target time, the highest of the 9 hubs. The overall volume of Grade 2 incidents across the Newark hub is a third of that recorded by the Riverside, with similar attendance performance. The Mansfield hub responds to a similar volume of Grade 2 incidents; however performance in 2015/16 is lower than target at 61%. Performance on the remaining 7 hubs is in line with the overall Force performance.
- 6.10 Whilst Grade 2 Incidents have reduced by 15.8% compared to 2014-15, there is less capacity to service these calls. For example, crime reports especially sexual crime and child sexual exploitation (CSE) have placed significantly higher demands on Police time. This means that officers are carrying a much higher workload and on occasions demand for service is higher than available resources. Despite this, it is encouraging that Grade 1 incidents are still achieving target as these incidents carry a higher threat, harm and risk to people. The target set in Leicestershire and Northamptonshire is 2 hours (twice the Nottinghamshire target).
- 6.11 With increasingly diminishing resources and more incidents requiring greater intensity and Police time, managing demand is becoming increasingly critical for Police and partners.
- 6.12 The Commissioner has included a strategic activity in his Police and Crime Plan (2015-18) to 'Adopt an integrated partnership approach to preventing demand for public, private and third sector.' There is now an agreed Partnership Prevention Programme Plan. Some prevention principles and enablers have been agreed. The plan will continue to concentrate on the following themes:

- Locality working in areas of high demand;
- Business crime and Town Centres;
- Community Safety and protection;
- Mental health, children and young people.

6.13 The Force's 'Delivering the Future' (DTF) programme is addressing this performance conundrum by dealing with increasingly more incidents at the first point of contact (i.e. over the phone). Also, appropriate resources are targeted to the right crime or incidents which are graded so that attendance only occurs when there is value or necessity in doing so.

To make £11.0m saving by March 2016 - Reason for Performance and Action being taken

6.14 The Government's grant has reduced significantly and in order to balance the budget, savings of £11.0m were required to be made in 2015-16.

6.15 The Force is unable at this time to provide finalised end of year figures because the numbers have not been formally shared with the Force Executive Board (FEB) and they are still provisional whilst they are going through scrutiny with the Auditors.

6.16 What can be said is that the Finance and Delivering the Future Teams are working closely with key enablers to ensure that there are coherent and tightly monitored plans in place to deliver £12m saving over the next financial year 2016/17 in line with total funding of £190.2m.

6.17 This includes a restructuring programme that is currently in phase one which incorporates people based services totalling around £2.5m. This phase, along with an on-going programme of Voluntary Redundancy (VR) at appropriate stages will roll in to a Second Phase of savings initially and tentatively identified in November 2015 which will include other areas of the Force that were not in Phase One. This is planned to deliver the £3.5m required.

6.18 Additionally, non-pay savings are being closely monitored to deliver £1.7m made up of improved contract management, procurement and tighter controls of non-required spend and natural reductions of retiring and resigning Officers and a more streamlined approach to senior ranking structure will deliver £5m.

6.19 In August 2015, a decision was taken in principle for the Force to form a Strategic Alliance with Leicestershire and Northamptonshire. The Force is also working closely with other Forces. Between the three Forces there is around a £0.5billion budget, which offers huge opportunities to protect communities and tackle the challenges ahead. A Chief Superintendent will support the work of Delivering the Future and the Strategic Alliance, on behalf of Nottinghamshire, with Deputy Chief Constable leading overall as the dedicated Chief Officer.

6.20 The Force's Delivering the Future work has six dedicated streams with lead officers:

- Capability


- Capacity
- Communication and Engagement
- Demand
- Finances
- Force structure

Overall spend v budget 2015/16 budget - Reason for Performance and Action being taken (£191.2m)

- 6.21 Expenditure at year end was £6.892m worse than budget. This was largely due to the shortfall in the efficiency programme which impacts numerous lines of expenditure. The yearend shortfall is anticipated to be £3.5m; due to redundancy costs; Police officer overtime due to various operations, staff pay; communications and computing due to a charge for systems provided by the Central Government; the charge for the MFSS which was omitted from the original budget; the timing of income recognition for externally funded projects which will reverse by the year end especially for the camera/speed awareness projects.
- 6.22 The Commissioner has regular meetings with the Chief Constable specifically to review the budget and hold the Chief Constable to account and consider options to improve performance and efficiency.

Total number of days lost to sickness – Officers and Staff

- 6.23 The chart below shows the 10 year trend since September 2005 to February 2016 (source: Iquanta, Jan and Feb 2016 Force data).



- 6.24 The latest cumulative (April 2015 to February 2016) sickness data for the Force has shown that officer sickness is **4.51%**. This equates to 10.0 days lost to sickness versus the target of 8.2 days (21.9% over target).
- 6.25 The latest cumulative (April 2015 to February 2016) sickness data for the Force has shown that staff sickness is **5.14%**. This equates to 11.4 days lost to sickness versus the target of 8.2 days (38.9% over target).
- 6.26 The Table below shows a breakdown of sickness by division and department.

Division/Department	Officers	Police Staff
City	4.25%	4.61%
County	3.83%	3.58%
Corporate Services	10.66%	3.66%
Crime and Justice Regional	2.11%	3.89%
Crime and Intelligence Command	3.99%	3.71%
Public Protection	6.67%	8.19%
EMOpSS ^f	4.05%	0.96%
Contact Management	16.76%	8.74%
Regional	1.00%	1.57%
Force-wide	4.51%	5.14%

- 6.27 There are two departments where the sickness level exceeds 10% i.e. Police Officers working in Contact Management and Corporate Services.
- 6.28 In Contact Management, officers from the Telephone Investigation Bureau (TIB) have now transferred into the CRIM (Contact Resolution Incident Management) team. This included officers with restrictions and historically higher absence levels. Three Police officer medical retirements from Contact Management have recently been approved - these individuals had long term sickness issues. It is anticipated that absence rates will show an improvement in this area in the coming months. Additionally since mid-February six Written Improvement Notices (WIN's) have been issued to officers in the CRIM team.
- 6.29 In Corporate Services, whilst there are relatively few officers (44), absence will have a disproportionately higher impact. Three officers on long term sick, returned to work in February which will reflect lower sickness absence rates in future months.
- 6.30 Since the introduction of MFSS, sickness data is controlled by individuals and line managers, and will reflect what has been reported into DMS (Duty Management System). Also, due to changing the Force HR and Duty Management System managers were unable to supply rolling 12 month sickness data.
- 6.31 The increase in sickness maybe due to that it is being more accurately recorded through the Force's 'Booking On / Booking Off' system introduced in March 2015. In addition to this there are now less officers and police staff. Police officer headcount has reduced by 124 (5.7%) from 2,161 at the end of March 2015 to 2,037 as at the end of March 2016. Over the same period Police Staff headcount has reduced by 260 (15%) from 1,736 to 1,476. This reduction may have contributed to an increase in the sickness absence rates, as any sickness will proportionally result in a higher percentage rate of absence.
- 6.32 The April 2015 to February 2016 cumulative figures compared to the February 2015 rolling average represents a 34% increase for officers and 47% increase for police staff.
- 6.33 In April 2016, new arrangements have been introduced to reduce the high number of sickness reasons that line managers can select on MFSS. This has been

^f The East Midlands Operational Support Service (EMOpSS)

communicated on the Forces intranet and DMS log-on screen, and will be supported by the HR sickness Single Point of Contact (SPOC)s.

6.34 There are a number of HR activities taking place on Attendance Management, including:

- holding 'surgery' / 'clinics' to support line managers on attendance management policy and procedures
- attending SMT / People Meetings to review sickness and provide information
- liaising with line management to provide advice and support at formal stage 1, 2, 3 meetings (incl. attending, and pre-meetings)
- providing monthly sickness information to divisional / department SMT and 2nd Line Managers
- supporting with case conferences and reviewing long term sickness cases to facilitate return to work
- supporting with stress actions plans and recuperative duties processes


6.35 In addition, there have been a number of locally driven initiatives in relation to attendance management. In Contact Management, a sickness case review meeting discussed all long-term sick cases. Progress will be reviewed and action taken as appropriate. In the City Division, a Superintendent has been leading/driving the requirement to undertake Stage 1/2/3 meetings with appropriate outcomes.

6.36 Divisional/department line management have liaised with HR for officers/staff that have breached a 'trigger' who have had a formal management meeting; in summary, 665 officers and police staff have breached a sickness trigger. Of these, 499 (75%) have had a formal management meeting.

New Red: 90% of victims of crime are completely, very or fairly satisfied with the service they have received from the police

6.37 The Chart below shows the trend for Victim Satisfaction since April 2012. The Commissioner's target of 90% is particularly challenging and in fact has never been met. The highest level was in February 2013 when it was 87.7%. Since then and up to July 2014 it declined slowly. There was a fall of 1% between July 2014 (87.7%) and November 2014 (86.7%) which was maintained for 9 months until August 2015 when it improved slightly until October 2015 when it was 86%. Since then it has fallen to its lowest level for nearly 4 years i.e. 84.8%.

6.38 It is worth noting that the difference between the peak in February 2013 and lowest point in February 2016 is only 2.9%. In addition, despite the dip in performance, Nottinghamshire Police ranks 2nd place in its MSG (most Similar Group) for Overall Victim User Satisfaction, and is still well above the MSG average of 82.7%. But nevertheless there is a fall in performance which has been analysed and responded to by the Force.



6.39 There is a significant difference between the Divisions in terms of the headline figure (City 82.7%, County 86.2%).

6.40 Previously this measure was Amber but when it was recently graded red, there was increased scrutiny at various Divisional and Force performance meetings. Discussions have recently taken place to better understand the dip in performance so that remedial action can be taken.

6.41 In terms of the various aspects which contribute to overall Victim User Satisfaction, Ease of Contact and Treatment well exceed the 90% target. However there is a significant deterioration in the Follow Up aspect. Traditionally the lowest aspect of Victim User Satisfaction has reduced from 77.8% last year to 75.0% this year. Looking at the short-term (3 month rolling) picture, a greater deterioration is apparent, with the rate down by 3.8% compared to the same period of last year.

6.42 When looking at performance by crime type, victims of Vehicle Crime show the lowest overall satisfaction levels. Within this, Theft of Motor Vehicle in particular has seen a significant deterioration in overall Victim User Satisfaction, Action Taken and Follow Up, each of these aspects has deteriorated by more than 5% in the 12 month rolling picture.

6.43 All supervisors receive and record satisfaction level data on a monthly basis, allowing them to assess their team's performance and address any specific issues. This information enables supervisors to effectively manage performance, with a view to either recovering service with dissatisfied victims or learning lessons in order to improve future service delivery.

6.44 These issues were discussed at the Force's Local Performance Board on 28th April 2016. Force policy no longer requires a Police officer to visit the scene of a crime involving a theft of or from a motor vehicle. Historical analysis reveals that there is little evidential benefit in such visits and with fewer resources the Force prioritises crimes which carry a higher Threat, Harm or Risk to the victim.

6.45 It would seem that there is an expectation by some of the public that Police officers should still visit the scene of a vehicle crime. Doing so is likely to improve satisfaction levels but would reduce capacity to service crimes which carry a

higher level of Threat, Harm or Risk. Since satisfaction levels are still much higher than the Force's MSG, the Commissioner is satisfied with the Force's current policy.

New Red: A 10% increase in the number of orders compared to 2014-15

- 6.46 The Force recorded 1 additional Confiscation and Forfeiture Order in 2015-16 compared to 2014-15, placing the Force 9.9% below target. However, the overall value of POCA^g orders has increased by 7.2% or £73,196.89, with the average value now at £4,827 compared to £4,522 in 2014/15.
- 6.47 The position against target has been reported as an absolute difference between the % change performance (+0.4%) and the target performance (+10%), so the Force is actually 9.6% below the 10% target. The Force had a total of 224 orders in 2014/15 and 225 in 2015/16. To achieve the 10% increase in orders the Force should have secured an additional 23 orders in 2015/16.
- 6.48 In respect of POCA, the financial investigation team is now operating with a reduced size; POCA orders are requested by the CPS (Crown Prosecution Service) and granted by the Court based on case files presented and are not necessarily a direct reflection on Police activity.
- 6.49 Due to the low numbers of orders, the Force considers % changes to be misleading. The variance in the number of orders does fluctuate considerably, from one year to another resulting in a high % swing. For example, in November 2014, 21 orders were granted and in 2015 only eleven were granted; similarly in March 2015, 26 orders were granted and in 2016 18 orders were granted.
- 6.50 The Home Affairs Committee is currently undertaking inquiries into how effectively the measures introduced in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, to deprive criminals of any benefit from their crimes, are working. In particular, the inquiry is assessing the operation of confiscation orders, which are the main mechanism through which this policy is implemented.^h

7. Monitor the Proportion of Rural Crime Compared to 2014-15

- 7.1 This measure has not been RAGB graded.
- 7.2 There were a total of 8,741 offences identified as Rural Crimesⁱ to the end of 2015-16, equating for just over 12% of all crime recorded by Nottinghamshire Police. This is fairly similar to the proportion in 2014-15. In terms of performance in rural areas, the Force recorded a 5.4% increase, or 450 additional crimes, compared to a -0.9% reduction, or 572 less crimes, in urban areas.

^g POCA – Proceeds of Crime Act

^h <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/home-affairs-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/proceeds-of-crime/>

ⁱ Rural Crime Force Definition: Rural crimes include all crimes occurring in rural areas in addition to those offences defined as rural (i.e. theft of livestock).

- 7.3 In line with the overall Force trend, Violence Against the Person (VAP) accounted for the main bulk of the increase recorded in rural areas with 299 additional offences recorded in 2015-16 compared to 2014-15, an increase of 16%.
- 7.4 Comparing offending in rural areas to urban, most crime types are following similar trends with the exception of Burglary Non Dwelling.
- 7.5 The Force recorded a 16.2% increase in Burglary Non Dwelling offences in rural areas in 2015-16 compared to a 5.8% reduction in urban areas. The increase in rural areas equates to 134 additional offences recorded in the 12-months to the end of March 2016, and was driven by increases in; Newark & Sherwood (+3.3% or 85 additional offences) and Bassetlaw (+4.6% or 41 additional offences).
- 7.6 Overall, Newark & Sherwood features as a rural area experiencing higher levels of offences in 2015-16 compared to the previous performance year with a 9.3% increase, or 236 additional offences. The increase was mainly driven by performance to the end of the first quarter where Newark & Sherwood recorded a 40.5% increase at that time.
- 7.7 Performance for rural crime from the start of Quarter 2 levelled off with similar levels recorded in most months culminating in a strong -16.7% reduction in the month of February 2016, and a -0.4% reduction in March 2016.
- 7.8 Offences with notable increases in 2015-16 are; Violence Against the Person (VAP) (+18.3% or 108 additional offences), and Burglary Non Dwelling. Violence increased due to a rise early in the year connected to changes in recording practises for 'Without Injury' offences, VAP levels reduced throughout the rest of the year. Burglary non dwelling relates to shed breaks and commercial premises; the increase has recently come to the attention of the Burglary Gold Group and is being investigated with the belief that it may be connected to the activities of certain specific individuals.
- 7.9 Although, the Force reduced crime overall in 2015-16, there were urban and rural areas where increases were experienced – see list below ranked by % increase. These are a mixture of Police areas and Partnership Plus Areas. Some Partnership Plus areas will contain a mixture of rural and urban beats. The below list contains hierarchical derivatives and as such the high level of crime in one will be directly attributable to the high level in another.
- Sutton –In-Ashfield North, a Partnership Plus Area (+20%)
 - Sutton East, a Partnership Plus Area (+15%)
 - Castle, a Partnership Plus Area (+13%)
 - Rural Hamlets and Isolated Dwellings, a rural area sub group (+12.8%)
 - Oak Tree, a Partnership Plus Area (+12%)
 - Rural Total, which includes the above "Rural Hamlets.." (+5.4%)
 - Worksop South, a Partnership Plus Area (+8%)
 - Trent Bridge, a Partnership Plus Area (+8%)
 - Woodlands, a Partnership Plus Area (+6%)
 - County Overall (+3.25%)

- Force Overall (-0.1%)
- City a reduction of (-4.56%)

Holding the Chief Constable to Account

- 7.10 The Commissioner is represented at the key Divisional, Partnership and Force Local Performance board meetings in order to obtain assurance that the Force and Partners are aware of the current performance threats, and are taking appropriate action to address the emerging challenges. Should there be any issues of concern these are relayed to the Commissioner who holds the Chief Constable to account on a weekly basis.
- 7.11 In addition, from time to time the Commissioner meets with both Divisional Commanders to gain a deeper understanding of threats, harm and risk to performance. The next meeting is due to be held on 21st March 2016.
- 7.12 At a previous Panel meeting Members asked if the Commissioner would include a specific example of where he had held the Chief Constable to account on an issue. The Commissioner would emphasise that he has a regular weekly agenda meetings with the Chief Constable. Furthermore, Force performance is always discussed. Frequently the budget and investigations on historic child sex offending are on the agenda.
- 7.13 Panel Members have asked if a case study could be prepared for each meeting. Previous case studies relating to Shoplifting, the Victims Code, Improving BME Policing Experiences were prepared. For this meeting, a case study has been prepared in respect of Hate Crime (see **Appendix A**).

Activities of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner

- 7.14 The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner continue to take steps to obtain assurances that the Chief Constable has not only identified the key threats to performance but more importantly that swift remedial and appropriate action is being taken to tackle the problems especially in the Priority Plus Areas in the County and High Impact Wards in the City. Key activities are reported on the Commissioner's web site.^j
- 7.15 On 27 April 2016 the Deputy Commissioner retired from her role.

DECISIONS

- 7.16 The Commissioner has the sole legal authority to make a decision as the result of a discussion or based on information provided to him by the public, partner organisations, Members of staff from the Nottinghamshire Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (NOPCC) or Chief Constable. The Commissioner's web site provides details of all significant public interest decisions.^k

^j <http://www.nottinghamshire.pcc.police.uk/News-and-Events/Latest-News.aspx>

^k <http://www.nottinghamshire.pcc.police.uk/Public-Information/Decisions/Decisions.aspx>

7.17 Panel Members have previously requested that the Commissioner provide a list of all forthcoming decisions (Forward Plan) rather than those already made. This Forward Plan of Key Decisions for the OPCC and the Force has been updated and is contained in **Appendix B**.

8. Financial Implications and Budget Provision

8.1 Finance and Budget performance is covered in a separate report under a different agenda item to this meeting.

9. Human Resources Implications

9.1 None - this is an information report.

10. Equality Implications

10.1 None – although it should be noted that high levels of hate crime are racially motivated adversely impacting BME communities. The Case Study contained in **Appendix A** details action taken to tackle Hate Crime.

11. Risk Management

11.1 Risks to performance are identified in the main body of the report together with information on how risks are being mitigated.

12. Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

12.1 This report provides Members with an update on performance in respect of the Police and Crime Plan.

13. Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

13.1 None that directly relates to this report.

14. Details of outcome of consultation

14.1 The Deputy Chief Constable has been sent a copy of this report.

15. Appendices

A. Case Study – Hate Crime

B. Forward Plan of Key Decisions for the OPCC and the Force

16. Background Papers (relevant for Police and Crime Panel Only)

- [Police and Crime Plan 2015-2018 \(published\)](#)

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Appendix A

Case Study – Improving Hate Crime Performance

Police and Crime Plan (2015-18)

- 1.1 Hate crime is a policing priority for the Commissioner. In the Commissioner's Police and Crime Plan for 2015-2018 he outlined in his priorities the need to ensure targeted provision is available, effective and focused on those most vulnerable to victimisation and offending and, in this context, to better understand and respond to hate crime.
- 1.2 Within his plan's first priority theme, he set two hate crime objectives: (1) Reduce the number of repeat victims of hate crime, and (2) Encourage the increased reporting and identification of hate crime. In support of his objectives, the Commissioner set the Chief Constable the targets of (1) a reduction in the number of repeat victims of hate crime compared to 2014-15, and (2) to monitor the number of hate crimes and the proportion which are repeats.
- 1.3 In 2015-16 there were 40 additional hate crimes recorded, representing a 4.0% increase. A similar volume of offences were recorded on the divisions; City with 493 offences and County with 447 offences. The proportion of hate crimes which are repeats reduced from 11.0% last year to 10.8% this year. There were 2 additional repeat victims in the year, an increase of 2.9%, the City recording 7 additional victims and the County 5 less.

Nottingham Citizens

- 1.4 The Commissioner took office in November 2012. At the end of 2013 Nottingham Citizens driven by community concerns, commissioned research into the experience of hate crime in Nottingham and Nottinghamshire. On 9th October 2014 the Nottingham Citizens published the results of its research: A Citizens Commission: No Place for Hate.
- 1.5 The Citizens' Commission report was a significant moment and raised a number of challenges for public authorities. It noted critically that in 2009-10 Nottinghamshire Police recorded almost 1,200 hate crimes and that by 2014-15 the figure was down to 592.
- 1.6 Nottingham Citizens' Commission also included amongst its key findings:
 - Significant under-reporting of hate crime in Nottinghamshire.
 - Weak public and professional understanding of what hate crime is.
 - The disproportionately significant impact of "low-level" hate crimes.
 - Hate crimes experienced specifically by women not being captured by recording.
- 1.7 In analysing its findings the Commission made particular reference to the loss of the Police's specialist hate crime function in 2010 as a likely contributory factor to the change in performance. Reference was also made to the loss of the Hate Crime Monitoring Project and the absence of a hate crime function within Nottingham City Council as a factor in less effective hate crime collaboration.
- 1.8 In response to their findings, Nottingham Citizens made the following key recommendations:
 - That Nottinghamshire Police (re)creates a specialist hate crime function.
 - That Nottingham City Council creates a specialist hate crime post.

- Nottinghamshire Police works with other groups to record misogynistic hate crime and that different forms of religious hate crime be disambiguated.

1.9 Following publication of the Commission report public authorities, including Nottinghamshire Police and Nottingham City Council, were lobbied to respond positively to the recommendations, particularly in terms of resource provision but at that time financial restrictions prevented a change in the resource landscape.

Safer Nottinghamshire Board

1.10 Partnership activity around hate crime in Nottinghamshire is coordinated by the Safer Nottinghamshire Board's (SNB) Hate Crime Steering Group (HCSG). The Commissioner and Nottingham Citizens (in their report) both recognise the pivotal role that the Hate Crime Steering Group plays in delivering improvements in hate crime.

1.11 The HCSG is headed by the Chief Executive, of Broxtowe Borough Council who chairs a quarterly Steering Group. The HCSG has a Hate Crime Delivery Plan to manage its business. The HCSG has no designated staff.

1.12 The Commissioner was fully involved with key members of Nottingham Citizens' and had numerous meetings with other stakeholders across the City and County to discuss a way forward with regard to existing albeit limited resources.

1.13 Consequently, the Commissioner agreed to fund a Hate Crime Manager to service both the Police and the HCSG for two years (2015-17). The Hate Crime Manager came into post on 1st April 2015. Following on from this in June 2015 Nottingham City Council seconded a Hate Crime Project Officer to work in conjunction with the Hate Crime Manager.

1.14 The Hate Crime Manager and Hate Crime Project Officer have been working to deliver the Commissioner's objectives through the HCSG's Action Plan. The job description of the Hate Crime Manager post was drafted to ensure that as many issues raised by the Nottingham Citizen's report were incorporated into this new role.

1.15 In 2015-16, 9 separate actions in the plan were delivered in full. A further 23 new actions have been included in the plan for 2016-17. A Nottingham City Hate Crime Action Plan has also been developed to ensure that activity to tackle hate crime is coordinated and joined up across the City and County.

1.16 Including funding for the Hate Crime Manager, the Commissioner allocated funding of £85,000 to the Hate Crime Steering Group in 2015-16 for work on hate crime. The Commissioner has allocated a further £78,250 to service the HCSG in 2016-17.

Achievements

1. Coordinated by the HCSG, on 18th December 2015 a "No to Hate" Pledge event was held at the National Holocaust Centre. At that event the Commissioner, Nottinghamshire Police, all local authorities in Nottinghamshire and other key statutory agencies made a landmark organisational pledge to address hate crime, which will be the basis for future work to engage partners.
2. Coordinated by the Hate Crime Manager, during 2015-16 all local authorities in Nottinghamshire have introduced hate crime policies for their organisations.
3. Following a conference event on women's safety in Nottingham in the autumn of 2015, Nottinghamshire Police committed itself to dealing with the sexist street and sexual harassment of women as misogynistic hate crime, bringing this online in April/May 2016. The Commissioner has committed funds to Nottingham Women's Centre to support

training of police staff on this important extension of hate crime in the organisation. At the same time, Nottinghamshire Police has engaged with the S.O.P.H.I.E. foundation to raise the profile of hate crimes against alternative sub-cultures and the force has extended its approach to hate crime to address this particular form of prejudice explicitly.

4. The Commissioner prioritises the effective response to vulnerable victims of hate crime. In 2015, the Hate Crime Manager in partnership with academic staff from Nottingham Trent University revised the hate crime risk assessment tool/process. This should significantly improve the quality of information obtained from victims in respect of the impact on them, their communities, repeat victimisation and perceptions of risk and harm. There is national interest from the Ministry of Justice in the new risk assessment as leading-edge practice. An important additional aspect of the risk assessment will be the facility to disambiguate particular forms of religious (and other) hate crimes. It will also identify hate crimes targeted towards Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities.
5. Supported through the Commissioner's funding, a marketing campaign was delivered in 2015 to increase public awareness of hate crime through posters, postcards, billboards, internal and external bus posters, tram advertising, throughout the City & County. Evaluation shows that confidence in reporting hate crime to the police increased by 11% in the period. The Commissioner has provided funds to the HCSG in 2016-17 to further developing public communications to increase hate crime reporting.
6. In early 2016 the HCSG delivered three one-day hate crime events at the National Holocaust Centre for approximately 200 organisational staff members. The events included personal testimony from Sylvia Lancaster OBE and an ex far-right hate crime perpetrator. Feedback has been extremely positive. Through the Commissioner's funding to the HCSG for 2016-17 and from Nottinghamshire County Council a further six one-day events have been secured for 2016.
7. Both the Commissioner and the Nottingham Citizens recognise the particular priority of disability hate crime. In 2015 the Commissioner supported the Safe Places programme to support people with learning disabilities in the community. Nottinghamshire Police has worked with the scheme in 2015-16 to train staff to support Safe Places and to help in creating more Safe Places. The Commissioner has committed additional funding in 2016-17 to support the Safe Places initiative.
8. The Commissioner recognises hate crimes against Gypsy, Roma and Travellers (GRT) as an important issue. The Commissioner is supporting an event in June 2016 for community members and organisational staff.
9. The Commissioner considers providing effective interventions with perpetrators a priority and has funded Remedi to provide restorative justice services. To ensure victims of hate crime have access to this service, a specific hate crime referral process between Nottinghamshire Police and Remedi has been implemented. Additionally, the HCSG is developing a behavioural change programme for perpetrators. This work has included the National Holocaust Centre, both Nottingham's universities and city and county youth offending services. The first planned programmes will occur over the summer of 2016.

Conclusion

- 1.17 The Commissioner's commitment through his leadership and financial support has significantly changed the provision of resources to address hate crime. The benefits of specific hate crime resources for the Police and City Council, as recommended by Nottingham Citizens, are showing real benefits in terms of partnership activity, action to support victims and address perpetrating behaviour. This has been translated into action

through the Hate Crime Steering Group's Delivery Plan, which has seen significant progress made with partner agencies to commit to tackling hate crime and incorporating this into their business.

- 1.18 Overall Police performance has improved, with hate crime reporting increasing and the proportion of hate crimes being repeat victimisation decreasing. Further work needs to be undertaken to reduce the overall frequency of repeat victims of hate crime.
- 1.19 The leadership of the former Deputy Commissioner and support of Nottinghamshire Police has demonstrated real commitment and new approaches to misogynistic hate crime which is nationally ground-breaking and the new risk assessment process has already been identified by the Ministry of Justice as of national relevance.



Nottinghamshire

POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONER

APPENDIX B

Decisions of Significant Public Interest: Forward Plan

1st May 2016 – 31st August 2016

Business cases						
Ref	Date	Subject	Summary of Decision	Cost (£) <i>Where available.</i>	Contact Officer	Report of OPCC / Force
	April / May 2016	Digital Investigation Unit	Purchase of hardware regarding digital interview storage.	Up to £90,000	DI Les Charlton	Force
	April / May 2016	Vision server	Upgrade to control room software	£26,000	Christi Carson	Force
	April / May 2016	Police Link Officer for the Deaf (POD)	Training of two officers to be available to do BSL and provide support for hearing impairment issues	£6,000	Insp Annie Yates	Force
	TBC	Niche Implementation Programme	Retaining some of the original programme resource to deliver general incident module.	£95,000		Force

Contracts (above £250k)						
Ref	Date	Subject	Summary of Decision	Cost (£) <i>Where available.</i>	Contact Officer	Report of OPCC / Force
	May 2016	Temporary Staff – Long term and Specialist	Procurement for the long term provision of temporary agency staff to Nottinghamshire Police for a period of two years with the option to extend for a further two years.	£2.6 million	Ronnie Adams, EMSCU	Force
	TBC	Victim Services	Potential contract extension for Victim Services.	£1 million	Ronnie Adams, EMSCU	Force



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	TBC	Various contracted work at Oxclose Lane and Carlton	Part of the Estates Rationalisation Programme.	£850,000 Carlton £300,000 Oxclose	Ronnie Adams, EMSCU	Force
	May 2016	Covert Vehicle Hire Services	Regional including Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire	£1,044,000 (£261,000 pa)	Ronnie Adams, EMSCU	Force
	July 2016	Refurbishment of 1 st Floor, West Bridgford	Part of the Estates Rationalisation Programme.	£300,000	Ronnie Adams, EMSCU	Force
	TBC	Commoditised software	Value to be confirmed for potential contract extension.	TBC >£250,000	Ronnie Adams, EMSCU	Force
	TBC	Holmes House & Mansfield Police Station	Consultants and Contractors	>£800,000	Tim Wendels, Assets	Force
	May 2016	Forensic Medical Examination	Medical Services for Custody and SARC	£4,000,000	Ronnie Adams EMSCU	Force
	TBC	Vehicle Recovery	Recovery of seized vehicles	TBC >£250,000	Ronnie Adams EMSCU	Force
	TBC	Uniform	Extension to Uniform Managed Service	TBC >£250,000	Ronnie Adams EMSCU	Force
	TBC	Waste Management	All waste services including general, recycled, WEEE and confidential shredding.	TBC >£250,000	Ronnie Adams EMSCU	Force

Estates, ICT and Asset Strategic Planning

Ref	Date	Subject	Summary of Decision	Cost (£) <i>Where available.</i>	Contact Officer	Report of OPCC / Force
	April 2016	Mansfield Partnership Hub	Lease for new Partnership Hub at Mansfield Civic Centre and sale of Mansfield Woodhouse Police Station	Approx. £80,000 capital spend £18,100 annual running costs	Tim Wendels, Assets	Force



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	April 2016	Netherfield Front Counter	Lease of premises for new Front Counter at St George's Centre, Victoria Road, Netherfield	£20,750 capital spend £5,000 annual rental	Tim Wendels, Assets	Force
	April/May 2016	Southwell Police Station	Lease of premises for replacement Police Station.	£2,300 annual rental plus IT costs.	Tim Wendels, Assets	Force
	June 2016	Cotgrave Police Station	Sale of existing Police Station and long lease of new Partnership Hub building	Property exchange	Tim Wendels, Assets	Force
	June 2016	Bunkered Fuel Sites	Decommissioning, repair and addition of bunkered fuel sites around Nottinghamshire.	TBC	Tim Wendels, Assets	Force
	June/July 2016	Hucknall Police Station	Lease of replacement premises for Neighbourhood Team and Training facilities. Sale of existing Police Station.	TBC	Tim Wendels, Assets	Force

Financial reporting (Including forecast budget and virement requests and Medium Term Financial Plan)						
Ref	Date	Subject	Summary of Decision	Cost (£) <i>Where available.</i>	Contact Officer	Report of OPCC / Force
	May 2016	Capital Outturn Report	Outturn of 2015/16 expenditure. This may include virements and requests a decision on the slippage to be carried forward into the next years capital programme.	NA	Pam Taylor	Force
	May/June 2016	Draft Annual Governance Statements	From the CC and the PCC	NA	Julie Mair for CC Charlie Radford for PCC	Both
	June 2016	Draft Statement of Accounts	Signed off by the CFO and DoF Reported to A&S		Charlie Radford, Paul Dawkins and Pam Taylor	Both
	May 2016	Revenue Outturn Report	As per Capital outturn above for revenue.	NA	Danny Baker/Mark	Force



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					Kimberley	
	May 2016	Treasury Management Strategy	Year-end Outturn report	N/A	Pam Taylor	OPCC

Workforce Plan and Recruitment Strategies						
Ref	Date	Subject	Summary of Decision	Cost (£) Where available.	Contact Officer	Report of OPCC / Force
<i>No decisions regarding workforce planning or recruitment strategies for decision, dependent on outcome of business cases.</i>						

Consideration	
Public/Non Public	Public
Report to:	Audit and Scrutiny Panel
Date of Meeting:	30 June 2016
Report of:	The Chief Executive
Report Author:	Alison Fawley
E-mail:	alison.fawley@nottsc.gov.uk
Other Contacts:	
Agenda Item:	18

PANEL WORK PLAN AND MEETING SCHEDULE

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To provide the Panel with a programme of work and timetable of meetings

2. Recommendations

- 2.1 To consider and make recommendations on items in the work plan and to note the timetable of meetings

3. Reasons for Recommendations

- 3.1 To enable the Panel to manage its programme of work.

4. Summary of Key Points

- 4.1 The Panel has a number of responsibilities within its terms of reference. Having a work plan for the Panel ensures that it carries out its duties whilst managing the level of work at each meeting.

5. Financial Implications and Budget Provision

- 5.1 None as a direct result of this report

6. Human Resources Implications

- 6.1 None as a direct result of this report

7. Equality Implications

- 7.1 None as a direct result of this report

8. Risk Management

- 8.1 None as a direct result of this report

9. Policy Implications and links to the Police and Crime Plan Priorities

- 9.1 This report meets the requirements of the Terms of Reference of the Panel and therefore supports the work that ensures that the Police and Crime Plan is delivered.

10. Changes in Legislation or other Legal Considerations

- 10.1 None as a direct result of this report

11. Details of outcome of consultation

- 11.1 None as a direct result of this report

12. Appendices

- 12.1 Work Plan and schedule of meetings

JOINT AUDIT AND SCRUTINY PANEL WORK PLAN

30 June 2016			
1	Election of Chair		
2	(5) IPCC investigations, recommendations and actions (October - March)	6 monthly	Force
3	(36) Force Improvement Activity Lessons Learned monitoring, IPCC lessons learned report (April – September)	6 monthly	Force
4	(6) & (7) Whistle Blowing Policy and review of compliance (October - March) and Anti-Fraud and Corruption Policy - review of compliance update (October - March)	6 monthly	Force & OPCC
5	(35) Force Governance monitoring, assurance and improvement outcomes for decision making	6 monthly	Force
6	External Audit Annual Audit letter	Annually	OPCC CFO
7	Verbal update on regional assurance work	Annually	OPCC CFO
8	(11) Draft Audit Plan (Annual internal audit strategy and audit plan)	Annually	
9	(10) & (42) Force, PCC and Regional draft Annual Governance Statements	Annually	OPCC & Force
10	(39) Internal Audit Annual Assurance and Performance Report	Annually	OPCC CFO
11	(23 & 24) Statement of Accounts and Summary Statement of Accounts - DRAFT	Annually	OPCC & Force
12	Police and Crime Plan 6-month monitoring report	6 monthly	OPCC Phil Gilbert
	Standard items:-		
	Updates on scrutiny and other reviews	As required	OPCC & Force
	PCC Update report	Quarterly	OPCC Phil Gilbert
	(12) & (40) Internal Audit Progress Report	Quarterly	OPCC CFO
	(40) Audit & Inspection Report	Quarterly	ACO Resources

15 September 2016

1	(23 & 24) Statement of Accounts and Summary Statement of Accounts	Annually	OPCC & Force
2	(10 & 42) Annual Governance Statements	Annually	OPCC & Force
3	External Audit – Annual Governance report	Annually	OPCC CFO
4	(43) Risk report on monitoring and actions for mitigation update	6 monthly	OPCC & Force
5	Regional Collaboration Update	Annually	Force
6	HMIC Inspections and Recommendations	Annually	OPCC
7	Police & Crime Plan 6 month monitoring report (carried over from June 2016)	6 monthly	OPCC
	Standard items:-		
	Updates on scrutiny and other reviews	As required	OPCC & Force
	PCC Update report	Quarterly	OPCC
	(12) & (40) Internal Audit Progress Report	Quarterly	OPCC CFO
	(40) Audit & Inspection Report	Quarterly	ACO Resources