

Risk ID	Risk	Risk Description	Inf	nerent F Score		Risk Owner	Controls	Resid	ual Risk	Score	Further Actions / Notes	Target Risk
			Р	1	RS			Р		RS		
FSR000 9	Inability to demonstrate the timely completion and sign off, of public accounts.	2020-21, 2021-22 and 2022-23 accounts have not yet been subject to audit. The draft 2021/22 and 2022/23 accounts were not completed in line with the statutory deadline (30/09/20220). These are now available on the PCC website. The impact of this is that the force is unable to demonstrate accountability to its stakeholders in line with statutory requirements. This could result in reputational damage to the organisation.	4	3	12	Mark Kimberley	<ul> <li>Monthly updates into FEB.</li> <li>Quarterly reporting into JIAC.</li> <li>COT/CFO oversight.</li> <li>Increased number of resources in the Finance Department associated with the production of the final accounts.</li> </ul>	4	2	8	<ul> <li>The risk will be reported to the Strategic Risk meeting.</li> <li>The risk will be reported to FEB and to JIAC.</li> <li>Accounts completed and audit 2021 started in May 2022. Lack of external audit resources means this is unlikely to be completed by the end of the financial year.</li> <li>Audit of the 2021/22 accounts is unlikely to start until 2024/25.</li> <li>Controls/mitigation in place to facilitate audits whenever they start.</li> <li>No further movement on this risk, as the external auditors are prioritising other local authorities/NHS.</li> <li>National initiatives and revised timetables for public sector audit backlogs to be completed are expected to be in place soon.</li> </ul>	4

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FSR00 10	Loss of confidence and trust by communities in Nottinghamshire due to local and national highprofile issues.	There have been a number of high profile issues within Nottinghamshire, greater detail is broken down in risks:  • FSR0022 - RAP • FSR0024 - VAWG	3 3	4	12	DCC Cooper	Training package encouraging officers and staff to take action and identify behaviour that is concerning.	3	4	<b>RS</b> 12	<ul> <li>Scoping of resources required to achieve what the Met are doing in relation to running all current employees through the PNC.</li> <li>PSD completing action plan,</li> </ul>	4
		• F5R0024 - VAWG					<ul> <li>Implementation of Government's Violence against Women and Girls Strategy and Action Plan.</li> <li>Community engagement.</li> </ul>				<ul> <li>looking at vetting issues in accordance with MET Police standards.</li> <li>Chief Constable now has Trust &amp; Confidence as one of the three</li> </ul>	
							<ul> <li>Referrals into PSD.</li> <li>The risk is reported to the Strategic Risk meeting.</li> </ul>				<ul> <li>Strategic Priorities in the Pledge.</li> <li>A new board has been established under Trust and Confidence, which draws together all controls available.</li> </ul>	
							<ul> <li>The risk is reported to FEB and to JIAC.</li> <li>We are following the latest NPCC/CoP guidance in relation</li> </ul>				<ul> <li>We are delivering all college based policing training products in relation to Trust and Confidence.</li> </ul>	
							<ul> <li>to the further vetting of staff.</li> <li>Call it Out campaign.</li> <li>OPCC Quarterly Review document with new strategic engagement approach</li> </ul>				<ul> <li>Inclusive conversation scheme implemented</li> <li>Cultural awareness action plan</li> <li>PCC Survey Work and results to the LEI board.</li> </ul>	
							All positive hits from the PND     Data Wash are being followed     up by PSD.					



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FSR00 12	Failure to meet the environmental targets proposed under the Environmental Act 2021. Failure to meet the government goal to be Carbon Zero by 2050.	There is a clear governmental directive to improve our environmental efficiency. The speed of change, along with increase in costs and demand, may make this net zero target hard to achieve, thereby potentially effecting the environment, finances and ability to operate.  Concerns that due to lack of environmental officer post, there is not the correct skillsets within the department to compliant with environmental legislation.	P 3			DCC Cooper	Solar panelling on police premises.     Investment in new buildings, which are more energy efficient and less carbon impairing.     Reduction in the size of our estate.     Integrated working such as with the Fore Service and the Council.     Risk appetite for this area is accepted given the Govt. targets are many years away.     The risk is reported to the Strategic Risk meeting.     The risk is reported to FEB and to JIAC.      Fleet department are working on the decarbonisation of the	P 2	I 3	RS 6	<ul> <li>This risk has a 'negative outlook.'</li> <li>Atkins are coming in to force to review our work in this area via the Estates Department. This review will generate an action plan for the Force to work to.</li> <li>Consultants have been tasked to create a roadmap for the Force to utilise to assist in meeting environmental goals. Force continue to work with Atkins to develop an Environmental Strategy.</li> <li>Estates and Facilities to utilise the Budget Planning Cycle for funding for a</li> </ul>	_		
							fleet.				<ul> <li>specialist Environmental Officer post. Job Description and Person Specification going through HAY Panel.</li> <li>New sustainability board chaired by the Chief Finance Officer.</li> </ul>			



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FSR00 15		The IS infrastructure across the organisation is being carefully observed because of a number of system failures over recent months.  Outages and service disruption have become more frequent for CM end users.  A full record of all issues are logged and kept up-to-date. On occasions, technology failure has resulted in business continuity plans being stood up in order to continue to provide service delivery to our communities and victims of crime. The longest outage was 36 hours with no command and control or incoming calls via SAFE (81 service requests at present with 10 identified as major since March 2022). The recent CM technological innovations have supported the BCP in respect of live chat, call-backs and SOH. However, the frequency of failures in technology, including SAFE command and control, SKYPE incoming calls, CISCO and Airwave, appear far in excess of other forces using the same technological platforms as us, and potentially highlight infrastructure deficiencies of which must be resolved in order for us to effectively service incoming demand.	4	4	16	DCC Cooper	<ul> <li>Corporate Services have placed additional resource in to fully understand the issues and support a long-term strategic remedy.</li> <li>CM and enablers are working closely with service providers including SAAB, SJS and BT.</li> <li>The recent CM technological innovations have supported the BCP in respect of live chat, call-backs and SOH.</li> <li>Scoping document for technical infrastructure review has been prepared and will be circulated with SAAB.</li> <li>The risk is reported to the Strategic Risk meeting.</li> <li>The risk is reported to FEB and to JIAC.</li> <li>Chief Supt – Corporate Services chairs regular 'Technical Infrastructure Review' meetings</li> <li>The addition of the IS Control Room SME</li> <li>Local configuration settings have been adjusted to optimise performance.</li> <li>A meeting with SAAB and senior stakeholders from both SAAB and Notts Police are held regularly.</li> </ul>	4	3	12	<ul> <li>Final Report has been received in Force, and the content was being reviewed allowing for better mitigation prospects imminently</li> <li>From the report, there were thirty-eight recommendations, of which 6 are complete, 3 are live in the pre-production and being tested before being made live, 10 are being scheduled, 2 are waiting for external specialist resource, 4 are in progress but not complete, 9 are in awaiting publication and 4 are still being discussed.</li> <li>To date, honest and open conversations have been had about the service management and quality of the support and an improvement plan has been agreed.</li> <li>Regular meetings are in place to monitor progress against the plan. This is supplemented with regular operation, tactical and strategic touch point meetings.</li> <li>Some work is taking longer as resources have had to be prioritised to focus on the upgrade and the local work for the National DCS project.</li> <li>Plans to rescore this risk post-report.</li> <li>The upgrades to SAFE and DCS were completed in January as planned. Working together with SAAB and specialist external support consultants, we are trying to identify and treat any issues. This is our joint top priority.</li> <li>The Commercial Team have reviewed the service agreement between the Force and SAAB, to ensure that meaningful metrics can be established, and the support experience is measurable. The draft is being finalised and will be shared with SAAB.</li> </ul>	3



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FSR00 17	Having an insufficient number of qualified detectives.  Specific issue in Major Crime.	The recruitment and retention of the appropriate number of detectives is a national issue for all forces which could result in inexperienced officers investigating serious crimes. It could also lead to significant pressure for those existing detectives and an inadequate level of service for victims of crime. This is a specific issue for Major Crime.  Concerns that moving inexperienced staff into these areas add additional workload to experienced staff. Potentially causing extra pressure due to training requirements.  The Force establishment for qualified detectives is 444.  As of end of January there were 238 with a further 68 in training.  The recent sergeant promotion boards have also seen a significant loss in detectives. The retention of detectives is a risk to maintaining numbers.	4	3	12	ACC Griffin	<ul> <li>Candidates sought from local universities for the graduate investigator scheme.</li> <li>Fast track to DC. Three cohorts recruited.</li> <li>Major Crime have brought in a PiP3 member of staff from the region to oversee one of the more difficult cases.</li> <li>Mentor in place to provide support and guidance for new staff.</li> <li>Recruitment plan for officers in 23/24 specifically focuses on Detective recruitment programmes.</li> <li>Police Pass purchased to assist in NIE examination rates increasing.</li> <li>TVP utilised to support retention in critical roles.</li> <li>Op Consolidation utilised (x5) to increase officer knowledge and awareness of PIP roles. The Chief Constable has agreed a new attachments process for all recruits at their week 90. They will have a mandatory six month attachment within investigations or neighbourhoods.</li> <li>Advert currently open for detective transferees.</li> <li>Continued programme of CPD</li> </ul>	3	2	6	<ul> <li>The risk will be reported to the Strategic Risk meeting.</li> <li>The risk will continue to be reported to FEB and to JIAC.</li> <li>Training courses planned for the new DS' and plans to upskill them in the next 6 months.</li> <li>Attachments process beginning in September to support areas of greatest risk.</li> <li>Review Op Consolidate data to establish progress to increase number of detectives.</li> <li>Detective Development and Resilience Programme – Action Plan</li> <li>New PIP 2 policy <ul> <li>Review of tutor payments</li> <li>There are 5 x FTDC cohorts in 2023 - 2024 that will realise a further 98 detectives over the next 12 – 18 months. There is a risk with this due to the new pathway under PCEP which means officers can apply to come off the FTDC scheme. This has seen a loss of 5 potential detectives last month.</li> <li>There is a cohort of 14 Graduate Investigators planned for this year – this is a pathway to becoming a detective.</li> <li>We have attracted 5 transferee detectives to the force who are awaiting a start date.</li> <li>A recent detectives careers fair encouraged interest in the role from the PCDA cohorts and existing police officers. A second careers fair is scheduled for later in February 2024.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	4



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FSR00 19	leading to risk of illegal detention  1. in Custody  2. following S.136.	The lack of available mental health beds results in detainees being held by police for periods in excess of the time legally allowed. The long periods of detention requires officers to remain/monitor detainees abstracting them from frontline duties and reducing operational effectiveness.  The MH triage team have been instrumental in improving working practices and communication between the agencies. This has streamlined the escalation process.  There is a national shortage of mental health beds particularly for children and PICU.	3	4	12	ACC Hooks	Monitoring and recording bed availability and daily OPEL score.  Discussions ongoing between ACC Hooks and Chief Executive of Nottinghamshire Healthcare Trust.  Ability to increase submissions to the S.136 suite as transition from custody through to escalation.  Increased scrutiny through police attendance at daily meeting regarding bed availability/flow.  Included in Phase 3 of the Right Care, Right Person programme which has National support.  Sixteen additional beds available through NHS funding.	2	4	8	<ul> <li>National reforms being sought centrally for an increase in mental health provisions.</li> <li>Working nationally and locally with NHS England for a solution as the risk remains high.</li> <li>This risk sits within Contact Management with the Mental Health Lead.</li> <li>New Bed Flow Manager in post within the NHS to assist in the management of mental health beds, there is a daily meeting held in which bed flow is discussed.</li> <li>There has been increased bed availability, however we are in a period of lower demand. (November)</li> </ul>	



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FSR00 20	sufficient	Cyber security is a risk across the organization as identified within the Annual SIRO report. Risk of cyberattacks and significant data breaches.	P 4	4	<b>RS</b> 16	DCC Cooper	<ul> <li>Cyber incident plan - owned by IS</li> <li>Cyber Security Response Action Plan - owned by IMU</li> <li>Training and education programme across the force, which is an action contained within the cyber security response action plan and is being progressed during 2024.</li> <li>As part of the above- IMU have monthly awareness articles which are added to the intranet to provide guidance and education to the force. These articles will target current emerging trends in relation to security incidents, or national guidance.</li> <li>SyAP- High level action plan (owned by IMU)</li> </ul>	P 4	2	<b>RS</b> 8	<ul> <li>Embed the plans detailed in the controls across the Force.</li> <li>Tabletop exercise completed at SLC.</li> <li>The SyAP which contains all the current controls, including cyber for the force is currently being actioned with a remedial action plan in place (owned by IMU). The SyAP actions are reviewed through the Information assurance sub group chaired by Supt Burrows which reports into IMB.</li> </ul>		



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FSR00 21	APSTRA	The force manages the capacity and capability of firearms risk via the APSTRA which currently dictates a four car patrol plan model. Due to a lack of capacity of ARV Officers the APSTRA is currently not met on an increasingly frequent basis that presents a risk to the force due to an inability to recruit and retain in the ARV role and a lack of capacity to cover overtime commitments to meet this requirement, leaving a residual risk of maintaining a sufficient firearms response.  Continued capacity challenges in ARV staffing numbers is undermining our ability to maintain our STRA patrol plan on an increasingly frequent basis. As of the 15th Nov 2023 there are 39 deployable ARV staff, upcoming and immediate retention issues are anticipated to loose a further 3 officers. With 4 cars in the STRA we require 8 officers per shift to cover them. (Min 40 ARVOs without leave/sickness etc). We are reliant as a dept on overtime to fulfil our operational requirements. The Overtime burden has begun not to be met by officers as numbers continue to dwindle. So far in 2023 we didn't meet the APSTRA for 37 shifts. The impact considers not putting out resources as APSTRA says we need to manage risk. We are working at capacity in relation to 12 hour shifts with no capacity for handovers. The establishment is 10 Sgts, 60 PCs deployable. Currently in the Force, we have 10 Sgts and 39 PCs. In an effort to meet APSTRA we are reliant on overtime this has led to officers burning out and ultimately not volunteering for overtime.  Paper taken to FEB to secure TVP payments for Firearms officers to aid retention however, this was declined. Consideration for change in shift pattern was not supported.  Following APSTRA review in Feb 2024, it was decided that as of April 1st the STRA will have a three-car patrol plan. We have delayed releases to other departments to other roles until the new recruits are deployable. Recruitment and retention of ARVs is still challenging.	4	4	16	ACC Griffin	<ul> <li>Overtime utilised. 12-hour shifts including overtime.</li> <li>Recruitment for Transferees – however we had one applicant.</li> <li>Recruitment drive for IFC course. This has recommended eleven go forward.</li> <li>Delayed release to other departments until new recruits are deployable.</li> </ul>	4	3	12	<ul> <li>FC begins in April 2024, however, concludes in August 2024. A maximum of eleven students at this stage.</li> <li>From April 1<sup>st</sup> we will operate a three-car patrol plan.</li> </ul>	3

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FSR00 22	The National Race Action Plan, created by the NPCC, highlights the potential for a loss of trust and confidence both internally and externally within policing	Nottinghamshire Police acknowledge all aspects of the RAP, and we are working to improve our service delivery both internally and externally in line with the recommendations.	4	4	16	Ch Supt Verma	Establishment of the Strategic Race Action Plan Group     Recruitment of a Strategic Race Action Plan	4	3	12	<ul> <li>Chief Constable now has Trust &amp; Confidence as one of the three Strategic Priorities in the Pledge.</li> <li>A new board has been</li> </ul>	4
	for members of the black community as a result of a series of events over a sustained period of time.						<ul> <li>Establishment of a powers board which assesses disproportionality and use of police force</li> <li>Establishment of a strategic</li> </ul>				established under Trust and Confidence, which draws together all controls available.  • We are delivering all college based policing	
							engagement group     Re-evaluation of our current IAG and ICSP forums				training products in relation to Trust and Confidence.  Black History training	
							Continuation of the work with the MBLC including innovation opportunities and youth outreach.				continues to be delivered within Force.  Inclusive conversation scheme implemented	
											<ul> <li>Cultural awareness action plan</li> <li>PCC Survey Work and results to the LEI board.</li> </ul>	
											Ongoing communication     PSD in regards to vetting	

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FSR00 24	Loss of confidence and trust by communities in Nottinghamshire due to violence against women and girls (VAWG)	The police response to Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) is significantly linked to trust and confidence from the public.  The murders of women in public open spaces nationally, including an offence perpetrated by a serving Police Officer, have contributed to a loss of confidence in the police service and heightened fear amongst women and some communities in Nottinghamshire.  These feelings have been compounded by further breaches of trust and professional standards by serving officers across UK policing, many of which are highlighted in the Baroness Casey Review.	4	4	16	ACC Griffin	Strategic governance process in place through a VAWG strategic panel (chaired by ACC Griffin), and tactical delivery panel (Chaired by Supt Maelor). Both meet quarterly.  Force has a 4P plan that is aligned to the national VAWG strategy. This feeds into the force VAWG governance boards.  Force has a specific Senior Leader (DCI) that co-ordinates strategic VAWG activity.  Range of work in place to build/develop trust and confidence: Engagement activities, including GWEN and Public Observation scheme. Partnership working with key agencies, including SVAN. Closely working with PCC office on range of projects. PSD launched a range of workstreams around PP-VAWG and general policing standards.  Newly launched Policing Code of Ethics and Race Action Plan both aligned to national VAWG framework. Our 4P plan reflects these also.  Range of new ways of working and policing delivery to improve police response to VAWG crimes/incidents  Implementation of Op Soteria – National response to investigating rape.  VAWG governance cross cuts across all policing areas and has own Power BI dashboard for all to access.	3	4	12	Plans to fully engage with national DA-Action plan when released.	4